This page contains posts and updates about Political Order and Geopolitics.
Updates:
Analysis: China’s Xi takes ‘diplomatic dance’ to Russia | Reuters
Top economist Mohamed El-Erian blames Fed for policy mistakes that can trigger a recession | Fortune
Kevin Rudd on ABC 730 – YouTube
The hopes that failed: the war in Ukraine one year on | Centre for Geopolitics (cam.ac.uk)
Russia-Ukraine War: Insights and Analysis | Harvard Kennedy School
Munich Security Conference | Centre for Geopolitics (cam.ac.uk)
Remarks by Vice President Harris at the Munich Security Conference | The White House
Exclusive interview with Prof. John J. Mearsheimer on Ukraine crisis – YouTube
The Holberg Debate | Holbergprisen (holbergprize.org)
Posts:
- ‘For a war crimes suspect nowhere is safe.’
- ‘Requiem for world order.’
- ‘Can might ensure right?’
- ‘The more institutions there are the more stable society is.’
- ‘Holberg Debate 2023.’
- ‘Two Lessons of Diplomacy’.
- ‘Is adoption of the Euro a way of both: (i) preserving the unity of the Union; and (ii) re-joining the EU?’
- ‘Annexation of territory in Ukraine – Russification is not new. It is a deeply embedded geopolitical strategy of the Russian state.’
- ‘Was China Betting on Russian Defeat All Along?’
- ‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations.’
- ‘US shifts goals on war in Ukraine amid concerns over Russia’s nuclear capabilities.’
- ‘Together we stand – divided we fall?’
- ‘Is the pen mightier than the sword?’
- ‘Is pressure mounting for UN Security Council reform?’
- ‘Cultural Heritage Safe Zones.’
- ‘No Fly Zones.’
- ‘Diplomacy and defence are not substitutes for one another – 1961 Address at University of Washington by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 25th President of the United States of America.
- ‘Cultural Heritage Funds – Can an ESG Fund be a Charitable Trust?’
- ‘Afghanistan – Transforming a geo-political fiasco into a diplomatic opportunity.’
‘For a war crimes suspect nowhere is safe’
For a war crimes suspect nowhere is safe, because all war crimes are crimes for which there is universal jurisdiction. Therefore, any State can prosecute them, i.e. they can be prosecuted anywhere and everywhere.
Once the ICC has issued an arrest warrant against a person [‘P‘] suspected of war crimes, the rhetorical question that those who belong to the same political elite or who associate with P need to ask themselves is – ‘Will I be next?’
States retain the primary responsibility in the prosecution of international crimes. Under the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I of 1977, States must prosecute people accused of war crimes before their own national courts or extradite them for trial elsewhere.
The International Criminal Court (‘ICC’), headquartered in the Hague, exercises a complementary jurisdiction in respect of international crimes, and may take up a case when either:
- a State is unable or unwilling to prosecute the suspects, which include former and serving:
- heads of state;
- government ministers;
- public officials;
- military, intelligence, and police personnel of any rank;
- members of a paramilitary group; and
- civilians; or
- the Court is requested to initiate proceedings by the UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
The ICC is an independent international organisation, and is not part of the United Nations system. To download the ICC guide, ‘Understanding the International Criminal Court’ please click on this link.
The jurisdiction of the ICC is limited to the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, including war crimes.
The ICC also has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, which include a range of acts committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population.
Together, this includes most of the serious violations of international human rights law covered by the 1949 Geneva Conventions and the 1977 Additional Protocols, whether committed during an international or non-international armed conflict.
The ‘crime of aggression’, also mentioned in the Statute, was not defined during the establishment of the Court, but will come within the ICC’s jurisdiction once it is.
Contrary to other international courts, the ICC may take action against individuals but not States.
However, nothing in the ICC Statute releases States from their obligations under existing international humanitarian law or customary international law.
War Crimes
‘All war crimes are crimes for which there is universal jurisdiction, so that any State can prosecute them. The most authoritative and convenient, list of war crimes, committed in international or internal armed conflicts, is now to be found in the ICC statute. The defence that an accused was acting under the order of a superior is available only in very limited circumstances.’ Handbook of International Law, by Anthony Aust (formerly legal advisor to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office).
Article 8 (‘War Crimes’) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court states,
- The Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of war crimes in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a large-scale commission of such crimes. 2. For the purpose of this Statute, “war crimes” means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the relevant Geneva Convention:
(i) Wilful killing;
(ii) …inhuman treatment…;
(iii) Wilfully causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health;
(iv) Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly;
(vi) Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;
(vii) …unlawful confinement;
(viii) Taking of hostages.
(b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that is, objects which are not military objectives;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally launching an attack in the knowledge that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated;
(v) Attacking or bombarding, by whatever means, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings which are undefended and which are not military objectives;
(vi) Killing or wounding a combatant who, having laid down his arms or having no longer means of defence, has surrendered at discretion;
(ix) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(xii) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xiii) Destroying or seizing the enemy’s property unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war;
(xvi) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(xvii) Employing poison or poisoned weapons;
(xviii) Employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all analogous liquids, materials or devices;
(xix) Employing bullets which expand or flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with incisions;
(xx) Employing weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering or which are inherently indiscriminate in violation of the international law of armed conflict, provided that such weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare are the subject of a comprehensive prohibition and are included in an annex to this Statute, by an amendment in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in articles 121 and 123;
(xxi) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(xxiv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;
(xxv) Intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including wilfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions;
(c) In the case of an armed conflict not of an international character, serious violations of article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the following acts committed against persons taking no active part in the hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention or any other cause:
(i) Violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture;
(ii) Committing outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment;
(iii) Taking of hostages;
(iv) The passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all judicial guarantees which are generally recognized as indispensable.
(e) Other serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the established framework of international law, namely, any of the following acts:
(i) Intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities;
(ii) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings, material, medical units and transport, and personnel using the distinctive emblems of the Geneva Conventions in conformity with international law;
(iii) Intentionally directing attacks against personnel, installations, material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping mission in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as long as they are entitled to the protection given to civilians or civilian objects under the international law of armed conflict;
(iv) Intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable purposes, historic monuments, hospitals and places where the sick and wounded are collected, provided they are not military objectives;
(v) Pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault;
(x) Declaring that no quarter will be given;
(xii) Destroying or seizing the property of an adversary unless such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of the conflict;
- Nothing in paragraph 2 (c) and (e) shall affect the responsibility of a Government to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the unity and territorial integrity of the State, by all legitimate means.
See also:
Head of State Immunity is Too Important for the International Court of Justice – Just Security
SUN7%B1:9129BK–01I:0001-K (ejil.org)
Putin Wanted by International Criminal Court Over Alleged War Crimes in Ukraine (foreignpolicy.com)
What does the ICC arrest warrant for Vladimir Putin mean in reality? | Vladimir Putin | The Guardian
House of Lords – In Re Pinochet (parliament.uk)
‘Requiem for world order’
If as ‘realists’ hold, the world is in fact anarchic, axiomaically, there is no ‘world order.’ However, if politics is ‘local’, and human nature dictates hierarchy, then whether democratically elected, an autocrat, or both – every community/society/government/state [‘S‘] naturally has a leader. In democracies and dictatorships, leaders sit at the head of a tribe/political elite/political party. Therefore, the survival of the leader depends upon the survival of the tribe. So the loyalty of the leader is divided by a conflict of interest, because when deciding what is the right thing to do, unless the leader [‘L‘] is politically suicidal, he/she will always place the interests of their ‘tribe’/core base [‘T‘]above those of society as a whole. In a democracy this structural constraint is balanced by the electorate having the right to vote the leader and his/her tribe out of power.
In realist theory, in order to survive, hegemons/aspiring hegemons [‘H‘] compete for power. This results in the creation and maintenance of spheres of influence [‘SI‘]. SI used to mean territory. Today, it includes the oceans, outer space, and cyberspace. While rights and behaviour within each of these spaces/spheres can be regulated by international treaties, norms and customs, there is no police force to enforce the rules. Therefore, the rule of international law has no teeth. However, where in a multi-polar world the L of each H recognises the existence of mutual interests e.g. trade, opportunities and ‘existential’ threats e.g. climate change and pollution – the stage is set for rising above tribalism and local politics by engaging in multi-lateral diplomacy, which may eventually lead to co-operation instead of conflict.
That begs a question – ‘What institutional architecture and tools need to be developed in order to create and maintain a practical and sustainable working relationship between the L‘s of each H, so that they can engage, and between them, construct a new world order in which each H cannot co-exist, survive, and prosper in peaceful competition with every other H on our planet and in space?’
The clock is ticking toward midnight! Whatever ‘tribe’ each L belongs to, and whatever ‘god’ their tribe may worship, I believe that as a matter of ‘survival’, it is rational to conclude that humanity needs an answer, before life as we know it is extinguished by a man-made and thus avoidable global catastrophe. Of course you may not agree. However, if you do, I would argue that this will require the displacement of ‘power politics’ by a collective recognition and universal implementation of a new geopolitical paradigm of ‘fiduciary global governance,’ so that emerging and emergent existential threats to all S‘s and their peoples, can be effectively prevented/managed, including irreversible climate change. This will of course be opposed by some and perhaps many disparate vested interests. Therefore, in order to overcome resistance, the political will must exist amongst the L‘s and their political elites/electorates, to create amongst them a shared vision of the future. Could this eventually be achieved through a process of mediation followed by multi-lateral diplomacy?
‘Can might ensure right?’
Applying practical ethics to geopolitics does might ensure right?
A counter-thesis to the ‘realist’ tenet that ‘might is right’ is the maxim, ‘Stronger together – weaker apart.’
In a multi-polar world bifurcated between a block of: (i) authoritarian states [‘A’]; and (ii) democracies [‘D’], survival is dependent upon relative strength. So, for democracies, the maxim translates into ‘might ensures right.’
Therefore, democracies need to stick together and to work together, in order to maintain dominance over A within each sphere of influence controlled by D.
Assuming that the strategic aim of A is to create division within D in order to rule, what strategy needs to be developed by D (i.e. collectively as the ‘West’), in order to thwart the strategic objectives of A in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Central Asia, the Far East and South America?
‘The more institutions there are the more stable society is’
When I was a teenage political science undergraduate at University, I was taught that ‘the more institutions there are the more stable society is’. In order for fascism to displace democracy, institutions must first crumble – which is a slow and gradual process. Mussolini compared accumulating power to ‘plucking a chicken one feather at a time, go slowly and no one notices’. As the late Madeleine Albright, former US Secretary of State, argues in ‘Fascism: A Warning’ (2019), fascism in pre-World War II Europe did not happen all of a sudden. It was incremental. Step-by-step democracy was undermined by eroding liberty. There was no overt overthrow. It can begin with the dehumanising of vulnerable people. In their book, ‘How Democracies Die – What History Reveals About Our Future’ (2018), Professors of Government at Harvard University, Stephens Levitsky & David Ziblatt argue, ‘Democracies may die at the hands not of generals but of elected leaders – presidents or prime ministers who subvert the very process that brought them to power … More often … Democracies erode slowly, in barely visible steps. … Many government efforts to subvert democracy are legal, in the sense that they are approved by the legislature or accepted by the courts. They may even be portrayed as efforts to improve democracy – making the judiciary more efficient, combating corruption, or cleaning up the electoral process. … People do not immediately realise what is happening. Many continue to believe they are living under a democracy. … Because there is no single moment- no coup, declaration of martial law, or suspension of the constitution -in which the regime obviously crosses the line into dictatorship, nothing may set off society’s alarm bells. Those who denounce government abuse may be dismissed as exaggerating or crying wolf. Democracy’s erosion is, for many, almost imperceptible. … The tragic paradox of the electoral route to authoritarianism is that democracy’s assassins use the very institutions of democracy – gradually, subtly, and even legally – to kill it.’ The professors developed a set of 4 behavioural warning signs which can help us to recognise an authoritarian when we see one – ‘we should worry when a politician (1) rejects in words or actions, the democratic rules of the game, (2) denies the legitimacy of opponents, (3) tolerates or encourages violence, or (4) indicates a willingness to curtail the civil liberties of opponents. … A politician who meets even one of these criteria is cause for concern.’ So one day, and without realising what has been happening over a period of years, you may wake up and find that you are living in an autocracy. That is why speaking out is critical to the resilience of democracy and safeguarding the rule of law so that politicians who are not above the law are held to account for their rhetoric and actions which are destructive of the institutions that bind society together in a democracy.
‘Holberg Debate 2023’
‘The Holberg Debate is an annual event organised by the Holberg Prize. The debate is inspired by Ludvig Holberg’s Enlightenment ideas and aims to explore pressing issues of our time.’
Link to the 2023 Holberg Debate: https://holbergprize.org/en/2022-holberg-debate-will-fear-keep-us-safe
The link also contains a transcript of the debate.
For information about the Holberg Prize, see: About the Holberg Prize | Holbergprisen
The 2022 Holberg Debate: “Will Fear Keep Us Safe?”
‘How will the war in Ukraine and other geopolitical crises impact the global security order, and what do they mean for the power of deterrence?’
Panel: John J. Mearsheimer and Carl Bildt
Moderator: Cecilie Hellestveit
Organizer: The Holberg Prize
John J. Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, where he has taught since 1982. He graduated from West Point (1970), has a PhD in political science from Cornell University (1981), and has written extensively about security issues and international politics. Among Mearsheimer’s six books, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (2001, 2014) won the Joseph Lepgold Book Prize; and The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy (with Stephen M. Walt, 2007), made the New York Times bestseller list and has been translated into twenty-five languages. His latest book is The Great Delusion: Liberal Ideals and International Realities (2018), which won the 2019 Best Book of the Year Award from the Valdai Discussion Conference, Moscow. In addition, Mearsheimer has a forthcoming book (with Sebastian Rosato), Homo Theoreticus: Rationality in International Politics. He has also written numerous articles and op-eds that have appeared in International Security, London Review of Books, Foreign Affairs, The Financial Times, and The New York Times. In 2003, Mearsheimer was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and in 2020, he won the James Madison Award, which is given once every three years by the American Political Science Association to “an American political scientist who has made a distinguished scholarly contribution to political science.”
Carl Bildt is Co-Chair of the European Council on Foreign Relations and contributing columnist to The Washington Post, as well as columnist for Project Syndicate. He serves as Senior Advisor to the Wallenberg Foundations in Sweden and is on the Board of Trustees of the RAND Corporation in the US. Bildt has served as both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Sweden. In March 2021, Bildt was appointed WHO Special Envoy for the Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator (ACT-Accelerator). Subsequently he served in international functions with the EU and UN, primarily related to the conflicts in the Balkans. Bildt was Co-Chairman of the Dayton peace talks on Bosnia and become the first High Representative in the country. Later, he was the Special Envoy of UN Secretary General Kofi Annan to the region.
Cecilie Hellestveit (moderator) is a lawyer and social scientist with a PhD in international humanitarian law (IHL) from the University of Oslo. She has been associated with a number of research institutes in Norway and abroad. Hellestveit researches and teaches in the field of international law, use of force, and armed conflicts.
See also:
- Special Public Lecture: The Hon. Kevin Rudd AC | Newcastle Institute
- Article Review 136 on “Proliferation and the Logic of the Nuclear Market” (issforum.org)
- Balance of Power Redux: Nuclear Alliances and the Logic of Extended Deterrence | The Chinese Journal of International Politics | Oxford Academic (oup.com)
- A Dyadid Theory of Conflict: Power And Interests In World Politics – Microsoft Word – dissertation4.doc (ohiolink.edu)
‘Two Lessons of Diplomacy’
When I was a precocious 8 year old, there was a board game we played at boarding school in front of a roaring log fire in a room surrounded by ancient armour, swords, shields, and with the mounted heads of long gone deer with antlers on the walls, on cold winter evenings called – ‘Diplomacy’. I recommend it to all young megalomaniacs who want to take over the world.
The room in which we played in my preparatory school – Nevill Holt (which is now owned by one of the founders of the Carphone Warehouse with whom I was at school at Uppingham), is where one of the Knights who murdered Archbishop Thomas Beckett in 1170 had stood, before riding out to Canterbury.
The floor was made up of grey and heavily worn down paving stones covered by a Persian rug on which me and my friends sat to play board games whilst being schooled in the art of ‘strategic Ambiguity’! with history and dark Jacobean furniture all around us. In a corner near the ceiling was the orginal Minstrel’s or Fool’s Gallery – looking down on us. We felt its presence!
The ‘deal making’ skills players develop in this game is also excellent training for budding Mediation Advocates in Contentious Probate Disputes (think of your ‘Empire’ as being an ‘Estate’!).
Of course I usually won, and naturally became the only Mediation Advocate in my year. Sadly I do not rule the world!
As a young ‘strategist’, the game taught me that the international order is ‘anarchic’ because there is no ‘higher authority’ i.e. ‘parent’ who can step in to save the players from themselves.
Human nature dictated that each player in pursuit of their own selfish i.e. ‘national’ interest, competed for power. This was measured by territory, which depended upon access to the sea (as the game was set in pre-World War 1 Imperial Europe).
‘Survival’ depended upon being bigger, more cunning, and more ruthless than your opponents – which is the psychology of ‘hegemons’ in a ‘realist’ paradigm of international relations.
One of the strategic principles which guided my tactics was ‘divide and rule’. I trusted no one and sought the trust of strategic allies who would both weaken my opponents and themselves in the process. The weaker my allies were, the more they needed me. I therefore disguised competition as co-operation.
Today, I am still a ‘Realist’ but as a ‘Mediator’, I recognise that while there is no ‘parent’ in the international order, there are higher ‘fiduciary’ principles of international relations which are existential. Therefore, ‘existential fiduciary principles of international relations’ are part of an antithesis to ‘realism’, because participants in dispute can avoid/settle their disputes by finding ‘common ground’ instead of going to war on the ‘battleground’.
As a writer I am formulating, ‘Principles of Humanitarian Mediation’, see the ‘Humanitatian Mediation’ page of this website. However, as a ‘realist’ I believe that the insecurity of nation states and their political elites will continue to drive armed conflict, just as in the game ‘Diplomacy’. However, the difference between the game and the world today, is that we live in a ‘missile’ age. Therefore, the risk of sleep-walking into war by accident is existential – as indeed WW1 proved to be to most of the Crown Heads of Europe.
‘Is adoption of the Euro a way of both: (i) preserving the unity of the Union; and (ii) re-joining the EU?’
The Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University is hosting a Zoom seminar on Monday – ‘Keir Starmer: Irish unity’s nemesis? with Sam McBride’ –
My question in advance notified earlier today (21.10.2022) is – ‘Depending upon how reunification on the island of Ireland affects the value of sterling, could there be an economic benefit of the Union (including Scotland) adopting the Euro in order to re-join the EU? If the answer is yes, is that an economic reason for Northern Ireland remaining in the Union?’
About the seminar – ‘For more than a decade, the Union has been under intense pressure in Scotland as well as, more recently, in Northern Ireland. The apparent fallout from Brexit and perceived errors by the DUP have invigorated what had been a moribund campaign for Irish unity. Many Irish nationalists believe that the reunification of Ireland is inevitable, while many unionists fear that they might be right. But how much of that thinking is tied to immediate circumstances that the entry of Keir Starmer to Downing Street could reverse?’
Speaker – Sam McBride is the Northern Ireland Editor of the Belfast Telegraph and the Sunday Independent. He also writes about Northern Ireland for The Economist and was previously Political Editor of the Belfast News Letter. His 2019 book Burned: The Inside Story of the Cash-for-Ash Scandal and Northern Ireland’s Secretive New Elite became a Sunday Times and Irish Times bestseller and was nominated for the Christopher Ewart-Biggs Memorial Prize. He is a regular presence on radio and television, giving analysis of events that impact Northern Irish politics.
Discussant: Professor Michael Kenny, Director of the Bennett Institute for Public Policy, Cambridge.’ (Google ‘The Centre for Geopolitics’).
‘Annexation of territory in Ukraine – Russification is not new. It is a deeply embedded geopolitical strategy of the Russian state.’
During a Zoom webinar hosted by the Centre for Geopolitics on 20 September (which is available to watch on YouTube), the third speaker, Sir Stuart Peach, former Chief of the Defence Staff and Chairman of the Military Committee of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) observed the ‘Russification’ is not a new issue. He argued that:
- This is not a new issue.
- This year we have seen in the raw behaviour of Russia many continuities with the Russian Empire, Russian time and beyond.
- These continuities apply equally to Russian attitudes Georgia to the Caucasus to the Black Sea to Russia East or their ongoing disputes with Japan.
- So, in other words there are many continuities in Russian policy which stands both the test of time and indeed the change in regime.
- That continuity is going to be stretched in the next few days as we saw the last few minutes the announcement of referenda in occupied territories in Ukraine.
- That sets some new challenges because one of the other things that is common to both the period of the Russian Empire and more recent events under resident Putin’s this concept of Russification, where places and peoples are made Russian to suit the geopolitical strategic purpose of the Russian state, empire, Soviet Union, in its various guises, and Kaliningrad was exactly that.
- Events in 1944/5 struck a chord – ‘where the chess pieces were moving rapidly and some of the maneuvers were more thought through than others.’
- Sir Stuart was struck by how many consequences there were of both world wars and the wholesale movement of peoples, which left minorities of various types stranded, and that the leaves future opportunities for either Russian meddling or bad behavior.
- ‘Russia is a peaceful country surrounded by ceasefires. … This sense of creating a periphery with options for future development with options possibly for technology, possibly maritime adventures [adding]…. in this strategic context, noting that the Centre is about Geopolitics, a very similar approach to Russian basing in Syria .. the Czars would have been entirely comfortable with Putin’s attempt to create a naval base and an air base in Syria for medium and long term thereby gaining access to warm water. … And yet, despite the history, despite the Russification and continuity in Russian behavior, I would argue that Russia is failing to meet its strategic objectives, that it set itself.’
- ‘Many of us for many years have wondered and worried perhaps about the true competence and consequence of the Russian military machine. … [Quoting the military historian John Keegan], “an army without discipline is a crowd”. I think morale factors and unit level morale issues and tactical issues in the Russian army are now a significant issue…. So there is not much new in Russian threats and style, but we are entering into a dangerous time and phase.’
- ‘One of the great strengths of NATO is its convening authority to bring countries together and for their armed forces to interoperate. … We need to go further. … Most missiles can be counted or deterred. Therefore one thing we should be doing now in the strategic setting of NATO and beyond is thinking about deterrence in a wider way. … Missiles need to be understood, so we need good intelligence, then you need to develop counters so you need good technology and those counters may not be the obvious ones because many embraced tactics and techniques that are not just as obvious as shooting them down. So this is a very important time for military is to use the innovative strategy NATO adopted at the summit this year and to develop new capabilities quickly to reflect the missile age we are in so that we can counter both through deterrence and if necessary defend ourselves.’
- ‘There needs [also] to be more focus on the maritime dimension.’ (This comment was added in reply to the reply to a question I had put about containment).
The geopolitics of Kaliningrad – YouTube
‘Was China Betting on Russian Defeat All Along?‘
‘The key geopolitical factor in Sino-Russian relations above all is Siberia. [A]chieving safe access to Siberia’s natural resources is a core geopolitical interest for China. [It] can achieve this [i] via [an] alliance with Russia [or], [ii] [a land] grab [of] Siberia or parts of it by force. In the case of an alliance the weaker Russia is the better for China. Regarding [ii] Siberia is strategically vulnerable to China to a great degree in many ways. Knowing the history of Sino-Russian relations, a Russian victory doesn’t seem to be in China’s interest. What is in China’s interest is a prolonged war of attrition, draining Russia’s resources as much as possible, weakening it as much as possible, meanwhile isolating it from the West as much as possible, and with a Russian defeat at the end. Given the fact that China seems to have been aware of the Russian plans to invade Ukraine from the very beginning, and encouraged Russia to do so, only to roll back its support once the war started, this all suggests that China may have been betting on a Russian defeat all along. A Russian victory would definitely not be in the interest of China. By raising the population of the Eurasian Union, Russia’s broader sphere of influence, from 185 million to 226 million through the incorporation of Ukraine, and enhancing Russia’s strategic positions against the NATO and EU by eliminating a buffer country of 41 million inhabitants, Russia would become significantly stronger than it was before the war, and such a change would be close in geopolitical terms to a kind of re-establishment of the Soviet Union. Significantly stronger, which means less willing to cooperate with China, more willing to pursue its own great power agenda, to pursue it to a degree where it may even harm Chinese interests, aiming to position itself as a third player between the US and China equal to both, rather than the ally of China. … However, a Russian defeat, which still seems to be possible, especially if it comes at the end of a prolonged war of attrition, significantly weakening Russia and isolating it from the West at the same time, would put it in a position where it would hardly have any other choice but to become a junior partner in a Sino-Russian alliance, if not a mere satellite of China. Russia’s military might, that which made it so far appear as China’s equal, has not only shown through this war to be way less formidable than the world thought, but has also suffered heavy losses, and will continue to suffer heavy losses as long as the war goes on. Such a weakened Russia, isolated from the West, would have little choice but to ally itself with China on whatever terms the latter demands. This would provide China with a committed and docile strategic ally, and with access to the natural resources of Siberia. The only major danger for China in case of a Russian defeat is the possibility of a pro-Western regime change. … Regarding the probability of Russia weakening as a result of the war, such a change will certainly happen if it ends with anything sort of an outright Russian victory. Moreover, Russia will likely end up not only weakened but weakened in a way that it will most likely never again achieve the position it had among the great powers of the world before the war. Russia’s demographic and economic resources are in fact so weak, that what is surprising is not the weakness its military shows in Ukraine, but more how it managed to remain so strong so long after the fall of the Soviet Union.’ [Further extract form the geopolitical Monitor Situation Report].
‘Situation Report in the Geopolitical Monitor – April 25, 2022 by Csaba Barnabas Horvath.’ (Truncated). Was China Betting on Russian Defeat All Along? | Geopolitical Monitor
‘While Chinese military planners are not forecasting war, the war for which they are preparing pits China against the US at sea. Chinese military strategists … are preparing for maritime conflict with a forward defense strategy based on controlling the seas near China within the first island chain, which runs from Japan, through Taiwan, to the Philippines and the South China Sea. … The US has signaled, that in case of war, its carriers would remain behind the first island chain. From that distance, carrier-based aircraft would be unable to reach targets on the Chinese mainland. Thus, the US navy has been struggling to find a way these aircraft carriers and their planes can remain relevant. [The 2015 RAND study] “The US-China Military Scorecard” … concludes that over the next five to fifteen years “Asia will witness a progressively receding frontier of US dominance.” This will pose for the US the prospect of a conventional conflict it could actually lose. … While the US may at times be fixated by events in the South China Sea or East China Sea, Chinese will expect Americans to eventually pivot back to ongoing wars in the Middle East, or Russian threats to Europe, or its problems at home. [Beijing] will be cautious and prudent about any lethal use of force against the US. Instead, by gradually changing facts on the ground and in the waters throughout the South China Sea and adopting to resistance encounters, as in the game of weiqi, the Chinese will win by the accumulation of overwhelming advantages. Furthermore, China will be strategic with Chinese characteristics, treating military force as a subordinate instrument in the orchestration of its foreign policy, which seeks not victory in battle that the achievement of national objectives. It will bolster diplomatic and economic connections with its neighbors, deepening their dependency on China, and use economic leveraged to encourage (or coerce) cooperation on other issues. In doing so, it hopes to increase influence on its periphery while also undermining the relationships between its neighbors and the United States. It may attempt to use “Barbarians” against “Barbarians” to prevent a balancing coalition from forming against China – for instance, by playing Japan against South Korea, or Russia against the US. In time, Beijing will achieve such preponderance of power that others in the region will simply accept its dominance not just as inevitable, but also as irresistible.’ Extract from ‘’Destined for War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap’ by Graham Allison (2017).
‘Russia’s military doctrine encompasses a broad range of potential national security threats, including local, or small-scale wars, regional, or large-scale wars, internal and foreign military threats, the Russian military’s budget, and a host of military-related technical, political, social, and economic issues. Additionally, the doctrine defines the circumstances under which nuclear weapons are to be used by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in response to a threat to Russia’s national security. The current edition of the Russian military doctrine—when compared to the national security strategy and military doctrine published in 1993—significantly lowers the threshold under which the use of nuclear weapons is permitted. While the 1993 doctrine allowed the first use of nuclear weapons only when the “existence of the Russian Federation” is threatened, the versions published since 2000 explicitly state that Russia “reserves the right to use nuclear weapons to respond to all weapons of mass destruction attacks” on Russia and its allies.’ [‘Escalate To De-Escalate: Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy by Joshua Bell published in Global Security Review 07.03.2022]: Escalate to De-Escalate: Russia’s Nuclear Deterrence Strategy (globalsecurityreview.com)
‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations’
[The following is an extract form my essay a ‘Fiduciary Theory of Art’ on the ‘Mediation of Art & Cultural Heritage Disputes’ page at www.carlislam.co.uk
‘Viewing future conflicts through the hard geo-political lens of the international relations doctrine of ‘Offensive Realism’, the rules of war under International Law (in particular under International Humanitarian Law [‘IHL’] are not an effective deterrent to the destruction of Cultural Heritage, because if an invading sovereign state is a hegemon/an aspiring hegemon [‘H‘], and the political logic underlying invasion is survival (i.e. because the political psychology of H is that it must dominate to survive), then achieving its political objectives requires the deliberate destruction of Cultural Heritage. This is based upon what the author calls, ‘Machiavelli’s Principle of Survival’ [‘MPS’] – see above.
Furthermore, the Achilles Heel of IHL is that to prosecute a violation you must be able to prove that the destruction of e.g. a monument, church or library was deliberately targeted. Even if you could prove this intent, there is no international police force to deter the destruction of Cultural Heritage before it happens, i.e. IHL has no political, diplomatic or military teeth.
Because of the strategic significance and value of Cultural Heritage (which in the opinion of the author is often completely misunderstood by politicians, policy makers, diplomats and the military), is there a better way of deterring the destruction of Cultural Heritage in war?
The author argues that there is, and that as part of this vision:
(i) The protection of Cultural Heritage needs to be integrated into a grand strategy in confronting and defeating an enemy during war – not least because of the paradox that when the enemy destroys part of a shared Cultural Heritage, it is destabilising its own society, because it is destroying part of: (i) its own identity; and (ii) a historical legacy owned by its own people. Therefore, its own people will inevitably ask – ‘who and what are we fighting for – the survival of a political elite (‘them’) or ourselves (‘us’).’
(ii) There is an urgent need to explore innovative and practical mechanisms that will allow non-state actors (NSA’s), to ensure the sustainable protection of Cultural Heritage. This is linked to the use of ‘Cultural Heritage Diplomacy’ as an instrument in the mediation of a peace process and agreement.
The author concludes that:
(i) Universally recognised fiduciary principles for the protection and preservation of Cultural Heritage exist under IHL.
(ii) These fiduciary principles can cohere as an ethical foundation for:
(a) the development of an integrated strategic framework for the protection of Cultural Heritage in a conflict zone; and
(b) its implementation, though a process of ‘humanitarian’ mediation.
The author further argues, that as a matter of practical application, (i) and (ii) above are strategically linked to:
(iii) Principles for the peaceful resolution through a process of multilateral ‘Cultural Heritage Diplomacy‘ of the apparently irreconcilable conflict between:
(a) the ethical duty of a state and its government to behave as a ‘fiduciary of humanity’; and
(b) the political instincts and ambitions of H in an ‘offensive realism’ paradigm – i.e. their impulse to destroy cultural heritage and its symbols in order to suppress and indoctrinate by erasing the cultural memory of the people H is oppressing.
(iv) The development of a unified and coherent international relations doctrine of ‘Fiduciary Principled Behaviour’ – i.e. the political idea that states and governments can maximise their survival and gains through collaboration, instead of competition, because ‘competition’ leads to ‘confrontation’ which can result in war.
(v) The mediation of a process and protocol for the preservation and protection of Cultural Heritage in a conflict zone by a politically non-aligned non-state actor (‘NSA‘), as a foundation stone in the negotiation of a sustainable and enduring peace process and agreement, based upon recognition of shared values, interests, realpolitik, and practical ethics.
Are fiduciary principles and norms underlying IHL a tool in the negotiation of a peace process and agreement?
If fiduciary principles are a cornerstone of IHL, are they a potential negotiation tool in the mediation of a peace process and agreement?
As the author observed above, there is a tension between the:
(a) common ground [‘CG’] represented by a shared cultural heritage (including a set of ethical, philosophical and religious values/beliefs); and
(b) political ambitions and objectives [‘PA’] that drive military strategy in war.
A logical corollary of MPS, is that where CG exists between an invading state and an invaded state, that the invader must destroy part of itself in order to achieve its political objective(s). Analysing the psychology of an invasion through the lens of an ‘Offensive Realism’ paradigm (see Mearsheimer, John J. (2014) The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics), if an invading sovereign state is a hegemon/an aspiring hegemon), i.e. H, and the political logic underlying invasion is survival, i.e. because a hegemon must dominate, then there is a paradox because PA requires the destruction of CG. In other words, to achieve its political objectives, H must destroy part of itself.
Therefore, invasion may be a political mistake. The miscalculation is that instead of H becoming stronger it will actually weaken itself, because by invading a state with a shared cultural heritage, H will to an extent destroy its own cultural identity. If that happens then over time, institutionally H may become unstable and ungovernable, resulting ultimately in the political break-up of H. In other words, institutionally, the destruction of CG by H is an act of political self-destruction.
The existential question for H then becomes, how do they end the war without ending up being in a worse position than they were in before it, in order to:
(i) preserve the status quo within H itself; and
(ii) restore the balance of power (i.e. the status quo ante) between H and other hegemons and aspiring hegemons in the region/world, including H‘s political allies – who may pursue their own self interest at the expense of H, if H becomes politically unstable, i.e. by annexing territory that H can no longer politically control, i.e. because its military capability and economy have been weakened.
If the author is right, then the calculus of risk by H is a dynamic that can influence a decision by H to end a war by positively engaging in mediation.
In other words, the fiduciary principles and norms that underly IHL are a tool in the negotiation of a peace process and agreement. Arguably, these principles are powerful tool, because violation, i.e. the impact of war on CG, may adversely affect public opinion within H and weaken support for the war.
When the political strategy of H is to create a failed state [‘FS‘], where it has failed in its primary objective to turn the invaded state into a client state, then the preservation and protection of cultural heritage in the invaded state, is arguably elevated to the level of being a threat to the national security of any other state in the region [S], because there is a risk of a failed state emerging within S‘s geo-political sphere of influence. If the destruction of CG has the potential to politically destabilise H, then it follows that S also has a national security interest in the survival of H. Therein, and counter-intuitively, lies the seed of a principle that can result in the mediation of terms of peace which ensure the survival of both H and the sovereign state invaded by H. If this geo-political interest is recognised by all parties to the conflict and their supporters, then this can open up a dialogue which includes the use of cultural heritage as a language of diplomacy, to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement. This is where a politically non-aligned NSA can play an instrumental diplomatic and mediation role.’
‘US shifts goals on war in Ukraine amid concerns over Russia’s nuclear capabilities’
‘US shifts goals on war in Ukraine amid concerns over Russia’s nuclear capabilities’ – PBS Newshour 5 May. A link to the full transcript appears below.
[During the past few months the Biden administration’s rhetoric about its ultimate goals for Ukraine appears to have shifted, with more talk about winning the war against Russia. Evelyn Farkas, executive director of the McCain Institute at Arizona State University, and John Mearsheimer, political science professor at the University of Chicago, join Judy Woodruff to discuss].
John Mearsheimer, political science professor at the University of Chicago.
‘I think … this policy that the Biden administration is following is remarkably dangerous and foolish.
We know that the one circumstance in which a great power is likely to use nuclear weapons is when its survival is threatened, when it thinks a decisive defeat is being inflicted on it.
And what the Biden administration is bent on doing is inflicting a decisive defeat on Russia. We are threatening its survival. We are presenting the Russians with an existential threat. And this, again, is the one circumstance where they might use nuclear weapons.
And I think we should be going to enormous lengths to make sure that we don’t put them into a position where they even countenance using nuclear weapons, much less use them.
I think it’s very important to understand that, if [Putin] were to use nuclear weapons, he would use them, in all likelihood, in Western Ukraine.
And there are no NATO or American forces in Western Ukraine. So he would not be attacking us. He would be using those weapons in Ukraine. And the question is, what do we do then? And I’m not sure what we would do then. Would we use nuclear weapons? Would we then get dragged into the war?
When Professor Farkas talks about the consequences of this for the world order, I’m more worried about the consequences if we ended up getting hit with nuclear weapons. I mean, we want to remember what President Kennedy did during the Cuban Missile Crisis. He was in a similar situation. What he did was, he tried to dampen the conflict. He tried to work out some sort of deal with Khrushchev, so we could both avoid getting vaporized.
What the Biden administration is doing is exactly the opposite. It’s upping the ante. It’s putting Putin in a position where he might very well use nuclear weapons. Again, I think this is remarkably foolish.’
Evelyn Farkas, executive director of the McCain Institute at Arizona State University.
‘I think [Putin is] most likely to use [tactical nuclear weapons], if he feels that there will be no consequences for him, if he thinks that we will not counter with a nuclear use — I know it’s a horrible thing to contemplate, but that is how deterrence works — or if he thinks that we will not enter the war directly.
And, actually, I think that I’m not sure whether our government would actually use nuclear force in response, though we have to say that because that’s part of deterrence. But what I do think is that, if there’s a nuclear use, if the nuclear taboo comes off, if nuclear weapons are used for the first time since World War II — and Vladimir Putin may well do that if he thinks we won’t respond — I think President Biden will then enter the war directly.
That doesn’t mean troops on the ground, but it means that Russia will lose.
So, I think that Vladimir Putin is likely smart enough to understand the danger for himself. He’s not going to reach for a nuclear weapon right now. He is already proceeding, I think, a little bit more cautiously, from what we can see. Of course, it remains to be seen how this all ends, but he’s not interested in taking on the United States and NATO.’
Full transcript of the discussion: U.S. shifts goals on war in Ukraine amid concerns over Russia’s nuclear capabilities | PBS NewsHour
‘Together we stand – divided we fall?’
Because fiduciary principles are a cornerstone of International Humanitarian Law [‘IHL’], then in theory, could a strategy to confront and defeat an invading state (‘S‘) be strengthened by integrating Cultural Heritage as an indirect tool of psychological influence and diplomacy?
This might have four aims:
(a) To drive a wedge between (i) S and (ii) it is own people, i.e. young conscripts [‘P‘], provided public opinion matters to S. The underlying rationale being that P will inevitably ask ‘why are we destroying our shared cultural heritage, i.e. who and what are we fighting for? – the survival of a ‘political elite’ in power in S (‘them‘) or P (‘us‘). That is linked to political stability within S, and is therefore a risk that must be weighed by S in a mediation about peace, just as a ‘litigation risk’ must be weighed by the parties in a mediation about a civil dispute.
(b) To drive a wedge between (i) S and (ii) it allies, e.g. by linking the award of re-construction contracts (to rebuild critical infrastructure destroyed by S in the invaded state) to the withdrawal of political support for S in the UN, as there is a universal fiduciary duty under international law to protect and preserve Cultural Heritage.
(c) Mediation of a peace process of agreement to end the war.
(d) To re-design and reform the institutional architecture of International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’), because the strength and influence of IHL as a pillar of global ‘fiduciary’ governance is relevant to National Security, i.e. because ‘together we stand and divided we fall.’
There is a tension between the:
(a) common ground [‘CG’] represented by a shared cultural heritage (including a set of ethical, philosophical and religious values/beliefs); and
(b) political ambitions and objectives [‘PA’] that drive military strategy in war.
A logical corollary of Machiavelli’s Principle of Survival (as I have defined it above) [‘MPS‘], is that where CG exists between an invading state and an invaded state, that the invader must destroy part of itself in order to achieve its political objective(s). Analysing the psychology of an invasion through the lens of an ‘Offensive Realism’ paradigm (see Mearsheimer, John J. (2014) The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition), Norton in the Research Bibliography and: Offensive realism – Wikipedia if an invading sovereign state is a hegemon (or an aspiring hegemon) [‘H’] and the political logic underlying invasion is survival, i.e. because a hegemon must dominate, then there is a paradox because PA requires the destruction of CG. In other words, to achieve its political objectives, H must destroy part of itself.
Therefore, invasion may be a political mistake. The miscalculation is that instead of H becoming stronger it will actually weaken itself, because by invading a state with a shared cultural heritage, H will to an extent destroy its own cultural identity. If that happens then over time, institutionally H may become unstable and ungovernable, resulting ultimately in the political break-up of H. The existential question for H then becomes, how do they end the war without ending up being in a worse position than they were in before it, in order to:
(i) preserve the status quo within H itself; and
(ii) restore the balance of power (i.e. the status quo ante) between H and other hegemons and aspiring hegemons in the region/world.
If I am right, then the calculus of risk by H is a dynamic that can influence a decision by H to end a war in Mediation. In other words, the fiduciary principles and norms which underly IHL are a tool in the negotiation of a peace process and agreement. It is a powerful tool, because the impact of war on CG, may influence public opinion within H and weaken support for the war.
When the political strategy of H is to create a failed state [‘FS‘], after it has failed in its primary objective to turn the invaded state into a client state, then the preservation and protection of cultural heritage in the invaded state, is arguably elevated to the level of being a threat to UK national security, becuase there is a risk of a failed state emerging within the UK’s neighbouring geo-political sphere of influence, i.e. in the heart of Europe. If the destruction of CH has the potential to politically destabilise H, then it follows that the UK also has a national security interest in the survival of H. Therein, and counter-intuitively, lies the seed of a principle that can result in the mediation of terms of peace which ensure the survival of both H and the sovereign state invaded by H. If this geo-political interest is recognised by all parties to the conflict and their supporters, then this can open up a dialogue which includes the use of cultural heritage as a language of diplomacy, to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement. This is where a politically non-aligned non-state actor (‘NSA’) can play an instrumental diplomatic and mediation role.
‘Is the pen mightier than the sword?’
Positioning for peace by restoring balance through multi-lateral diplomacy, coalition building, treaties and a reformed institutional framework – is the pen mightier than the sword?
In ‘The Tragedy of Great Power Politics’ (2014), published by Norton, John J. Mearsheimer (R. Wendell Distinguished service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago), explains that while security competition is endemic to daily life in the international system, war is not. Therefore, security competition rarely gives way to war. So what does? ‘The main causes of war are located in the architecture of the international system. What matters most is the number of great powers and how much power each controls. The system can be either bipolar or multipolar. The power ratios among all the great powers affect the prospects for stability, but the key ratio is that between the two most formidable states in the system. If there is a lopsided power gap, the number one state is a potential hegemon. A system that contains an aspiring hegemon is said to be unbalanced. A system without such a dominant state is said to be balanced. The basic requirement for balance is that there not be a marked difference in power between the two leading states. If there is, the system is unbalanced. Unbalanced multipolar systems are dominated by three or more great powers, one of which is a potential hegemon. Unbalanced multipolar systems feature the most dangerous distribution of power, mainly because the potential hegemon is likely to get into wars with all of the other great powers in the system. These wars inevitably turn out to be long and enormously costly. A [problem] with multipolarity lies in its tendency to foster miscalculation. Multipolarity lead states to underestimate the resolve of rival states and the strength of the opposing coalitions. States then mistakenly conclude that they have the military capability to coerce an opponent, or if that fails, to defeat it in battle. War is more likely when a state underestimates the willingness of an opposing state to stand firm on issues of difference. It then may push the other state too far, expecting the other to concede when in fact it will choose to fight. Such miscalculation is more likely under multipolarity because the shape of the international order tends to remain fluid, due to the tendency of coalitions to shift. As a result, the nature of the agreed international rules of the road – norms of state behaviour, and agreed divisions of territorial rights and other privileges – tend to change constantly. Under the circumstances, one state may unwittingly push another too far, because ambiguities as to national rights and obligations leave a wider range of issues on which each state may misjudge the other’s resolve. War is also more likely when states underestimate the relative power of an opposing coalition, either because they underestimate the number of states who will oppose them, or because they exaggerate the number of allies who will fight on their own side. Such errors are more likely in a system of many states, since states then must accurately predict the behaviour of many other states in order to calculate the balance of power between coalitions. Even assuming that the state knows who is going to fight with and against it, measuring the military strength of multistate coalitions is considerably more difficult than assessing the power of a single rival.’
See also:
- Alex Stubb on why Mearsheimer is wrong about the war in Ukraine • European University Institute (eui.eu)
- EUIdeas | John Mearsheimer’s lecture on Ukraine: Why he is wrong and what are the consequences
‘Is pressure mounting for UN Security Council reform?’
‘Member States must now take sides and choose between peace and aggression’ (see below) – 18.03.2022 Reuters News announced ‘Top Ex-Kremlin Official Quits Post After Condemning Ukraine War.’ The official was a former Russian deputy prime minister.
The problem with Ukraine is that there is no one who today can effectively provide an observance of the International Humanitarian Law Rules. No international peacekeeping mission is possible because Russia is blocking Security Council action.
At the diplomatic level, is pressure mounting for UN Security Council reform? Russia is being investigated for War Crimes, and the pressure for urgent reform mounts with every war crime committed against the people of Ukraine. See: ‘As Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine Creates New Global Era, Member States Must Take Sides, Choose between Peace, Aggression, General Assembly Hears – Delegates Urge All Parties to Respect Principles of United Nations Charter, Speakers Representing Small, Developing States Decry ‘Might Makes Right’ Concept – At the dawn of a new era forced upon the world by the Russian Federation’s war in Ukraine, Member States must now take sides and choose between peace and aggression, delegates said today as the General Assembly moved into the second day of its emergency special session. [The emergency special session — the eleventh called since the founding of the United Nations — opened on 28 February, meeting less than 24 hours after being mandated to do so by a vote in the Security Council, following its failure to adopt a resolution condemning the Russian Federation’s recent actions in Ukraine.’ Press Releases SC/14808 and SC/14809 for details.][01.03.2022]: As Russian Federation’s Invasion of Ukraine Creates New Global Era, Member States Must Take Sides, Choose between Peace, Aggression, General Assembly Hears | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases (un.org)
See also:
- UNESCO’s military manual of 2016: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000246633 (This gathers all major rules of conduct in relation to cultural heritage in armed conflicts).
- The role of the international community: https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/182
- The Rise of Safe Havens for Threatened Cultural Heritage | International Journal of Cultural Property | Cambridge Core
- Protection of Cultural Heritage: BL-4_C.qxd (coe.int)
- UNESCO strengthens action to safeguard cultural heritage under attack – UNESCO World Heritage Centre
- The Safety and Security of Cultural Heritage in Zones of War or Instability | IOS Press
- Cultural Heritage Policy of the International Criminal Court: https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20210614-otp-policy-cultural-heritage-eng.pdf
- Functions and Powers | United Nations Security Council
- United Nations Security Council |
- Security Council reforms must reflect 21st century realities, says UN Assembly President | | UN News
- Will Ukraine’s tragedy spur UN Security Council reform? (brookings.edu)
- Security Council Reform (Why Must the Security Council be Reformed?) | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (mofa.go.jp)
‘Cultural Heritage Safe Zones’
Cultural Heritage Safe Zones as an instrument of Humanitarian Mediation’ – This is the proposed title of one of my three essays for the Diploma in Art Law Course at the Institute of Art & Law in London. For the current draft introduction to the essay, please visit the ‘Mediation of Art Disputes’ page at www.ihtbar.com. The thesis of the essay is ‘Could Cultural Heritage diplomacy be a neutral method of mediating a ceasefire to create a network of humanitarian corridors, i.e. by designating certain areas as “Cultural Heritage Safe Zones” and linking them up?’ In the essay I will also discuss:
(i) The relationship between the human environment, development and culture, because all civilisations spring from and are shaped by the quality of their surrounding natural elements and the histories of different peoples are inseparable from the natural conditions in which they have lived for millennia. In other words, art, literature and science cannot be understood, or even imagined, without acknowledging the influence of nature and its components. Thus, cultural diversity, like biological diversity, emerges from the various ecosystems.
(ii) The link between illicit trafficking and:
(a) organised crime;
(b) money-laundering; and
(c) terrorist financing.
(iii) Why cultural identity is considered to part of human dignity, and is linked to human rights, i.e. because cultural heritage is of crucial importance to individuals and communities as part of their identity. I will also argue that since cultural heritage requires memory, this applies to both tangible and intangible heritage, because material and physical heritage needs to be placed in both a historical and cultural context, in order to understand its value.
(iv) Why mediation is a powerful tool in Cultural Heritage D #humanrights #culture #law iplomacy, and that at its centre are ‘norms’ of behaviour, which theoretically apply with equal vigour to private law claims, i.e. there is a bridge between public international law claims, and private law claims when art becomes cultural heritage. That bridge is the fiduciary doctrine of Jus Cogens.
As the war in Ukraine has brought into sharp focus, there is no one who today can effectively provide any observance of the International Humanitarian Law Rules. No international peacekeeping mission is possible, because Russia is blocking Security Council action. Therefore, the designation of an area as a ‘Cultural Heritage Safe Zone’ is also linked to two other issues that I will discuss:
(i) the powers and procedures of the UN Security Council; and
(ii) reform of the UN Security Council.
See:
Vatican Diplomacy – Diplomat Magazine
The Vatican and International Diplomacy on JSTOR
Vatican Secret Diplomacy (culturaldiplomacy.org)
The language and tools of Cultural Heritage Diplomacy enable a Mediation framework to be jointly developed by those at War by identifying common ground, i.e. a shared cultural heritage, and the connection between: (i) protecting cultural heritage; and (ii) preserving the environment, e.g. where there is a risk of nuclear contamination because a nuclear power plant is located in the War Zone and could be attacked.
In cultural heritage disputes there is a philosophical and legal nexus between the existence of ethical standards and norms of behaviour in relation to antiquities and cultural heritage (which includes landscape). Because formulating international ‘ethical’ duties of care and standards (i.e. framing and institutionalisation), that are capable of practical implementation, monitoring, and enforcement involves multi-lateral diplomacy, Mediation is an incubation tool in Cultural Heritage Diplomacy.
Norms are linked to the existence of fiduciary duties. This is an evolving question that is linked to the concept of global fiduciary governance in the form of treaty-making and multi-lateral co-operation.
My theory is that when art [‘A’] is of cultural significance, i.e. is recognised as being cultural property [‘CP’], it forms part of a recognised heritage. If then in either a narrow or a broad sense, it becomes part of civilization and a record of human evolution (i.e. part of the consciousness and collective memory of mankind), public duties do or should attach to possession. In particular, the possessor [‘P’] who owns A under private law that is also CP, is also a custodian of the object [‘CPO’]. In which case, fiduciary duties attach to possession, e.g. a duty to preserve and protect the cultural property [‘DP’] (including an underwater site). If P is a state, these duties extend to protecting the CP in the event of war. Therefore, DP is a quintessentially fiduciary duty. The underlying premise is that every civilized society is a fiduciary of humanity, and so are their governments.
There is also a relationship between the human environment, development and culture. The commentary to the preamble to the Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (5th edition, IUCN Switzerland 2015) states:
‘All civilisations spring from and are shaped by the quality of their surrounding natural elements [and that] the histories of different peoples are inseparable from the natural conditions in which they have lived for millennia. … Art, literature and science cannot be understood, or even imagined, without acknowledging the influence of nature and its components. Thus, cultural diversity, like biological diversity, emerges from the various ecosystems.’
Since the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 1972 (the ‘1972 Stockholm Declaration’) stated that ‘Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat which are now gravely imperilled …’, and this ‘special responsibility’ includes a duty to restore and maintain the integrity of the environment, the existence of fiduciary duties in relation to cultural heritage is linked to wider: environmental; strategic; legal; and policy issues, i.e. international law applying to activities on the high seas and on the continental shelf.
The big question is ‘What ethical standards of behaviour do these duties give rise to?’ This is linked to:
(i) international humanitarian law;
(ii) the protection and preservation of cultural property; and
(iii) illicit trafficking of art and antiquities.
The problem of illicit trafficking is further linked to:
(a) organised crime;
(b) money-laundering; and
(c) terrorist financing.
Because cultural identity is considered to part of human dignity, it is linked to human rights, i.e. cultural heritage is of crucial importance to individuals and communities as part of their identity. Since cultural heritage requires memory, this applies to both tangible and intangible heritage, because material and physical heritage needs to be placed in both a historical and cultural context, in order to understand its value.
That is why mediation is a powerful tool in cultural heritage diplomacy, and at its centre are ‘norms’ of behaviour, which theoretically apply with equal vigour to private law claims, i.e. there is a bridge between public international law claims, and private law claims when art becomes cultural heritage. That bridge is the fiduciary doctrine of Jus Cogens.
Therefore this theory is not only about mediation, it is also about the fundamental values humanity attaches to Art and Cultural Heritage, because those values can translate into norms of behaviour that can be building blocks for reaching agreement in a mediation about art and cultural heritage between both private parties and states.
This is the subject of an article I will be writing in 2022 for a Diploma in ‘Art Law’ at the Institute of Art & Law in London. See the ‘Mediation of Art Disputes’ page at www.ihtbar.com.
‘No Fly Zones’
‘Air power can only be used effectively to coerce or deter if it is used in accordance with these ends. It can be called in to support a force on the ground and attack the targets indicated by the force as threatening it; and it can react to any aircraft ignoring the NFZ [No Fly Zone] and shoot it down. If it is to deter or coerce, then the opponent has to believe that targets that matter to him will be struck effectively, even if they are not necessarily those that he is risking in battle. He must also believe that you will escalate if you do not succeed in getting him to succumb at first, and that the outcome would be to his disadvantage. One is in effect negotiating by threatening or using force, in confrontation not conflict.’(‘The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World’ [2005], p.345 by General Sir Rupert Smith (former Deputy Supreme Commander (DSACEUR) in NATO. All territorial airspace is considered as coming within the purview of International Humanitarian Law [‘IHL’]. ‘IHL provides that certain areas within the territory of a party to the conflict (or in any other territory) may be rendered off-limits to military activity, through designation of the area as a demilitarised zone, a neutralised zone, and undefended locality (or safe zone), or a hospital or safety zone. Thus, IHL provisions and protection still apply, but these zones are not to be made the location of hostilities. Non-defended localities can be any town, village, dwelling, or building which is declared to be an undefended place. … Neutralised or demilitarised zones may also be established by parties to a conflict. … Demilitarised zones are outlined in article 60 of API and are intended to protect civilians living within such zones from attack by parties to the conflict. The provisions for establishing a demilitarised zone are similar to those for an undefended locality: however, demilitarised zones can only be created by agreement of the parties to the conflict. As the ICRC Commentary to the Protocols notes, the “essential character of the zones created in article 60 … [is] that they have a humanitarian and not a political aim; they are specially intended to protect the population living there against attack.”‘ (The Oxford Guide to International Humanitarian Law (2020) edited by Ben Saul and Dapo Akande), p.67. In international armed conflicts, international humanitarian law applies as soon as an armed conflict exists between states. The formal declaration of war is not required. Therefore, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply to the invasion of a sovereign state by another state actor. The toolbox for humanitarian intervention includes the imposition of ‘humanitarian’ no-fly zones. An undefended locality can be estatblished unilaterally. Attacking a UN safezone is a breach of the rule of law. See also the ‘Humanitarian Mediation’ page at www.diplomaticlawguide.com.
See also:
- Amid Violence, Mass Forced Displacement, ‘Lives of Millions’ of Ukrainian Civilians at Stake, Humanitarian Affairs Chief Tells Security Council | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
- 2022-02-26_Ukraine_Situation Report #1.pdf (reliefweb.int)
- What the UN General Assembly can do for Ukraine | Crisis Group
- On Theory and Practice of No-Fly Zones in Humanitarian Intervention: Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: Vol 0, No 0 (tandfonline.com)
- Clipped Wings: Effective and Legal No-fly Zone Rules of Engagement (usnwc.edu)
- NATO rushing to resupply Ukraine by land; no-fly zone all but ruled out – POLITICO
- Denying Flight: Strategic Options for Employing No-Fly Zones (rand.org)
- Meibauer_The futility of buffer zones.pdf (lse.ac.uk)
‘Diplomacy and Defence are not substitutes for one another’
‘We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises.
We cannot, under the scrutiny of a free press and public, tell different stories to different audiences, foreign and domestic, friendly and hostile.
We cannot abandon the slow processes of consulting with our allies to match the swift expediencies of those who merely dictate to their satellites.
We can neither abandon nor control the international organization in which we now cast less than 1 percent of the vote in the General Assembly.
We possess weapons of tremendous power–but they are least effective in combating the weapons most often used by freedom’s foes: subversion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, civil disorder.
We send arms to other peoples–just as we send them the ideals of democracy in which we believe–but we cannot send them the will to use those arms or to abide by those ideals.
And while we believe not only in the force of arms but in the force of right and reason, we have learned that reason does not always appeal to unreasonable men–that it is not always true that “a soft answer turneth away wrath”–and that right does not always make might.
In short, we must face problems which do not lend themselves to easy or quick or permanent solutions. And we must face the fact that the United States is neither omnipotent or omniscient–that we are only 6 percent of the world’s population–that we cannot impose our will upon the other 94 percent of mankind–that we cannot right every wrong or reverse each adversity–and that therefore there cannot be an American solution to every world problem.
These burdens and frustrations are accepted by most Americans with maturity and understanding. They may long for the days when war meant charging up San Juan Hill- or when our isolation was guarded by two oceans– or when the atomic bomb was ours alone– or when much of the industrialized world depended upon our resources and our aid. But they now know that those days are gone– and that gone with them are the old policies and the old complacencies. And they know, too, that we must make the best of our new problems and our new opportunities, whatever the risk and the cost.
But there are others who cannot bear the burden of a long twilight struggle. They lack confidence in our long-run capacity to survive and succeed. Hating communism, yet they see communism in the long run, perhaps, as the wave of the future. And they want some quick and easy and final and cheap solution– now.
There are two groups of these frustrated citizens, far apart in their views yet very much alike in their approach. On the one hand are those who urge upon us what I regard to be the pathway of surrender-appeasing our enemies, compromising our commitments, purchasing peace at any price, disavowing our arms, our friends, our obligations. If their view had prevailed, the world of free choice would be smaller today.
On the other hand are those who urge upon us what I regard to be the pathway of war: equating negotiations with appeasement and substituting rigidity for firmness. If their view had prevailed, we would be at war today, and in more than one place.
It is a curious fact that each of these extreme opposites resembles the other. Each believes that we have only two choices: appeasement or war, suicide or surrender, humiliation or holocaust, to be either Red or dead. Each side sees only “hard” and “soft” nations, hard and soft policies, hard and soft men. Each believes that any departure from its own course inevitably leads to the other: one group believes that any peaceful solution means appeasement; the other believes that any arms build-up means war. One group regards everyone else as warmongers, the other regards everyone else as appeasers. Neither side admits that its path will lead to disaster–but neither can tell us how or where to draw the line once we descend the slippery slopes of appeasement or constant intervention.
In short, while both extremes profess to be the true realists of our time, neither could be more unrealistic. While both claim to be doing the nation a service, they could do it no greater disservice. This kind of talk and easy solutions to difficult problems, if believed, could inspire a lack of confidence among our people when they must all– above all else– be united in recognizing the long and difficult days that lie ahead. It could inspire uncertainty among our allies when above all else they must be confident in us. And even more dangerously, it could, if believed, inspire doubt among our adversaries when they must above all be convinced that we will defend our vital interests.
The essential fact that both of these groups fail to grasp is that diplomacy and defense are not substitutes for one another. Either alone would fail. A willingness to resist force, unaccompanied by a willingness to talk, could provoke belligerence– while a willingness to talk, unaccompanied by a willingness to resist force, could invite disaster.
But as long as we know what comprises our vital interests and our long-range goals, we have nothing to fear from negotiations at the appropriate time, and nothing to gain by refusing to take part in them. At a time when a single clash could escalate overnight into a holocaust of mushroom clouds, a great power does not prove its firmness by leaving the task of exploring the other’s intentions to sentries or those without full responsibility. Nor can ultimate weapons rightfully be employed, or the ultimate sacrifice rightfully demanded of our citizens, until every reasonable solution has been explored. “How many wars,” Winston Churchill has written, “have been averted by patience and persisting good will! …. How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands!”
If vital interests under duress can be preserved by peaceful means, negotiations will find that out. If our adversary will accept nothing less than a concession of our rights, negotiations will find that out. And if negotiations are to take place, this nation cannot abdicate to its adversaries the task of choosing the forum and the framework and the time.
For there are carefully defined limits within which any serious negotiations must take place. With respect to any future talks on Germany and Berlin, for example, we cannot, on the one hand, confine our proposals to a list of concessions we are willing to make, nor can we, on the other hand, advance any proposals which compromise the security of free Germans and West Berliners, or endanger their ties with the West.
No one should be under the illusion that negotiations for the sake of negotiations always advance the cause of peace. If for lack of preparation they break up in bitterness, the prospects of peace have been endangered. If they are made a forum for propaganda or a cover for aggression, the processes of peace have been abused.
But it is a test of our national maturity to accept the fact that negotiations are not a contest spelling victory or defeat. They may succeed– they may fail. They are likely to be successful only if both sides reach an agreement which both regard as preferable to the status quo– an agreement in which each side can consider its own situation to be improved. And this is most difficult to obtain.
But, while we shall negotiate freely, we shall not negotiate freedom. Our answer to the classic question of Patrick Henry is still no– life is not so dear, and peace is not so precious, “as to be purchased at the price of chains and slavery.” And that is our answer even though, for the first time since the ancient battles between Greek city-states, war entails the threat of total annihilation, of everything we know, of society itself. For to save mankind’s future freedom, we must face up to any risk that is necessary. We will always seek peace– but we will never surrender.
In short, we are neither “warmongers” nor “appeasers,” neither “hard” nor “soft.” We are Americans, determined to defend the frontiers of freedom, by an honorable peace if peace is possible, but by arms if arms are used against us.
And if we are to move forward in that spirit, we shall need all the calm and thoughtful citizens that this great University can produce, all the light they can shed, all the wisdom they can bring to bear. It is customary, both here and around the world, to regard life in the United States as easy. Our advantages are many. But more than any other people on earth, we bear burdens and accept risks unprecedented in their size and their duration, not for ourselves alone but for all who wish to be free. No other generation of free men in any country has ever faced so many and such difficult challenges-not even those who lived in the days when this University was founded in 1861.
This nation was then torn by war. This territory had only the simplest elements of civilization. And this city had barely begun to function. But a university was one of their earliest thoughts– and they summed it up in the motto that they adopted: “Let there be light.” What more can be said today, regarding all the dark and tangled problems we face than: Let there be light. And to accomplish that illumination, the University of Washington shall still hold high the torch.’
John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 25th President of the United States of America.
Address at University of Washington | JFK Library
See also: Who Blinks First in Ukraine? | The New Yorker
William Taylor, the former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine now at the U.S. Institute of Peace, told me this week, a few days after returning from Kyiv. “[Putin] will want to own or dominate or reabsorb Ukraine until he dies.”
‘Cultural Heritage Funds – Can an ESG Fund be a charitable trust’
This is a question that I put in a slightly different way to the panel at a joint UN – Islamic Finance Summit 28.09.2021 (Islamic Finance and the UN SDG’s 2021 Global Summit); IF-SDG-2021-Global-Summit-Agenda.pdf (ukifc.com) (UKIFC in partnership with UN and Islamic Development Bank organised a virtual global summit on Islamic finance and the SDGs to coincide with the UN General Assembly which I was invited to attend online. Please note that I am an English Trust Law practitioner and Commercial Mediator and do not practice in the field of Islamic Finance.
I do not see any legal impediment to the creation and administration of an ESG Charitable Trust under English law, provided the trustees exercise their duties and powers in accordance with English law, see: see: Islamic law principles applicable to the administration of trusts | Carl’s Wealth Planning Blog) and Chapters 3 (Powers of Trustees), and 4 (Duties of Trustees), of my book the ‘Contentious Trusts Handbook’ published by the Law Society in July 2020: Wildy & Sons Ltd — The World’s Legal Bookshop Search Results for isbn: ‘9781784461249’
To develop a business plan and strategy for such a trust the following issues would need to be thought through and agreed (and this is not an exhaustive list):
- Objectives;
- Size;
- Investors;
- ESG portfolio principles;
- Asset classes;
- Asset pool;
- Governance structure;
- Fund management;
- Management structure;
- Administrative powers;
- Fund management duties (including fiduciary duties);
- Investment policy;
- Liquidity management;
- Selection evaluation and monitoring of investments;
- Risk assessment & due diligence;
- Regulatory compliance (including MLC compliance);
- Transaction management and record keeping;
- Execution rules and protocols;
- Auditing; and
- Legal and Data Protection compliance.
In addition advice would need to be obtained about how to structure and manage the ESG fund for tax-efficiency.
Because most professional trustees have limited knowledge of funds and ESG investing, perhaps a trust specialist, a fund specialist and an ESG specialist could make up the board of a private trust company in the structure?
I am not sure if anybody has yet designed a structure that combines the idea of a charitable trust with an ESG fund for the ethical financing of social projects, e.g. a cultural heritage project (involving Islamic Finance). Therefore, because the idea of such a structure is innovative, it will probably need a sponsor to give it wings.
Meanwhile, I invite you to connect the dots between the following ‘boxes’:
- Environmental protection.
- Agriculture.
- Irrigation, clean water and sanitation.
- Environmentally friendly energy generation, e.g. solar power.
- Politically stable and prosperous civil societies.
- Free trade areas.
- UN protected enclaves.
- Micro social projects, which together create a larger matrix of projects that can create a functioning civil society.
- Moving refugees out of camps into a healthy, and safe environment where they can apply themselves (and acquire new skills) to create a tolerant and functioning civil society, i.e. municipal services e.g. emergency services, hospitals, schools, and the planning and implementation of building and infrastructure (which requires architects, engineers, and trades e.g. electricians).
- Development finance provided by states.
- Technical know-how and co-operation provided by the private sector; and
- Ethical investment by ESG (including Islamic Finance) funds – which already exist, see: ESG and Islamic Finance collaboration could be major revenue boost for sustainable investment: report (responsible-investor.com).
An idea for a specific micro-project which could form part of a larger matrix that occurs to me, is a Global Initiative to create ‘Islamic Gardens’ (i.e. as parks for planting trees, and with greenhouses for growing plants, fruit and vegetables), see for example Gardens of Paradise: past and present | Aga Khan Foundation UK (akf.org.uk). These Gardens or Parks appear to tick all of the above boxes.
There is also a relationship between the human environment, development and culture. The commentary to the preamble to the Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development (5th edition, IUCN Switzerland 2015) states:
‘All civilisations spring from and are shaped by the quality of their surrounding natural elements [and that] the histories of different peoples are inseparable from the natural conditions in which they have lived for millennia. … Art, literature and science cannot be understood, or even imagined, without acknowledging the influence of nature and its components. Thus, cultural diversity, like biological diversity, emerges from the various ecosystems.’
Since the Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, June 1972 (the ‘1972 Stockholm Declaration’) stated that ‘Man has a special responsibility to safeguard and wisely manage the heritage of wildlife and its habitat which are now gravely imperilled …’, and this ‘special responsibility’ includes a duty to restore and maintain the integrity of the environment, the existence of fiduciary duties (i.e. in public international law) in relation to cultural heritage, is linked to wider: environmental; strategic; legal; and policy issues, i.e. international law applying to activities on the high seas and on the continental shelf.
See further: Mediation of Art & Cultural Heritage Disputes – Carl Islam
Therefore, it would appear that an Islamic Charitable Trust could in principle be established as an ESG fund to finance Cultural Heritage projects throughout the Islamic world. However, this specific idea does not yet appear to be on the radar of either the Islamic Finance industry, academics, Governments, or UN institutions.
‘Afghanistan – Transforming a geo-political fiasco into a diplomatic opportunity’
Applying the following conflict resolution principles to Afghanistan, and taking into account the points set out below about the transference of global economic power to Asia and the fast evolving new world economic order, can a diplomatic ‘safe zone’/ ‘breathing-space’ be created by organising an international conference about infrastructure development in Central Asia in e.g. Qatar or Turkey?
Paradoxically, could ‘Global Britain’ miss out entirely on potentially ‘the largest free trade deal in history’ because the UK is ‘going-it alone’, whereas geo-politically Central Asia as a region, is moving in the opposite direction of multi-lateral trade and development co-operation. In other words, does Afghanistan present the UK with a diplomatic opportunity for future investment in Central Asia? – see: https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/publication/29927/central-asia-trade-policy.pdf, the extract from the ‘New Silk Roads’, and ‘Afghanistan – Linking economic diplomacy to humanitarian relief, & evacuation’, below.
Conflict resolution principles:
- Transform conflict into an opportunity – ‘Every conflict takes place at a crossroads that, when recognised for what it reveals, offers each participant an opportunity to overcome what Sigmund Freud called “the narcissism of minor differences”, and thereby become better, more balanced, collaborative human beings. … At its deeper levels, conflict resolution is naturally and automatically a path of integrity and character, of heart and spirit, of learning and revolution, that begins here and now inside each of us. In the end, of course there are no paths. The way forward begins wherever we are, and opens whenever we are ready to open our eyes, drop our judgements and expectations, and act authentically. More fundamentally, we need to learn how to resolve our differences if we hope to ever end the use of warfare, reduce climate change and environmental degradation, and assuage racial, gender, national, religious, and cultural hatreds. This will require us not only to focus our energies on learning and teaching these more subtle and demanding arts and sciences in dispute resolution, but to recognise that we can only succeed in eliminating conflicts in others by discovering how to eliminate them within ourselves.’‘The Crossroads of Conflict – A Journey Into the Heart of Dispute Resolution’ by Kenneth Cloke (2019).
- Create an enabling environment for transformation and transcendence, i.e. a ‘breathing space’ / ‘safe zone’ to open up unimagined possibilities – ‘[Daniel Shapiro has] developed a practical method to bridge the toughest emotional divides. This method leverages the unique feature of conflict that has been consistently overlooked: the space between sides. We typically view conflict as a binary concept – me versus you, us versus them – and focus on satisfying our independent interests. But conflict literally exists between us – in our relationship – and in that spacelive complicated emotional dynamics that thwart cooperation. Learning how to transform an emotionally charged conflict into an opportunity for mutual benefit requires that you learn how to effectively navigate the space. My goal has been to decode the space between disputants and to design processes to help them work through intransigent emotions, divisive dynamics, and clashing beliefs. The result is the method that I call ‘relational identity theory’, which features practical steps that produce dynamic effects, much as the few simple actions necessary to light a pile of wood produce the dynamic effect of fire. The greatest barrier to conflict resolution is what I called the tribes effect, divisive mindset that cast you and the other side as inevitable adversaries. As long as you are trapped in this mindset, you will be trapped in conflict. The way out is to counteract the five hidden forces that draw you toward this outlook – the Lures of the tribal mind – and to cultivate positive relations via the process of integrated dynamics. In the course of doing so, you will confront unavoidable tensions – relational dialectics – that threaten to make your conflict feel like a no-win proposition. ….
In the sunny resort town of Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, I facilitated a workshop called “building peace, breaking taboos”. Its purpose was to help regional leadership wrestle with political taboos constraining progress in the Israeli Palestinian negotiations. Co-led by Tony Blair, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the United Nations Middle East quartet special envoy at the time, the session included participants ranging from high-level negotiators and government leaders to royalty and religious figures. To create a safe zone, I established the rules of our workshop [i.e. mediation], including confidentiality and mutual respect. In the tense context of the conflict, I knew that productive conversation would be possible only if participants felt safe enough to voice their honest opinions. I also emphasise that our workshop was exploratory, providing everyone a clear chance to think outside the constraints of the conflict [i.e. to think outside the box]. No one will be asked to commit to any action discussed in the workshop. This freed the participants to engage in energised conversation. Mr Blair took the floor to discuss his involvement in negotiating the Good Friday peace agreement that helped to resolve the Northern Ireland conflict. He explained that effective negotiations could not have taken place within an environment of violence and counter-attack. Both sides needed “breathing space” – [i.e. a] safe zone that, once established, opened up possibilities that Blair said he had “never imagined possible”.’ ‘Negotiating the Non-Negotiable – How To Resolve Your Most Emotionally Charged Conflicts’ by Daniel Shapiro (2017).
A new economic world order?
‘By 2050 the per capita income in Asia could rise sixfold in purchasing power parity (‘PPP’) terms, making 3 billion additional Asians affluent by current standards. By nearly doubling its share of global GDP to 52%, as one recent report put it, “Asia would regain the dominant economic position it held some 300 years ago, before the industrial revolution.” The transference of global economic power to Asia “may occur somewhat more quickly or slowly”, agreed another report, “but the general direction of change and the historic nature of this shift is clear” – concluding similarly that we are living through a reversion to how the world looked before the rise of the West. The acute awareness of the New World being knitted together has helped prompt plans for the future that will capitalise on and accelerate the changing patterns of economic and political power. Chief amongst these is the Belt and Road initiative, President Xi’s signature economic and foreign policy, which uses the ancient silk Roads – and their success – as a matrix for Chinese long-term plans for the future. Since the project was announced in 2013, nearly $1 trillion has been promised to infrastructure investments, mainly in the form of loans, to around 1000 projects. Some believe that the amount of money that will be ploughed into China’s neighbours in countries that are part of the Belt and Road over sea and land will eventually multiply several times over, to create and interlinked world of train lines, highways, deep-water ports, and airports that will enable trade links to grow even stronger and faster … Today, there is a series of Great Games taking place, over competition for influence, energy and natural resources, for food, water and clean air, the strategic position, even for data. … The number of passengers travelling by plane will nearly double to 7.8 billion a year by 2036, with the growing and increasingly affluent populations of Asia, with China, India, Turkey and Thailand driving this increase. … Pakistan is now the World’s fastest growing retail market, partly thanks to the fact that disposable income has doubled since 2020. … There are fortunes to be made by being in the right place at the right time – and consequences for failing to adapt or respond in the right way. … Tastes, trends and appetites will be made in the East and not in the West. Changing aspirations, appetites and tastes will drive demand – as they always have done. … Corporate fortunes and failures will be made in the East – and not in the West. … The age of the West is at a crossroads. … The themes of isolation and fragmentation in the West are in sharp contrast to what has been happening along the Silk Road since 2015. The story across large parts of the region linking the Pacific through to the Mediterranean has been about consolidation and trying to find ways to collaborate more effectively; the trend has been about defusing tensions and building alliances; the discussions have been about solutions that are mutually beneficial and provide the platform for long-term co-operation and collaboration. These have been facilitated by multiple institutions that both enable dialogue and take practical steps to deepen ties between states – multilateral financial institutions such as the Asian Development Bank and the New Asian infrastructure Development Bank, but also groups like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the Eurasian Economic Union, the BRICS summits, the Transpacific Partnership (albeit without US participation) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership – the last of which includes countries from South East Asia along with China, India, South Korea, Japan, Australia and New Zealand. Together, these have a combined GDP of almost – 30 trillion or 30% of global GDP – and represent 3.5 billion people. Negotiations to create a modern comprehensive high quality and mutually beneficial economic partnership agreement have intensified, raising the prospect that one economist has called the largest free trade deal in history. .. The world is spinning in two different directions: decoupling and going it alone in one, and deepening ties and trying to work together in another. … A typical example of the way in which the heart of the world is being knitted together comes from a conference held in Samarkand in November 2017 when senior officials from the Central Asian republics as well as from Afghanistan, Russia, China, Turkey, Iran, India and Pakistan, met to discuss ways of working together to deal with terrorism, religious extremism, transnational organised crime and drug trafficking under the theme “Central Asia: one past and a common future, cooperation for sustainable development and mutual prosperity.” … If Kazakhstan and Iran build transit networks, Kazakhstan may be linked to the southern waters through Iran, and Iran can be connected to China via Kazakhstan … The development of a new international north-south transport corridor that connects Southeast Asia and northern Europe has also made progress and seen government bodies in Azerbaijan, Russia and Iran working closely with each other.’’ The New Silk Roads – The Present and Future of the World, by Peter Frankopan(2018).
Diplomatic opportunity?
The UK elected to ‘go it alone’. The US President has pinned his colours to a policy of isolationism. China is the emerging global leader in Central Asia. Could the UK miss out entirely on ‘the largest free trade deal in history’ because of a lack of coherent thinking, imagination and diplomatic leadership, or does regime change in Afghanistan represent a time-limited opportunity?
AFGHANISTAN – Linking economic diplomacy to humanitarian relief, & evacuation
An idea cannot be killed by military action, however its appeal can be weakened by creating a stable and thriving economy that rewards application, in other words entrepreneurship and wealth creation are weapons that can silently defeat an ideology over time by making it irrelevant to people’s needs, expectations, and aspirations. That is why communism was doomed to fail from the start, i.e. because it removed the incentive to work, which runs counter to human nature as most rational people want to improve not only their own lives but also to create opportunities for their children. Wealth creation should therefore be part of a coherent and cohesive diplomatic strategy for managing the risk of terrorism fuelled by a culture of crime in a hostile oligarchy or failed state. Educated Afghan refugees can help build the economies of Central Asian states and create wealth and social flourishing in the region, which in the long term may increase stability in Central Asia. Is there a time-limited opportunity for the US, EU, UK, Turkey, Canada and Australia, to jointly develop a coherent diplomatic strategy linking trade deals to an agreement by Central Asian States to provide a home for refugees from Afghanistan?
‘Regional preferential trade agreements have the potential to contribute to Central Asia’s economic diversification. Their usefulness is positively correlated with their capacity to facilitate trade among participants and negatively correlated with the extent of trade diversion caused by the agreement. From that perspective, the Commonwealth of Independent States free trade area is useful and fairly harmless because it reinforces the already existing regime of Central Asia’s trade with traditional partners based on a set of rules consistent with the WTO’ – Connecting Central Asia with Economic Centres: Final Report (adb.org)
A potential Win/Win strategy?
- Fly in aid to Afghanistan.
- Fly out evacuees for settlement in Central Asian States.
- US, EU, UK, Turkey, Canada and Australia to provide: (i) humanitarian relief to Afghanistan; and (ii) trade and development support to Central Asian States.
The problem
After the last flight has left Kabul there will be no airports under neutral control to fly in and out of, and no force on the ground to create and protect a humanitarian land corridor, and to escort evacuees to safety.
Can Pakistan and the UAE provide troops wearing ‘blue’ helmets and air cover with the agreement of the Taliban and local war lords, to operate and protect strategic airports and to ensure safe passage?
Otherwise, how are people, including UK and US citizens i.e. passport holders, left behind (who apparently number more than 2000), to get out of Afghanistan?
They are trapped.
Likewise, how is humanitarian aid going to get into Afghanistan and be distributed where it is needed?
That is where a coalition of the US, EU, UK, Turkey, Canada and Australia appear to have some diplomatic leverage, unless of course China advances into the political vacuum and eventually controls the ungoverned space. If it does, geopolitically who is going to end up being the largest investor in Central Asia – the US, EU, UK, Turkey, Canada and Australia or China?
‘The United States has a vested interest in promoting regional economic integration, which could catalyze political reform and reinforce efforts to stop illicit traffic and militant activity at Afghanistan’s borders. As cited in a World Bank report, landlocked countries can face average growth rates that are about 1.5 percentage points lower because of transaction costs and other inefficiencies such as unpredictability in transportation time. In July 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the New Silk Road (NSR) initiative, a long-term economic vision to transform Afghanistan into a hub of transport and trade, connecting markets in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia. Some of the proposed NSR projects include completing the Afghan Ring Road; establishing rail links between Afghanistan and Pakistan; completing the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) pipeline; and creating a regional electricity market by establishing a transmission line between Central Asia and South Asia (CASA-1000). NSR requires U.S. leadership, not necessarily an infusion of new U.S. funds. It will instead involve cooperation from multilateral development banks, foreign donors, regional governments, and the private sector. NSR has been enthusiastically welcomed by governments in Afghanistan and Central Asia who want to connect to markets in Europe and Asia and appreciate American attention to their economic challenges. However, connecting Central to South Asia via Afghanistan will be challenging in light of the barriers to continental transport and trade, including the lack of regional cooperation. NSR will not be a panacea for Afghanistan’s economic woes, but it does offer a vision for the broader region that could foster private sector investment if projects are prioritized and steps are taken to create an enabling environment. The United States can play a vital role by supporting political and economic reform and leveraging its resources.’
CENTRAL ASIA AND THE TRANSITION IN AFGHANISTAN (govinfo.gov)
See also:
Why did the UK become involved? – https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/afghanistan-and-uks-illusion-strategy
What can the US do now? – Biden can still salvage his legacy and US credibility. It won’t be easy. – Atlantic Council
Scale – Half a million Afghans could flee across borders – UNHCR | Reuters
Can Central Asian States provide a refuge? –Afghanistan: Where will refugees go after Taliban takeover? – BBC News
Concerted humanitarian strategy? – David Miliband calls for ‘unified’ international engagement with the Taliban (alaraby.co.uk)
EU diplomatic support? – Top EU diplomat Borrell calls for dialogue with the Taliban in Afghanistan – POLITICO
UK logistical support? – https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/afghanistan-uk-troops-refugees-support-b1910646.html
Regional consequences? – Afghanistan: What Taliban takeover means for the region | Asia | An in-depth look at news from across the continent | DW | 19.08.2021
Could Turkey be a diplomatic mediator? – https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/turkeys-return-central-asia
Russia – Sino-Russian Economic Cooperation in Central Asia is Not What It Seems to Be – The Diplomat
India – Taliban takeover a ‘body blow’ to Indian interests in Afghanistan | Taliban News | Al Jazeera
Pakistan – Pakistan’s problematic victory in Afghanistan (brookings.edu)
Islamic Finance – Gulftimes : Central Asia pushes Islamic finance in preparation of post-Covid era (gulf-times.com)