Negotiating Political Order

This page contains a blog about the mediation of Political Order, i.e. the facilitated negotiation through a Track 2 mediated process, of constitutional principles and an institutional framework for political survival and independent co-existence of the ‘stakeholders’ in a geo-political conflict, with the ambition of jointly developing a road-map for peace (i.e. a ‘Peace Process’), which results in the agreement and practical implementation of a coherent, comprehensive and sustainable ‘political’ solution to the underlying ‘root’ and ‘dynamic’ causes of the conflict (i.e. a ‘Peace Treaty’), thereby ensuring peace underwritten by security guarantees and International Law. A ‘Research Bibliography’ is set out at the end, after the blogs.

List of Blogs

Scroll down to find the full text of each blog listed below.

–   ‘Trump’s Tariffs.’

–   ‘Why does Keir Starmer want to honour Trump with an unprecedented State Dinner with the King?’

–        ‘Mediation Advocacy Paradigm – Who am I negotiating with – the Political Leader, an Oligarch or a Patriarch – or all three?’

–        ‘Mediating Geopolitical Conflict as a Project-Management Exercise?’ 

–      ‘The Coming Arab Backlash – Middle Eastern Regimes—and America—Ignore Public Anger at Their Peril.’

–      ‘When progressives act realistically and practically, they change the world.’

–      ’16^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Knowing when to fight & when to settle.’

–       ‘Former Supreme Court President among 600 lawyers to sign letter calling on UK to stop arms sales to Israel (04.04.2024).’ 

–       ‘Hierarchy of Sanctions for non-compliance with a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.’

–       ‘How do you mediate a dispute where one or both participants are deluded?’

–       ‘Two-State Solution.’

–      ‘Consequences of Delusional Decision-Making.’

–       ‘Gaza – Is the way forward the creation of a single normal secular state for both Israelis and Palestinians?’

–        ’15^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – In order to get a participant to really think about the philosophical basis and legitimacy of their position you need to speak to them in the language of their own source of reference.’

–         ‘Ethical decision-making based upon principles of natural law.’

–         ‘Understanding Conflict & Mediating Settlement.’

–         ’14^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Balancing realism with morality in the design of a political structure.’

–         ‘Under International Law an occupier is both a fiduciary for their own people and also of humanity writ large.’

–          ’13th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Listen to and acknowledge each participant’s [‘P’s]  interests and concerns.’

–           ‘Unconscious bias in Mediation.’

–           ‘Relationship between Loss aversion & Distributive Justice.’

–           ‘The “5 Points” in the Mediation of a Peace Process.’

–           ’12th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order’ –  Common interest in entering into mediation early.

–            ’11th Principle of Negotiating Political Order’ – See the world as it is and not as you want it to be.

–            ‘The Power Paradox in Mediation.’

–            ‘Universal principles of International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) as a Mediator tool in agreeing common ground in mediating how a new political order could be constructed to end a conflict?’

–            ‘Black Swans – Looking out for the unknown unknowns in mediation.’

–            ‘Empedocles’ Sphere.’

–            ‘Coalitions of the weak.’

–            ‘Analysing the causes of armed conflict.’

–           ’10th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order ‘– Share a vision of co-existence.’ Explore and find common ground by engaging in a mediated diplomatic conversation about the existence and relevance of Fiduciary principles of international relations which transcend regional balance of power politics, e.g. rules and norms of International Humanitarian Law.

–           ‘9th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order  – Calculate the political price of doing a deal.’

–           ‘Time to mediate?’

–           ‘8^th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Analyse the underlying dynamics.’

–           ‘7th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Legitimacy.’

–           ‘6th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Analyse the existence of pillars to support a political and strategic framework for managing the relationship between the states who are in direct conflict with each other.’

–           ‘5^th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Do not make things worse.’

–           ‘4^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Realism.’

–           ‘3nd Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Exploratory talks to discover elements of a bespoke process.’

–           ‘2nd Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Choice of Mediator.’

–           ‘1st Principle of Negotiating  Political Order – Diplomats must have room to manoeuvre.’

–           ‘Engineering convergence through Mediation – Can we put the Genie back into the bottle?’

–           ‘Ukraine – Who can Mediate?’

BLOGS

Trump’s Tariffs

• Trump ‘buckled under the pressure’ of failing markets | Yanis Varoufakis explains Trump U-turn: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0ou67YmnihY
• Trump Speeds Up FALL OF THE WEST With Tariff War: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ogenfhH8HY8
• Gerald Celente: On the Path to Economic Collapse, Social Decadence & War: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MMQ9N2W_Gmg
• https://www.theguardian.com/business/2025/apr/03/global-markets-turmoil-trump-tariffs-wall-street-downturn
• Jeffrey Sachs : Does Trump Understand Basic Economics?: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJezuheYPqY

‘Why does Keir Starmer want to honour Trump with an unprecedented State Dinner with the King?’
See:
· https://lnkd.in/eAFyZUxV
· https://lnkd.in/ersuTUMw
· https://lnkd.in/eFVPtmBW
· https://lnkd.in/e8psj4WX
· https://lnkd.in/eaT5U32R

Why are any of the these actions by Trump in the UK national interest? i.e. (i) imposing tariffs today on UK exports; (ii) outlawing protest & interfering with freedom of speech in the UK; (iii) taking Canada; (iv) drawing the UK into a US/Israeli war with Iran that: sets the Gulf region on fire, brings down UK allies and trading partners amongst the ruling Gulf State autocracies, and crashes the world economy; and (v) precipitating the collapse of Europe’s defence architecture – at the centre of which is NATO?

These are all acts of a hostile Hegemon, and not of a geopolitical partner.

So, why does Starmer appear to be meekly submitting to the will of Trump, as if Trump were his political master, and the UK is the servant or slave of the US?

I argued before Starmer was elected that he would sail the UK ship in the wrong geopolitical direction, and that as a result we would end up drifting rudderless in the middle of the high seas between (i) a ‘rock’ – the US; and (ii) ‘a hard place’ – ‘BRICS.’

That as a trading nation, is exactly where we find ourselves today.

So, can any politician in the UK Parliament see this, and urge engagement with other trading nations on Trump’s ‘black list’, in order to sail our ship toward as safe harbour through ‘economic diplomacy’, i.e. by forming new trading arrangements with the EU and BRICS?

That will not only require skilful negotiation/economic diplomacy, it will also require original thinking and a near complete reversal of the UK’s failed Foreign Policy, as we will have to reposition ourselves as a nation in this brave new world.

So, what I am wondering is whether Starmer is possessed of any of the skills and abilities to accomplish this, or whether he is going to run the ship aground, i.e. by making the UK bankrupt?

Based upon his performance so far, what do you think?

I wonder whether business owners/company directors, and their professional advisors, have drawn any conclusions for themselves, as nobody in the UK (who as taxpayers are ultimately paying for the state dinner) appear to be talking about this. I also wonder what they are thinking and have to say about the geopolitical and economic mess into which UK politicians of all stripes have sailed the UK ship through successive governments (beginning with former Prime Minister David Cameron’s BREXIT referendum)? I ultimately wonder – are these UK political leaders geopolitically and economically illiterate – or am I missing something?

I think our political leaders in the UK need to take expert advice quickly, about how to develop and implement a new model of international trade that puts the UK national interest first, rather than clinging on to the coat tails of Trump. That model may have to exclude the US. When I was 23, I studied the regulation of international trade as a Master’s Degree student and cannot think today of any economic rationale for Trump’s tariffs against the UK. Perhaps I am missing something? I later worked as a negotiator for two multinational companies and understood how a technical specification could be used to impose standards that would make bidding for a tender uneconomic, thereby in effect excluding a potential bidder from the start. I wonder whether BRICS members will eventually impose standards in order to punish the UK for its foreign policy mistakes, by in effect excluding UIK companies from exporting to their markets? If that happens, then since we are out of Europe, and today the special relationship with the US just evaporated in front of our eyes, along with the hope of a trade deal, if we cannot trade with BRICS countries, who on the map of the globe is left to trade with, without incurring a tariff?

My understanding, according to reports sourced from those who work closely with Starmer, is that he spends most of his time dealing with Ukraine, and very little time dealing with economic and UK domestic issues.

‘Tony Blair branded ‘apolitical’ Keir Starmer an ‘out-of-touch human rights lawyer’ amid claims the Prime Minister is ‘not driving the train’ and that his Irish chief of staff is actually at the wheel.’ See:

https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-14351603/Tony-Blair-branded-Keir-Starmer-lawyer.html

Starmer has no background in economics, international trade or international relations.

So, does he know how to sail the UK Plc ship and is Starmer even at the helm with both hands on the wheel?

If you are an elderly person whose winter fuel allowance he withdrew or a disabled person who benefits he has taken away, in order it would appear to give £billions to Zelensky’s regime in Kiev, you may be asking yourself – ‘who comes first for Starmer – us or Zelensky?’

See also:

• Richard D. Wolff and Michael Hudson on Trump’s Trade Policies: A Fast Track to Economic Ruin: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=594yN8rxIJo
• Jeffrey Sachs : Does Trump Understand Basic Economics?: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iJezuheYPqY
• Prof. Jeffery Sachs : The Disaster of Tariffs: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x0alGvV0SjcSo, did Trump wake up on Wednesday morning and say to himself – ‘What shall I do today? I know I will smash the global system of international trade!’?The result is global supply chain chaos and plunging stock markets all around the world.

  Professor Sachs who taught economics at Harvard and now at Columbia says he would fail any 1^st year student who submitted a paper asserting the same mistaken economic assumption that Trump has made, i.e. that the root cause of the US trading deficit is other trading countries ‘ripping-off’ the US. The actual reason is that the US spends more than it earns from international trade. So, the imposition of global tariffs is not a panacea. Professor Sachs states three legal remedies and anticipates that the legality of imposing tariffs will be litigated in the US courts. However, by the time that these cases reach the Supreme Court how much damage will have been done to British business? If you think that a 10% tariff is light you are entirely missing the reality. The reality is that complex products e.g. cars, incorporate parts imported into the US from multiple counties who Trump has tariffed at higher rates. So, for the sake of argument if the cumulative effect of these tariffs is to push the price of a car assembled in the US up by 25% in total, then what impact is that going to have on the value of sales if US manufacturers pass that cost on to consumers? Yes – less sales of cars. So, what effect do you think a reduction in sales is going to have on future orders for car parts in the UK? What will that lead to unless UK companies can access new markets to compensate for loss of business? Which is the biggest market in the world – BRICS. So, what changes need to be made to UK foreign policy to smooth the path toward international trade with member states?

‘Mediation Advocacy Paradigm – Who am I negotiating with – the Political Leader, an Oligarch or a Patriarch – or all three?‘

I recommend – ‘The World: A Family History’ (2022) by Simon Sebag Montefiore: https://lnkd.in/ekRMcfnW.

Where a political leader [‘PL’] is also an Oligarch and/or Patriarch – what is her/her priority – their business/family empire, or their country?

So, if you are a Mediation Advocate negotiating peace & political order [a ‘MAP’] – who are you negotiating with?

When evaluating whether there is a ‘method’ in PL’s apparent ‘madness’, i.e. whether what PL said about what he/she plans to do, is rational – a MAP must examine this through the paradigm of PL’s own business/family.

The question a MAP needs to ask themselves when negotiating the constructive resolution of a geopolitical conflict is – ‘Qui Bono’ (who benefits?), i.e. who/whom has a vested interest in conflict & regional political disorder?

Hypothetically, if for example, a PL’s plan, involves taxpayers in PL’s country [‘PLC’], sacrificing billions in blood & treasure, in order to further the geopolitical interests of a foreign power [‘FG’] (which do not align with the geopolitical interests of PLC), so that FG in breach of International Law, can obliterate the territory of a neighbouring sovereign power [NSP’], in order to:

(i)        clear the ‘indigenous’ land of NSP, by committing ethnic cleansing/genocide;
(ii)       unlawfully appropriate the indigenous land of NSP, i.e. ‘steal it’; &
(iii)      then transfer the indigenous land of NSP to PLC,

so that PL’s family/business (& their partners ‘in crime’ [‘PIC’]), can profit from re-construction contracts, & the building/ownership of resort hotels, golf clubs & casinos on the indigenous land of NSP,

then why is that strategy ‘irrational’ within the ‘paradigm’ of PL’s ‘paramount family/business interests?’

‘Commercially’ – while illegal & immoral (i.e. criminal), in the minds of PIC, are they not also likely to think and say that this is a ‘great idea’?

In a democracy, unless free speech has been silenced, & the civil service institutions which safeguard PLC from corruption can be rendered powerless at the ‘flick of a pen’ by a PL, then logically, a MAP could pull the rug out from underneath the feet of a PL by exposing the PL to his/her own political power base, as being a ‘self-aggrandising political fraud’.

However, that requires a free press.

So, in evaluating whether that is what a PL in fact is, a MAP needs to pay close attention to anything PL does to dismantle the institutional pillars of democracy within PLC.

If PL is a world leader, a MAP should also be alert anything PL does to subvert the institutions of: International Law, the Liberal Rules Based Order & International Criminal Justice.

Reading Simon Sebag Montefiore’s book, it appears that the tale of such ‘conflicts of interest’ & behaviour, is as old as time.

So a MAP can learn valuable lessons from this thought-provoking book.

For a long time I have been assembling material on the ‘Negotiating Political Order’ and ‘Geopolitical Mediation’ pages at www.diplomaticlawguide.com, with the aim of some day writing a book about ‘Mediation Advocacy in the constructive resolution of geopolitical conflicts.’ The blogs that I have written on these pages over the last 10 years, are informed by what I learned as a Political Science undergraduate at University, in what in those days was one of the top 5 schools of Political Science in the UK. I would be interested in hearing your comments about whether I should now consolidate those ideas, by writing a book provisionally entitled – ‘Negotiating Political Order – Ideas for Constructive Conflict Resolution’. If I do this, then one of the issues I will discuss is the ‘Mediation Advocacy Paradigm – Who am I negotiating with – the President, an Oligarch or a Patriarch – or all three?’ I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

Notes added:

I have just learned about the following international developments announced today (07.02.2025), see:

– https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2025/feb/07/middle-east-live-donald-trump-gaza-benjamin-netanyahu-icc-latest-news-updates

– https://www.reuters.com/world/trump-impose-sanctions-international-criminal-court-2025-02-06/

So, why has this been done – Qui Bono?

‘Mediating Geopolitical Conflict as a Project-Management Exercise?’

In 1990, as a reward for my contribution in the negotiation in Kuala Lumpur of a major power project awarded to the Rolls-Royce Industrial Power Group, I was selected for the rigorous in-house Rolls-Royce one-year training programme for Project Mangers of Major Projects. I was the 1st lawyer in the company, to have ever undertaken and completed the training course. One of the key tools Projects Mangers use is a ‘Work Breakdown Structure’ (‘WBS’). I use the tool to this day to analyse complex transactions/problems top-down, in a framework which resembles a pyramid. At the top is the ‘end-product’, & below it in descending levels of detail, is how this is planned to be accomplished. So, by analogy to the Mediation of Geopolitical Conflict:

Level 1 of the WBS (i.e. at the top of the pyramid) would = An arrangement between:
(i) the Western ‘Neo-Liberal’ Hegemon(s) [‘H’]; &
(ii) BRICS [‘B’],
about ‘spheres of influence’, including the agreement of a new security architecture in Europe, which satisfies the primary interests of both H & B, i.e. the design of a ‘new world order’, in which both H & B can co-exist and compete in peace & mutual prosperity, through ‘collaboration’ instead of ‘conflict’.

If level 1 can be agreed, then the levels below it can logically follow, i.e.
sub-levels about:
(iii) how to end the Conflicts in Ukraine & in MENA;
(iv) avoid future wars, e.g. between the US & China; and
(v) arms control & reduction of nuclear weapons.

I wonder if this is how President Trump, with his expertise in construction, could conduct a face-to-face conversation with the leaders of BRICS, starting by meeting with Presidents Putin & Xi Jinping, to map out their: (i) own national, i.e. selfish; (ii) conflicting; & (iii) overlapping & potentially converging interests?

On 11 April 2022, I had the great honour and privilege of meeting with the late Professor Roger Fisher in his study at Harvard Law School. At the end of the meeting he handed me a copy of his book ‘Beyond Machiavelli – Tools For Coping With Conflict’, which he inscribed with the words – ‘To CARL – ANOTHER SET OF IDEAS.’

On page 69 of the book (which I recommend that you read cover to cover) is a Table – 16. ‘A Four Quadrant Analysis for Problem-Solving’. Every politician and political leader should read and understand how this works. However I fear that most in H have not read this, and do not understand how this tool can be used to develop a road-map to global peace – one conflict at a time!

Since I doubt whether any politicians and political leaders will ever read this post, nor their political advisors and civil servants, perhaps the ideas promulgated by the late Roger Fisher will occur to them naturally?

However, I doubt it, which is a pity, because the tools for ‘coping with conflict’ are all there & staring them in the face, if only they educated themselves, by reading Roger Fisher’s book.

Notes added:

I am wondering whether Trump, who like Biden, formed his world-view during the ‘uni-polar’ moment, which has now passed, has grasped that we are now living in a multipolar/nodal world? Until that paradigm shift in his worldview takes place, I do not see how he can engage in any menaingful dialogue with the leaders of BRICS, about the design of a new world order, because he is living (in his mind), in a bygone era. When he speaks about America’s ‘New Golden Era’, if he means the bygone ‘unipolar’ era, then his entire foreign policy ‘grand’ strategy (if he has one), i.e. as a potential global peacemaker and ‘unifier’, is entirely misconceived, flawed and doomed to fail from the start. Any strategy, which instead of being based upon ‘realism’, rests upon the foundation of a delusional worldview, is bound to fail.

For current anlysis see – Richard D. Wolff & Michael Hudson: How the US Can Handle Eurasia’s Rise:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GnCMXP04dg4

‘The Coming Arab Backlash – Middle Eastern Regimes—and America—Ignore Public Anger at Their Peril.’

Writing today in Foreign Affairs, Mark Lynch, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs at George Washington University, warns:

• Arab activists and intellectuals have been developing powerful arguments about the nature of Israel’s domination of the Palestinian territories and these are entering the Western discourse in new ways.
• The case South Africa brought to the International Court of Justice, alleging an Israeli genocide in Gaza, introduced many of those arguments into circulation across the global South and within international organizations. It did so by referencing not only the statements of Israeli leaders but also conceptual frameworks about occupation and settler colonialism developed by Arab and Palestinian intellectuals.
• The war of ideas that the United States sought to wage in the Muslim world after 9/11, claiming to bring freedom and democracy to a backward region, has reversed course, with the United States on the defensive because of its hypocrisy in demanding condemnation of Russia’s war on Ukraine while supporting Israel’s war on Gaza.
• This is all happening in an era characterized, even before the Israel-Hamas war, by the declining primacy of the United States and the rising autonomy of regional powers.
• Leading Arab states have increasingly sought to demonstrate their independence from the United States, building strategic relations with China and Russia and pursuing their own agendas in regional affairs. The willingness of Arab regimes to defy U.S. preferences was a hallmark of the previous decade, as Gulf states ignored American policies toward democratic transition in Egypt, flooded weapons into Syria despite Washington’s caution, and lobbied against the nuclear agreement with Iran. This willingness to flout the United States’ wishes has become even more apparent following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The past two years have seen most Middle Eastern regimes refusing to vote with Washington against Russia, and Saudi Arabia declining to follow the United States’ lead on oil pricing.
• Washington’s unblinkered support for Israel in its devastation of Gaza, however, has brought long-standing hostility toward U.S. policy to a head, and triggered a crisis of legitimacy that threatens the entire edifice of historic U.S. primacy in the region. It is difficult to exaggerate the extent to which Arabs blame the United States for this war. They can see that only U.S. weapons sales and United Nations vetoes allow Israel to continue its war. They are aware that the United States defends Israel for actions that are the same as those the United States condemned Russia and Syria for. The extent of this popular anger can be seen in the disengagement of a large number of young workers in nongovernmental organizations and activists from U.S.-backed projects and networks built up over decades of public diplomacy, a development cited by Annelle Sheline in her principled resignation from her post as a foreign affairs officer at the State Department in March.
• The White House is still acting as if none of this really matters.
• Arab regimes will survive, anger will fade or be redirected to other issues, and, in a few months, Washington can get back to the important business of Israeli-Saudi normalization. That is how things have traditionally worked. But this time may well be different.
• The Gaza fiasco, at a moment of shifting global power and changing calculations by regional leaders, shows how little Washington has learned from its long record of policy failures.
• The nature and degree of popular anger, the decline of U.S. primacy and the collapse of its legitimacy, and Arab regimes’ prioritization of their domestic survival, as well as regional competition, suggests that the new regional order will be much more attentive to public opinion than the old. If Washington continues to ignore public opinion, it will doom its planning for after the war ends in Gaza.

See:

The Coming Arab Backlash: Middle Eastern Regimes—and America—Ignore Public Anger at Their Peril (foreignaffairs.com)

Alastair Crooke: Will Zionism Self-Destruct? (youtube.com)

’16^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Knowing when to fight & when to settle.’

Whereas ‘delusion’ can lead to war – ‘realism’ results in Diplomatic settlement.

The difference between ‘realism’ and ‘delusion’ is existential – i.e. ‘survival’.

For a masterclass in ‘realism’ v. ‘delusion’ watch – Should Congress Stop Funding the War in Ukraine? (youtube.com)

This debate demonstrates why reason based upon facts, i.e. common sense, must prevail over ideology and emotional rhetoric in professional Foreign Policy discourse.

The ‘Realists’ – Professor John Mearsheimer is a graduate of Westpoint and served in the US Armed Forces during the Vietnam War. Lt.Colonel Davis is a decorated veteran who fought in Operation Dessert Storm, and in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The ‘Dreamers’ – Ambassador Paula Dobriansky and Heather Conley are senior members of the US Foreign Policy establishment. While each of them is highly accomplished, knbowledgeable and experienced, neither of them has served in the military and had any combat experience.

I will let you draw your own conclusions about whether US Foreign Policy is deluded because senior policy makers do not understand what Professor Mearsheimer describes as ‘Balance of Power Politics 101.’

What this comes down to is a battle between ‘ideas’ and ‘facts’.

When ‘ideas’ and ‘values’, no matter how laudible, prevail over reality on the ground, based upon documented facts about the ‘metrics’ of warfare, then the side which will win on the battlefiled is the military force who can carry on shooting after all the other side has left are ‘ideas’.

Therefore, is there something deeply immoral about being a ‘dreamer’, when war can be avoided and lives saved from slaughter, by being a ‘realist’?

One of the first things I did when I completed my last exam in Political Science Finals at University was to treat myself to copy of the original edition of ‘Rationalism in Politics.’ Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays: Amazon.co.uk: Oakeshott, Michael: 9780865970953: Books

I also recommend the following books by Professor John Mearsheimer:

The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy: John J. Mearsheimer: Amazon.co.uk: Mearsheimer, John J, Walt, Stephen M: 9780141031231: Books

The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (Henry L. Stimson Letures): Amazon.co.uk: Mearsheimer, John J.: 9780300248562: Books

The Tragedy of Great Power Politics – Updated Edition : Mearsheimer, John: Amazon.co.uk: Books

How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy: Amazon.co.uk: Mearsheimer, John J., Rosato, Sebastian: 9780300269307: Books

I also recommend watching:

• BREAKING: U.S. is a Knife’s Edge away from War w/Iran (youtube.com)
• Deep Dive Intel Briefing: What We Learned This Week (youtube.com)
• Ukraine Front Lines on the Verge of Collapsing w/Col. Jacques Baud (youtube.com)
• John Mearsheimer: Ukraine’s NEW Counteroffensive / Zelensky Guarantees Victory? (youtube.com)
• Col Jacques Baud – What really happened on the ground October 7th (youtube.com)

See also:

• Israel Risking ‘MILLIONS OF LIVES’ In Regional War: Omar Badder (youtube.com)
• ‘Disastrous’: Israel-Iran tensions test limits of US policy amid Gaza war | Israel War on Gaza News | Al Jazeera
• Royal Marines preparing to lead ‘Dunkirk-style’ evacuation of Britons living in the Middle East should Iran launch missile attacks on Israel after consul blast that killed 13 people (msn.com)

‘Former Supreme Court President among 600 lawyers to sign letter calling on UK to stop arms sales to Israel (04.04.2024)’

The letter concludes:

‘The present situation in the Gaza Strip is catastrophic, and the International Court of Justice has held that there is a plausible risk of genocide being committed against the Palestinian people in Gaza. As the ICJ has previously emphasised, the obligation to prevent genocide is “normative and compelling”.98 The UK must take immediate measures to bring to an end through lawful means acts giving rise to a serious risk of genocide.99 Failure to comply with its own obligations under the Genocide Convention to take “all measures to prevent genocide which were within its power ”would incur UK state responsibility for the commission of an international wrong,100 for which full reparation must be made.101 Serious action is moreover needed to avoid UK complicity in grave breaches of international law, including potential violations of the Genocide Convention. We are concerned that the UK Government is failing to discharge its international obligations in these respects. While we welcome the increasingly robust calls by your Government for a cessation of fighting and the unobstructed entry to Gaza of humanitarian assistance,102 simultaneously to continue (to take two striking examples) the sale of weapons and weapons systems to Israel and to maintain threats of suspending UK aid to UNRWA falls significantly short of your Government’s obligations under international law.’

‘Mark Lyall Grant, a former national security adviser, said the facts had changed considerably since the government’s lawyers last assessed the situation in Gaza in December.

Since then, the international court of justice has suggested in an interim judgment that there is a plausible risk of genocide in Gaza. Last week, the UN security council passed a resolution calling for an immediate ceasefire in Gaza, which Israel has not abided by.

A humanitarian crisis has unfolded in the Palestinian territory, with David Cameron, the foreign secretary, accusing Israel of blocking the delivery of aid.

“All those developments since then means that if the government lawyers were to look again at this issue they may come to a different judgment,” Lyall Grant told Sky News. “In that case then it would be very difficult for the British government to continue to sell weapons to Israel.’ (Ex-MI6 chief blames Israel’s ‘systematic targeting’ for death of aid workers in Gaza | The Independent).

See also my blog on the ‘Understanding Conflict & Mediating Settlement’ page- ‘According to a leaked recording the British Government has received advice from its own lawyers stating that Israel has breached international humanitarian law in Gaza but has failed to make it public’, in which I wrote:

‘If this is the advice members of the Foreign Office Legal Department have provided to the UK Government, then what legal advice has been provided by Government Legal Advisors in the US State Department, the German Federal Foreign Office, and the French Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs to their respective Governments?’

See:

• Gaza-letter-FIN-3-April.pdf (lawyersletter.uk)
• Lady Hale among 600 lawyers to sign letter calling on UK to stop arms sales to Israel | The Independent
• Former supreme court judges say UK arming Israel breaches international law | Israel-Gaza war | The Guardian
• UK’s Rishi Sunak faces growing pressure to stop arms sales to Israel | Israel War on Gaza News | Al Jazeera
• UK is breaching international law by continuing to arm Israel, Sunak warned | Politics News | Sky News
• Ex-MI6 chief blames Israel’s ‘systematic targeting’ for death of aid workers in Gaza | The Independent
• Sir Alan Duncan calls for Lord Polak, Lord Pickles and Tom Tugendhat to face… – LBC
• Alan Duncan being investigated by Conservative Party after criticising fellow Tories for… – LBC
• Why Israel Slaughters Aid Workers – And How Media Outlets Covered It Up (youtube.com)

Google also:

• Palestine Action crashes into Israeli drone factory in Leicester (thelondoneconomic.com)
• UK arms sales to Israel should end, say legal experts – BBC News – which states: ‘The UK has licenced arms to Israel worth over £574m since 2008, when official country-level data was made available, according to pressure group Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT). Business Minister Greg Hands has previously told MPs the figure for 2022 – £42m – represented 0.02% of Israel’s military imports that year.’
• CBP-9964.pdf (parliament.uk)
• UK arms exports to Israel – House of Commons Library (parliament.uk)

Hierarchy of Sanctions for non-compliance with a binding resolution of the UN Security Council

As a precocious 19 year old political science undergraduate, I argued that, ‘If the mobile and wealthy segment of the population of a pariah state leave, then that state will eventually implode, because it will not be able to pay for public services. The catalyst is sanctions, which eventually lead to the total economic and diplomatic isolation of the pariah state. In other words, the embargoed state cannot survive because it cannot pay its bills.’

This is an over- simplification. However, sanctions over time can work, provided civilians living in the pariah state can get out.

I call this the ‘paradox of expansion’, because by committing ethnic cleansing in order to unlawfully take land from the indigenous population, colonial settlers in the pariah state, ultimately destroy themselves.

Therefore, the biggest ‘existential’ mistake that the leaders of such a pariah state can make, is to refuse to comply with a binding resolution of the UN Security Council.

The hierarchy of sanctions is typically as follows:

1^st – A trade embargo. Often limited to a prohibition on supplying arms. A full trade embargo will prohibit the export to, and import from, the embargoed state of all goods, with the exception of food and medical supplies which are needed for humanitarian purposes, and sometimes other humanitarian goods. The embargo may be partial e.g. permitting the supply of defence systems to intercept incoming rockets, whilst banning the export of all other arms and parts.

2^nd – Financial sanctions. Without them, the embargoed state would be much better able to pay for smuggled goods. There may be a comprehensive freeze on all existing funds held by the embargoed state, and a prohibition on making new funds available to it. There may also be a total ban on any bank, financial insitution or law firm having any dealings whatsoever with the embargoed state.

3^rd – Sequestration and impounding of assets.

4^TH – Flight restrictions.

5^TH – Diplomatic & similar sanctions, including prevention of sports men and women from participating in international events and the suspension of government-sponsored scientific and cultural exchanges. This would include a ban on participation in the Eurovision Song Contest.

6^TH – Refusal of visas to high-level officials.

‘The whole system of the United Nations has been conceived to deal with the primary actors in international law: states. In this spirit, a mechanism of international security has been created that gives the United Nations Security Council a unique power to deal with threats to the international peace and security. The Security Council can deal with such threats by imposing sanctions against the source of the threat. But it has never been thought of during the San Francisco Conference to sanction individuals. Nevertheless, ever since the Security Council has applied sanctions, it has targeted them also against individuals and other non-state actors. The very first time the Security Council chose to apply sanctions it did not target a state but the white minority government of Southern Rhodesia, at the time not a sovereign state but a British colony. Virtually all United Nations sanction regimes in part directly affect individuals. In some cases, only members of governments and their closest associates and relatives were sanctioned. But in recent years, hundreds of individuals have been ‘blacklisted’ by the Security Council as suspected terrorists. Usually such sanctions include the freezing of assets and restrictions on travel. ’

See: Birkhauser.pdf (esil-sedi.eu)

See also:

• N. expert says Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, calls for arms embargo (msn.com)
• UN rights expert report to call for Israel arms embargo over ‘acts of genocide’ | Israel-Gaza war | The Guardian
• Will the UN ceasefire resolution stop Israel’s war on Gaza? | Israel War on Gaza News | Al Jazeera
• Security Council Demands Immediate Ceasefire in Gaza for Month of Ramadan, Adopting Resolution 2728 (2024) with 14 Members Voting in Favour, United States Abstaining | Meetings Coverage and Press Releases
• Politicians from 12 countries unite to press for arms ban on Israel | Israel | The Guardian

‘How do you mediate a dispute where one or both participants are deluded?’

1st a Mediator [‘M’] should not assume anything.

2nd a Mediator does not possess all of the facts.

3rd – M is an adult in the room.

In my Article – ‘Mediating Probate and Trust Disputes – Process Challenges and Tools – Part 2′ published in Trusts & Trustees (Oxford University Press) last year,  I wrote:

‘Acknowledging and summarizing without judgment –

Appreciate their point of view. Understand it. It is very important to appreciate the way they see it. Even if you don’t agree, say that it merits serious consideration. Don’t say that they are wrong. Appreciate their self-esteem. Acknowledge that the other person has been heard. Be prepared to argue their case better than they can before you answer it.’[i]

In the opinion of the author this wisdom applies to both advocates and mediators with one critical distinction – M does not argue anything, he enquires about P’s case and may ‘reality-test’ P’s underlying perceptions, assumptions and beliefs.

M needs to summarize without judgment, e.g.:

‘What I am hearing is …’

Tell me this …’

‘Is that an accurate summary.’ …

Probing and clarifying  – M should assume nothing, and presume that something in the jigsaw puzzle is missing. Mediators have to work in the moment, relying upon intuition to decide what to ask next and how. M needs to be curious, i.e. nosey, whilst being gentle, caring and polite. M needs to ask strategic, incisive and effective questions in private sessions, in order to create clarity of thinking and ensure that deeper information is uncovered.’

Asking what the other P would think and say – It is not the function of a facilitative mediator to offer or provide an opinion about any issue in dispute. If P asks M what he thinks about an issue, M should turn the question around by asking P what he thinks the other participant is likely to think, based upon those facts.

[i] The late Professor Roger Fisher in a two hour conversation with the author at Harvard Law School during a research visit as a Scholar from King’s College London to Harvard University in April 2002.’

See also my blog below – ‘Consequences of Delusional Decision-Making.’

‘Two-State Solution’

See:

• Achieving the Two-State Solution in the Wake of Gaza War — Jeffrey D. Sachs (jeffsachs.org)
• Aaron Maté : More State Dept. Lies (youtube.com)
• Senate Democrats press Biden to establish two-state solution for Israel, Palestine | The Hill
• The Strange Resurrection of the Two-State Solution | Foreign Affairs
• History of the Question of Palestine – Question of Palestine (un.org)
• Anya Parampil : Is Zionism Falling? (youtube.com)

‘Consequences of Delusional Decision-Making’

‘Self-deception may be one of the worst kinds of deception that there is top mankind. .. Deceiving oneself being unwilling to acknowledge things that are objectively true – this could be the worst because the consequences very often won’t just rebound upon you but will accrue immediately upon your head.’

See:

• Macron’s Dangerous Gambit: Boasts of Strength – but Exposes Weakness – YouTube 
• Jeffrey Sachs: “You can’t run a world on hate in the nuclear age without risking destroying humanity – YouTube
• Col. Doug Macgregor: Macron Bluffing on the World’s Stage with his Threats (youtube.com)
• Ray McGovern: CIA and German Propaganda (youtube.com)
• UK arms exports to Israel – House of Commons Library (parliament.uk)

The Parliamentary Report states:

‘The Secretary of State for Defence, Grant Shapps, says that UK defence exports to Israel are “relatively small”, amounting to £42 million in 2022. Since 2008, the UK has licenced arms worth over £574 million to Israel, according to analysis of Government export data by CAAT, a UK based pressure group that seeks an end to the global arms trade.’ The UK Government also buys arms from Israel.

Google also – ‘UK won’t say if arms export licences to Israel flagged over concerns were revoked – NGOs say British public has again been left in the dark about whether UK-made arms are being used by Israel in Gaza war.’

‘Gaza – Is the way forward the creation of a single normal secular state for both Israelis and Palestinians?’

Could this be geo-politically engineered by the US under a Trump administration, working in collaboration with Iran and other members of the Global South? See:

• Anya Parampil : Is Zionism Falling? (youtube.com)
• EU Declares Israel Deliberately Starving Gaza (youtube.com)
• Is Victory FADING AWAY for Israel? w/Matt Hoh fmr State Dept, Kelley Vlahos, Quincy Inst (youtube.com)
• Alastair Crooke: The Resistance to Israel is Ready – YouTube
• My blog on the ‘Understanding Conflict & Mediating Settlement’ page – ‘Is Zionism a form of white colonial settler supremacy?
• My blog below – ‘Understanding Conflict & Mediating Settlement.’
• My blog below – ’14^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Balancing realism with morality in the design of a political structure.’
• ‘The idea of Geopolitical Mediation’ on the ‘Geopolitical Mediation & Peace Building’ page.
• My blogs on the ‘Geopolitical Mediation & Peace Building’ page:

–  ‘The geopolitical price of US support for Zionism and complicity in Genocide in Gaza.’

– ‘Is Geo-Political Mediation by Turkey the gateway to an eventual Diplomatic Rapprochement by the West with Russia under a Trump administration?

– ‘Could the election of Donald Trump result in peace in both Ukraine and Gaza? – Some food for thought for realists.’

–  ‘Religion is not a sustainable basis for nationalism.’ 

• Israel’s ‘Total Victory’ Losing Washington’s Support (youtube.com)
• Karmi, Ghada (2023) One State – The Only Democratic Future for Palestine-Israel, Pluto Press. [Available from Amazon Books].
• Pappe, Ilan (2007) The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications. [Available from Amazon Books].
• Pappe, Ilan (2017) Ten Myths About Israel, [Available from Amazon Books].

’15^th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – In order to get a participant to really think about the philosophical basis and legitimacy of their position you need to speak to them in the language of their own source of reference.’

Then you can challenge the legitimacy of their position using the philosophical framework of their own arguments.

So, if an Evangelical Christian Zionist quotes the Book of Revelations at you from the Old Testament, you patiently counter and undermine their theological reasoning by quoting from the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to get them to realise and acknowledge that their entire belief system is undermined by an alternative world view based upon principles of natural law which transcend and contradict the philosophical basis of their world view.

In other words, that the basis of their entire belief system is critically flawed based upon the application of their own principles and values, i.e. because it makes no ‘absolute’ sense when rigorously scrutinised, interrogated and tested against those philosophical benchmarks or anchors.

That is when doubt enters their mind.

While you get nowhere reciting principles of International Humanitarian Law to them – because they don’t care, and cannot reason with them about the calamity for mankind of ‘Armageddon’, because they will say – ‘bring it on’, as they believe this will accelerate the 2nd coming of Christ – which is their objective, you break through by engaging in a theological argument using their own source of reference, i.e. the Bible against them.

So, in order to steer and nudge a participant in Mediation [‘P‘] in the direction of the zone in which a constructive problem-solving dialogue can take place and develop through a process of mediated engagement with their opponent, the Mediator [‘M‘] must first bring about the ‘cutting adrift’ of P from their own obsessive pre-conceived belief-system and its dogma.

This is facilitated by M through a process of polite, courteous, culturally sensitive, careful and patient questioning/probing, whereby through a gradual process of self-realization and reflection, P starts to question the intellectual/spiritual/ideological validity of their own beliefs and underlying values. That is because M has planted a seed of doubt in their mind. It is as if M is not even there, i.e. M stays invisible behind the power and influence of the counter-reasoning, as P awakens himself.

Once P has been self-awakened, then M as P‘s trusted ‘guide’, can help P move along toward acknowledgment and eventually an agreement, that there is another and better way of co-existing and living-together in peace.

See also my blog below – ‘Ethical decision-making based upon principles of natural law.’

‘Ethical decision-making based upon principles of natural law.’

Thomas Aquinas’ thought is more relevant than ever – ‘What does the thought of one of the most distinguished theologians in the history of the Church have to do with the development of social sciences? The work of a philosopher with the ways in which human relationships are articulated and grow?

More than you might think, as the Pope has pointed out in a letter to the participants in a workshop organised by the Pontifical Academy of Social Sciences.

Taking place from Thursday to Friday of this week, the conference is considering the theme “Aquinas’ Social Ontology and Natural Law in Perspective”. …

Pope Francis also stresses the attention that the Angelic Doctor dedicates to issues of justice, especially in his Commentaries. These demonstrate, the Pope said, “his influence in shaping modern moral and legal thought.”

Aquinas, the Pope recalls, affirms “the intrinsic dignity and unity of the human person” – both the virtues of the body and those “of the rational soul” – which enable us to distinguish between true and false and between good and evil.

This is what Saint Thomas calls the “innate capacity” of human beings “to discern and to order or dispose acts to their ultimate end through love,” otherwise known as “natural law.” …

Aquinas’ trust in the natural law inscribed in humanity’s heart can offer, the Pope insists, “fresh and valid insights to our globalised world” which is “dominated by legal positivism and casuistry,” even though – he acknowledges – it “continues to seek solid foundations for a just and humane social order.” …’

See: Pope Francis: Thomas Aquinas’ thought more relevant than ever – Vatican News

Principles of Practical Ethics are a moral compass to guide decision-making about ‘what is the right thing to do.’

These principles are therefore a powerful tool which a skilful Mediator can apply in order to enable a religious zealot to challenge the basis of their own irrational beliefs.

These beliefs may for example be based upon scriptural admonitions e.g. references to Amalek, and to a selective and literal reading of the Bible about Armageddon and the second coming of Christ – which are the foundation stones of extreme right wing Evangelical Chrisitan Zionist beliefs in both the US and UK.

What can Mediators learn from ‘practical ethics’ based upon ‘principles of natural law’ in order to help save religious zealots from themselves, and to save normal secular folk from the ideological madness of these people?

See also:

• Natural law – Wikipedia
• The Natural Law Tradition in Ethics (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• “In Search of a Universal Ethic: A New Look at the Natural Law” International Theological Commission (vatican.va)
• Thomas Aquinas (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• Religion and Terrorism LB.pdf (globalindiafoundation.org)
• Thomism – Wikipedia
• ‘An Introduction to Ethics: A Natural Law Approach’, by Brian Besong – which is listed in the Research Bibliography toward the foot of the ‘Understanding Conflict & Mediating Peace’ page.
• Pope says Ukraine should ‘raise white flag’ and end war with Russia – video | World news | The Guardian

In international relations theory, it is a cannon of realist doctrine that a policy which is strategically and morally bankrupt will neither serve and advance your interests nor has any ethical raison d’être.

Because it does not align with core principles underlying the policy-maker’s interests and may prove to be antithetical, it is not rational and is a geopolitical mistake.

Applying this principle to the design of a political structure [‘PS’], the likely consequence is that PS will not survive.

That is because in balance of power politics, PS may threaten the interests of key stakeholders [‘KS’] including:

(a) demographic groups with the territory of PS;
(b) neighbouring states; and
(c) regional hegemons/aspiring hegemons and their proxies.

If PS has no legitimacy at birth, then inevitably this will take all key stakeholders back to square one, i.e. it will result in a resumption of armed conflict. So, as a political solution, at every level, PS will prove to be a failure.

However, if the geopolitical architects of PS can balance ‘realism’ with ‘practical ethics’, then arguably PS can achieve legitimacy by applying for membership of the United Nations, i.e. as a state recognized by each KS UN member state [‘UNKSMS’].

If each KS acknowledges and supports this political endgame, then a balance can be agreed through a mediated process, and a mediator tool is the previously uncharted body of ethical principles underlying peremptory norms of international humanitarian law, upon which each UNKSMS can agree.

If the endgame is achieved, then PS can integrate with each UNKSMS in order ensure and maintain stability in the region for the mutual benefit of each UNKSMS. This may take the form of interdependence through collaboration e.g. in education, trade, infrastructure development, investment, and mutual security – including environmental protection.

Writing in ‘Foreign Affairs’ 20.02.2024, in an article – ‘The strange resurrection of the two state solution – how an unimaginable war could bring about the only imaginable peace’, Martin Indyk wrote:

‘Wars often don’t end until both sides have exhausted themselves and become convinced that they are better off coexisting with their enemies than pursuing a futile effort to destroy them. … Over time, majorities in both societies may recognize that the only way to secure the future for their children is to separate out of respect rather than engage out of hatred.’

The design and evolution of a two-state solution is not a unilateral process. At some point, when each KS is ready to talk, it will require a process of geopolitical mediation in order for each KS to arrive at the realisation that ‘the only way to secure the future for their children is to separate out of respect rather than engage out of hatred.’

That is the break-through moment.

Extrapolating from that principle, I would further argue that once each KS has reasoned that survival can only be mutually assured by living together in peace, that may open a door to dialogue about the creation of a normal secular state for both Israelis and Palestinians

‘Under International Law an occupier is both a fiduciary for their own people and also of humanity writ large’

This dual commission principle finds expression in many areas of international law, including:
– the doctrine that states bear legal obligations to the international community as a whole (obligations erga omnes);
– the idea that the international community bears a collective responsibility to protect humanity from mass atrocities, see the 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, Oct 24, 2005, at: 133; 138-139; S.C. Res. 1973, A/Res/60/1, Mar 17, 2011, preamble); and
– international agreements that affirm states’ co-trusteeship of the environment as a common concern of humankind.
These fiduciary duties also resonate with Art. 74 of the United Nations Charter, which states:
‘Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters.’

‘Verdross argued that states bore an imperative duty under international law to undertake certain moral tasks. Lauterpacht asserted that peremptory norms derive their unique legal authority from two interrelated sources – international morality and general principles of state practice. In Lauterpacht’s view, “overriding principles of international law,” [which in the author’s submission includes a duty by an occupier to protect ancient public monuments located in the occupied territory – subject to the doctrine of military necessity], “may be regarded as constituting principles of international public order (ordre international public). These principles … may be expressive of rules of international morality so cogent that an international tribunal would consider them forming a part of those principles of law generally recognised by civilised nations which the ICJ is bound to apply [under] it statute.” … Kant’s theory of international law ultimately relies on his social contract theory of the state. [The] theory we defend is that the state and its institutions are fiduciaries of the people subject to state power, and therefore a state’s claim to sovereignty, properly understood, relies on its fulfilment of a multifaceted and overarching fiduciary obligation to respect the agency and dignity of the people subject to state power. One of the requirements of this obligation – is compliance with jus cogens. Put another way, the fiduciary principle governs the relationship between the state and its people, and this principle requires the state to comply with peremptory norms. … Fiduciary relations arise from circumstances in which one party (the fiduciary) holds discretionary power of an administrative nature over the legal or practical interests of another party (the beneficiary), and the beneficiary is  peculiarly vulnerable to the fiduciary’s power in the sense that she is unable, either as a matter of fact or law, to exercise the entrusted power. … The fiduciary’s power is purposive in that it is held or conferred for limited purposes, such as furthering exclusively the equitable interests of a trust’s beneficiary.  And finally, the power is institutional in that it must be situated within a legally permissible institution.  … The law seeks to dissolve rather than regulate relationships of incorrigible domination. Beneficiaries are particularly vulnerable in that, once in a fiduciary relationship, they generally are unable to protect themselves or their entrusted interests against an abuse of fiduciary power. … Locke had famously asserted that legislative power is “only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends” and that “there remained still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislators, when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. In other words, popular sovereignty denotes that the state sovereign powers belong to the people, and so those powers are held in trust by the rulers on condition that they be used for the people’s benefit. Popular sovereignty thus implies that the state and its institutions are fiduciaries of the people, for their justification rests exclusively on the authority they enjoy the governance of the people. … [It] is an entity’s assumption of state powers, not de jure statehood per se, that triggers the fiduciary principle. Any entity that assumes unilateral administrator power over individuals bears a fiduciary obligation to honour the basic demands of dignity, including the peremptory norms of international jus cogens. … [Implicit] within the state’s obligation to secure legal order is another independently sufficient condition for the identification of peremptory norms: the rule of law. … Public corruption offends the state subject fiduciary relation irrespective of whether the corrupt acts are large or small in scope: a low-level public official who … Accepts a petty bride violates the peremptory norm against corruption, just as a head of state violates jus cogens by draining the state treasury for private gain. The prohibition against corruption thus illustrates the important principle that the scope of jus cogens is not limited exclusively to acts such as military aggression. … Violations of peremptory norms .. are necessarily wrongful and legally impermissible on any scale. …

Legal scholars have traced the fiduciary concept as far back as the Code of Hammurabi in ancient Mesopotamia … and have shown that concepts of fiduciary obligation informs not only Roman law … But also Islamic law. … Indeed, the modern Anglo-American law of trust owes a considerable debt to the waqf from Islamic law – an endowment created by a donor for use by designated beneficiaries and under the administration of the trustee – which was introduced to England by Franciscan friars returning from the Crusades in the 13th century.’ (Criddle, Evan J. & Evan Fox-Decent A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens, The Yale Journal of International Law (2009) Vol 34: 331-387).

’13th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Listen to and acknowledge each participant’s interests and concerns.’

What underlying strategic interests and concerns are driving the conflict?

P.1’s beliefs about the legitimacy of P.2‘s interests and concerns is irrelevant and vice versa. That is because, all that matters is what each P believes in their own mind.

As I wrote in my blog below, the ‘11th Principle of Negotiating Political Order ‘ – See the world as it is and not as you want it to be’ – ‘Before a mediator can empathise with each participant in a mediation he/she must first know and understand each participant’s history.

‘Appreciate their point of view.  Understand it. It is very important to appreciate the way they see it. Even if you don’t agree, say that it merits serious consideration. Don’t say that they are wrong. Appreciate their self-esteem. Acknowledge that the other person has been heard. Be prepared to argue their case better than they can before you answer it.’

The late Professor Roger Fisher in a two-hour conversation with the author at Harvard Law School during a research visit as a Scholar from King’s College London to Harvard University in April 2002.’

Therefore, in order to engage in dialogue each P must first listen to and acknowledge the other P’s interests and concerns in order to make each P‘s underlying drivers of conflict transparent to all of the P‘s and their proxies, e.g. ‘Sovereignty of P.1’ v. ‘Security of P.2’. In my blog below – ‘The “5 Points” in the Mediation of a Peace Process’, I argue that, ‘The political Deal Making Zone exists in the space between two interacting parallel dynamics which may converge in the consciousness of each P:

– Relative Gains v. Relative Losses [‘P.1 – P.2’].

– Common Ground [‘CG’].

These are interrelated, because acknowledgment of common ground may reduce perceived ‘losses’ and increase perceived ‘gains’ in the mind of each P.

Acknowledgement of each other’s interests and concerns can slowly but gradually result in a breakthrough moment when each side says to itself and then to each other – ‘Why are we fighting each other instead of working together?’

‘Unconscious Bias in Mediation’

Unconscious/Implicit bias [‘UB’] refers to a set of attitudes and beliefs that Participants, and the Mediator may be unaware of. It has two components:
1.  Attitudes; and
2.  Stereotypes.
Attitudes can be positive, negative, or neutral. Stereotypes are categories that constrain and shape what a person believes about, and expects from, other people. One of the challenges in managing stereotypes is that they are a form of automatic thinking: they spring to mind even if they represent a view that our conscious minds find abhorrent.
In mediating a cultural property dispute UB is linked to fairness. ‘In the pursuit of fairness, the interest-based framework instructs negotiators to answer the question of distribution by relying on objective criteria. According to the interest-based framework, objective criteria-often found in traditions, customs, scientific findings, and market valuations – are deemed legitimate so long as they are created by a third party and are accepted by a sizeable number of people. These criteria are touted as authoritative benchmarks of what is fair. The central promise of interest-based negotiation is that a fair process based on these fair criteria will guarantee a fair distribution which in turn leads to a fair outcome. The problem with this promise is that: in part, it hinges its guarantee of fairness on the presumed fairness of the criteria themselves. It presupposes that so long as criteria are externally crafted and generally accepted, they are objective and therefore fair. However, many types of criteria relied upon by the interest-based framework to ensure objectivity and fairness are themselves animated by norms that are prejudiced and, in fact, unfair. With the twofold recognition that norms can become embedded in ostensibly objective criteria and that said norms can be unjust and unfair, the promise of fairness seemingly collapses. In the wake of this collapse, negotiators must be prepared to (1) assess which unfair norms, explicit or tacit, are shaping the dynamics of the negotiation and (2) consider how the pursuit of fairness dictates that the norms themselves be renegotiated. It is these (often implicit) norm negotiations that are the most difficult, the most unsettling, the most frightening and the most important. These negotiations can have long-term systemic implications for who gets what and why. This can feel, and often is, existential. … A postcolonial negotiation about land distribution between an indigenous group and a former coloniser is as much about land ownership as it is about the white supremacist norms used to justify the initial land theft. … In short, if interest-based negotiation is to realise its promise of fairness, sources of legitimacy must be reimagined.’ [Eckblad, Ariel ‘In Pursuit of Fairness: Renegotiating Embedded Norms and Reimagining Interest-Based Negotiation’, Harvard Negotiation Law Review, Vol 26:1 Fall 2020, 1-29].

‘Relationship between Loss aversion & Distributive Justice’

‘When making decisions, most people, most of the time, give more weight to the risk of suffering a loss of a given magnitude than to the chance of gaining a benefit of the same magnitude. This preference seems irrational, and it is considered a cognitive bias. This bias is known as loss aversion. Loss aversion refers to the symmetry in the evaluation of positive and negative outcomes, in which losses loom larger than the corresponding gains. In other words, a person is more deterred by the idea of losing a particular sum of money than excited by the idea of gaining the same sum: for most people the fear of losing $100 is more intense than the hope of gaining $150.’ (Linveh, Yair Overcoming the Loss Aversion Obstacle in Negotiation, Harvard negotiation Law Review, Vol.25:187, Spring 2020, 187-212).

‘The “5 Points” in the Mediation of a Peace Process’

5 points make up the tips of a star, and 5 points make up the vertices of the inner pentagon i.e. the ‘Hub’.
The ‘5 Points’ in the mediation of a peace process are:
·       ‘Dynamic Drivers’ – i.e. each participant’s [‘P’s] wants, needs, priorities & reasons.
·       ‘Political risk’ – political costs incurred/could be incurred in going to war.
·       ‘The political price of doing a deal that is enough’ i.e. the Deal-Making risk/benefit calculus.
·       ‘Acknowledgement of common ground.’
·       ‘Exploration of the hub to discover hidden common ground in order to close the gap & do a deal.’

The diplomatic settlement of a political dispute invariably involves a trade-off between ten inter-connected variables along a spectrum of needs, resources, priorities, and ‘Red-line’ dealmaker/breaker imperatives, i.e. each P’s BATNA.

The political Deal Making Zone (‘DMZ’) exists in the space between two interacting parallel dynamics which may converge in the consciousness of each P:

– Relative Gains v. Relative Losses [‘P.1 – P.2’].

– Common Ground [‘CG’].

Relative Gains v. Relative Losses:

(i)         Governance.

(ii)        Security.

(iii)       Land.

(iv)       Recognition.

Common ground in eliminating existential risk by doing a deal instead of fighting includes:

(v)     Sovereignty/equal rights.

(vi)    Law & order.

(vii)    Rule of law – Human rights, justice & accountability.

(viii)   Reconciliation/Integration/Peaceful co-existence.

(ix)    Institutional stability, creation & maintenance of conditions for investment & development so that society can flourish and prosper.

(x)     Safeguards, guarantees, & membership of international security & economic networks on a level playing field so that each P can survive in an inter-dependent world & peace can take root, grow and spread.

The author posits that the gap between P1. and P.2 is reduced by the convergence of CG with P.1 – P.2. In other words, the closer P.1 – P.2 is to the underlying CG, the smaller the gap is between P.1 and P.2. That is the DMZ. Visually this can be represented as follows:

Pre- Convergence

P.1 ————————————————————————————–P.2

CG?

Convergence

P.1 ————-P.2

         CG

In Mediation the possibilities are only limited by the imagination of the participants and their legal representatives. Whilst not infinite, ‘doable’ deals that ‘are enough’ are invariably possible.

’12th Principle of Negotiating Political Order’ –  Common interest in entering into mediation early

In order to prevent a fire from spreading you must put it out. Parties – those who started the fire and those who are victims, are stakeholders. However, not all stakeholders are parties. A party and their proxy, may have started a fire with the intention that it spreads. That risk expands the class of Stakeholders to all affected if the fire does spread, i.e. if a ‘NIAC’ (non-international armed conflict) becomes an ‘IAC’ (international armed conflict). Therefore from the outset in a NIAC, wider interests are in play other than those of the parties and the proxies themselves, because the NIAC could trigger a regional conflict, and even political insurgencies elsewhere around the globe, which harm the interests of those wider stakeholders e.g. at critical economic and geopolitically strategic ‘choke-points’ such as the Straights of Hormuz. It is therefore in the interest of wider stakeholders to contain the fire so that it can be extinguished before it spreads. A Westphalian peace treaty can then emerge before all that is left are ashes. Common ground exists where interests converge. You cannot militarily kill an idea, but you can outflank and undermine it by creating conditions on the ground which marginalise it to the point of irrelevance. That involves: political reform; creation and protection of human rights; education; and the establishment of a healthy and prosperous society. Wealth creation depends upon investment, which requires political stability. The pillars of political stability in any society are its ‘institutions’. If those institutions are consumed by the flames, while new institutions can be created they will fail if parachuted in. Iraq is a prime example. Sustainable, resilient, and enduring political institutions have to take root and grow in the soil of their local environment. Stakeholders who are not parties can act as gardeners. If there is consensus between these stakeholders about what weeds need to be dug out, then that will have some legitimacy. If however, a party takes the law into their own hands, and breaches International Humanitarian Law on a historically unprecedented scale in modern times, then that should result in a War Crimes Tribunal. If stakeholders are seen to have stood by and allowed this to happen, they will appear to be complicit. If those stakeholders are liberal democracies, the consequences of passive or active acquiescence in such a war crime will undermine the rule of law. Geopolitically, in a multi-polar and politically bifurcated world, this will result in those state actors not only becoming even more deeply entrenched on one side of a regional conflict with no foreseeable exit strategy other than to leave, it will also weaken their diplomatic influence in the region, because their regional partners today will tomorrow, be looking elsewhere for political and military backing to protect their own backs. That is why in order to put the fire out, it is better to enter into mediation sooner rather than later, because stakeholders will be negotiating from weakness and not strength, if they allow the fire to burn and spread – possibly out of control.

The ‘Power Paradox’ is that the harder P.1 makes it for P.2 to say ‘no’, the harder P.1 makes it for P.2 to say ‘yes’.

‘The key mistake we make when we feel frustrated is to abandon the problem-solving game and turn to the power game instead. Overcoming the power paradox means making it easier for the other side to say yes at the same time that you make it harder for them to say no. Making it easy to say yes requires problem-solving negotiation; making it hard to say no requires exercising power. You don’t need to choose between the two. You can do both. Treat the exercise of power as an integral part of the problem-solving negotiation. Use power to bring the other side to the table. Instead of seeking victory, aim for mutual satisfaction. Use power to bring them to their senses, not to their knees. If the other side refuses to come to terms despite all your efforts, it is usually because they believe they can win. They believe that their best alternative to negotiation—their BATNA—is superior to your golden bridge. You need to convince them that they are wrong. Use your power to educate the other side that the only way for them to win is for both of you to win together. Assume the mind-set of a respectful counsellor. Act as if they have simply miscalculated how best to achieve their interests. Focus their attention on their interest in avoiding the negative consequences of no agreement. Don’t try to impose your terms on them. Seek instead to shape their choice so that they make a decision that is in their interest and yours. Using power to educate the other side works in tandem with building them a golden bridge. The first underscores the costs of no agreement, while the second highlights the benefits of agreement. The other side faces a choice between accepting the consequences of no agreement and crossing the bridge. Your job is to keep sharpening that choice until they recognize that the best way to satisfy their interests is to cross the bridge.’  William Ury | Getting Past No – Use Power to Educate

‘Universal principles of International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) as a Mediator tool in agreeing common ground in mediating how a new political order could be constructed to end a conflict?’

In my previous blog, ‘Structuring as a tool of mediating peace?’ (below), I argued that an instrument/tool for creating political order out of anarchy is ‘institution building’, and observed, ‘If a proxy war requires a proxy solution, then a challenge for mediators in a contemporary ‘Westphalian’ process, is to facilitate the design/structuring/engineering of a new political order that results in a sustainable peace, which is secured/guaranteed by the key stakeholders with the participation and consent of their proxies’. In other words, in their toolkit mediators need the ability to facilitate structural thinking about institution building – which like any form of structuring, requires imagination’. In my draft article – ‘Transforming Conflict Through Humanitarian Mediation & Cultural Heritage Diplomacy’ (below), I wrote, ‘Whether IHL can bring warring P‘s together in an ‘offensive realism’ paradigm depends upon the answer to the following questions:
– Do ‘universal ethical values’ exist under IHL, i.e. as ‘core fiduciary principles and norms’ [‘UV-IHL’].
– What are these values.
– In the real world, are UV-IHL’s potential building blocks, in the Mediation of a peace process, protocol, and agreement – i.e. are they a sufficient basis for starting a ‘difficult’ conversation that can eventually transform attitudes and each participant’s Political Doctrine [‘PD’], resulting in the negotiation of a sustainable and enduring Peace Treaty.
Where CG [i.e. common ground represented by a shared cultural heritage including, a set of ethical, philosophical and religious values/beliefs] exists, then the answer to the second question depends upon whether UV-IHL’s align with [a participant’s] political interest in the preservation of CG, as destruction of CG is ultimately an act on institutional self-destruction. So, in theory, because, by definition preservation of CG is common ground, the door is open to Mediation through Cultural Heritage Diplomacy.’ Today I have connected the idea of ‘Institution building’ with the existence of ‘Universal principles of IHL’, as building blocks in creating a foundation for a sustainable peace through mediation.

‘Black Swans – Looking out for the unknown unknowns in mediation’

Think of a series of interlinked circles labelled e.g.: ‘Law’; ‘Practical Ethics’;  ‘International Relations’; and ‘Party Politics’. The alchemy in the mediation of a Cultural Heritage dispute is to discover what lies in the centre, i.e.  in that small space where these circles all overlap with each other, because that is common ground. This is also the zone in which a ‘Black Swan’ may exist. ‘Black Swans are events or pieces of knowledge that sit outside our regular expectations and therefore cannot be predicted.. … There are those things we know … Those are known knowns. There are those things we are certain that exist that we don’t know. … Those are known unknowns and they are like poker wild cards; you know they’re out there but you don’t know who has them. The most important are those things we don’t know that we don’t know, pieces of information we’ve never imagined that would be game changing if uncovered.. … These unknown unknowns are Black Swans.  … Finding and acting on Black Swans mandates a shift in your mindset. It takes negotiation from being a one-dimensional move counter move game of checkers to a three-dimensional game that is more emotional, adaptive, intuitive … and truly effective.’ (Never Split The Difference – Negotiating as if your life depended on it’ by Chris Voss (2016), rh Business Books, page 216).

‘Empedocles’ Sphere’

A challenge for the Mediator [‘M’] in any dispute is to bring about a ‘paradigm shift’ in the attitude and behaviour of each participant [‘P’] to: (i) themselves; and (ii) the dispute/conflict, by enabling each P to:

• Discover and explore their true hidden motivation.
• Recognise and acknowledge, that they are ‘all in the same boat,’ in that they are all trapped in a reciprocal cycle of mutual destruction, from which neither can or will emerge as an overall victor/‘winner.’
• Accept that armed conflict and oppression cannot kill an ‘idea’ and ‘values’. Therefore, unless and until a modus vivendi has been agreed, there will be endless conflict. So what is the point of armed conflict/war?

‘One of the most important elements of the mediation process is the exploration of the covert reasons for the dispute, as well as the overt. The parties will have developed rigid values and belief systems as their overall strategy for survival in an uncertain world. These can emerge in the dispute as perhaps just a single particular belief. But this might simply be one aspect of an overall overt strategy for achieving a ‘winning position’. Beneath this may lie many other diverse motivations: pride, jealousy, anger, hurt, envy, kudos, arrogance, greed, vanity, the protection of identity, self-esteem and numerous other hidden driving forces. … Frequently, the parties may not even recognise that the real conflict is hidden and very different to what they express it to be. They may not understand or recognise their own true underlying motives: they may believe they are simply seeking proper redress or compensation, whereas in fact they are expressing anger and hurt, and a desire to see the other party punished and humiliated.^’ (‘Mediation – A Psychological Insight into Conflict Resolution’, by Freddie Strasser and Paul Randolph (2004), continuum.

What can we learn from classical literature about the psychology of human conflict in an anarchic and uncertain world, e.g. ‘Empedocles Sphere’? See:

• Empedocles (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)
• untitled (umich.edu) – EMPEDOCLES, ON NATURE I 233–364: A NEW RECONSTRUCTION OF P. STRASB. GR. INV. 1665–6
• Fragments of Empedocles – Wikisource, the free online library
• Empedocles | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy (utm.edu)

This is a subject I will return to later in the year, after I have read the ‘Fragments’, as the poetry of Empedocles may contain profound truths which Mediators today can use/adapt as an ‘analytical framework’ for engaging in a difficult conversation with the P’s about the: nature; root causes; and underlying dynamics driving any conflict.

‘Coalitions of the Weak’

Earlier in the week, Victor Shih, Associate Professor, Ho Miu Lam Chair in China and Pacific Relations – School of Global Policy & Strategy UC San Diego (ucsd.edu), presented a Zoom talk to the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University (https://lnkd.in/e9P8atem) about the subject of his new book, ‘Coalitions of the Weak’ (Cambridge University Press) (2022). As one of the reviewers on the Amazon page for his book observes, ‘At a time when scholarship and public opinion alike stress the seamless strength of the Chinese Communist state, Victor Shih paints a more complex picture in which insecure leaders from Mao to Xi assemble Coalitions of the Weak to perpetuate their personal rule. Based on a wealth of primary sources, Shih’s fascinating analysis reveals an inherent trade-off between autocratic power and policy success that points to a fundamental vulnerability at the heart of China’s political system.’ (Elizabeth J. Perry, Henry Rosovsky Professor of Government, Harvard University). What are the wider lessons to be drawn for Humanitarian Mediation where one participant is a one-party autocracy? Two thoughts occurred to me during the talk:
(i)          Unless the other participants [‘P’s] and the mediator [‘M‘] are communicating  directly with the leader of the one-party autocracy [‘L’], they cannot accurately evaluate the mind of L, or be certain that what they say to his/her representatives will be accurately conveyed to L.
(ii)        In negotiating with L or his/her representatives, unless the other P’s understand: (a) the internal dynamics of the autocracy; and (b) L’s fears and personal insecurities, then what the P’s think is rational and propose may:
–     be doomed to failure from the start, i.e. because in the psychology of L it weakens his/her position as leader;
–     make things worse, i.e. because what they are proposing threatens the existence of L, or could undermine his/her authority and potential political longevity.

An expert granular analysis may reveal that popular assumptions and beliefs about an opponent or comptetitor are not only simplistic, but are based upon myth, and not reality. The moral is to study and attempt to understand your opponent/competitor before making a political judgement and deciding policy. In order to do this, you must first see the world through their eyes. Before you can do that, you need to study the history of their political universe and culture.

I was also reminded of what Sun Tzu said, ‘Know the enemy and know yourself in a hundred battles you will never be in peril. When you are ignorant of the enemy but know yourself, your chances of winning or losing are equal. If ignorant both of your enemy and of yourself, you are certain in every battle to be in peril.’

This leads to a third thought, that unless M is an expert on L and of the political world L inhabits, M‘s effectivenes can be enhanced by involving an expert co-mediator/’political advisor’.

‘Analysing the causes of armed conflict’

There is a methodological distinction between analysing the:
(i) ‘structural’ i.e. ‘deep’ causes of a conflict; and
(ii) ‘precipitating’ i.e. immediate causes of the conflict – by analogy,  the moment when a ‘bolt’ of lightening set fire to the forest, e.g. in a geopolitical context, a dispute about a maritime border that results in a confrontation at sea. That is because the precipitating causes cannot tell you what has happened in the past. In order to mediate a geopolitical conflict, a mediator needs to understand the ‘historical roots’ of the conflict that have shaped each party’s competing narrative. The questions the mediator should ask each party to explain to him/her are:
(a) What brought the parties to where they are today?
(b) What kept them away from the negotiating table in the past?
(c) What has now brought them to the negotiating table?
A fundamental analytical tool for discussion in the mediated resolution of any dispute/conflict, is the drafting of a chronology of events based upon facts and evidence – in contrast to myth and belief. Without the benefit of historical perspective, a Mediator cannot begin to understand how and why each party feels and thinks the way they do, their behaviour, and the underlying:
(i)    Competing interests that need to be reconciled.
(ii)   Dynamics which have shaped and are driving the dispute.
In a proxy war, these interests include the competing strategic geopolitical ambitions and imperatives of hegemons, and the dynamics include domestic politics and elections. Therefore, in preparing for mediation, each party needs to be clear about the ‘real’ facts, circumstances, and events, that both preceded and resulted in armed conflict. Then, the Mediator can help to move the warring parties along from where they are now toward peace, by enabling them to transform conflict into co-existence by jointly developing a peace process and agreement. Looking back through the clear lens of historical facts is therefore the first step in developing a ‘road-map’ for peaceful co-existence. In my opinion, looking forwards, the potential ‘building blocks’ of a peace process and agreement, include shared/universal ‘fiduciary principles’ of international relations, e.g. preserving and protecting agricultural land and the wider environment. See:
– My essay a ‘Fiduciary Theory of Art’ on the ‘Mediation of Art & Cultural Heritage Disputes’ page at www.carlislam.co.uk.
–Conflict Analysis: Questions and Answers with the Author | United States Institute of Peace (usip.org)

Factors Shaping the Course of Intractable Conflict | Beyond Intractability

The Five Main Causes of Conflict – Vilendrer Law, PC

Structural Causes of Conflict and the Superficiality of Transition | (lawexplores.com)

‘10th Principle of Negotiating Political Order – Share a vision of co-existence.’ Explore and find common ground by engaging in a mediated diplomatic conversation about the existence and relevance of “Fiduciary Principles of International Relations” which transcend regional balance of power politics, e.g. rules and norms of International Humanitarian Law.

In order to share and develop a joint vision of co-existence which is not discordant in ‘realist’ theory with the survival of each ruling elite, the P’s can discover what they have in common by exploring the existence of hopes and ambitions which transcend regional balance of power politics. Instead of fighting each other they can work together to solve global problems which are an existential threat to their region, e.g. climate change. Beyond their region they can work together for the betterment of mankind by e.g. researching a cure for cancer, stabilising the global economy, and exploring space.

Hidden away in the Report to China’s 2022 Party Congress is the following passage:

‘We have grown stronger in basic research and original innovation, made breakthroughs in some core technologies in key fields, and boosted emerging strategic industries. We have witnessed major successes on multiple fronts, including manned spaceflight, lunar and Martian exploration, deep sea and deep earth probes, supercomputers, satellite navigation, quantum information, nuclear power technology, airliner manufacturing, and biomedicine. China has joined the ranks of the world’s innovators. … – We must maintain a global vision. The Communist Party of China is dedicated to pursuing happiness for the Chinese people and rejuvenation for the Chinese nation. It is also dedicated to human progress and world harmony. We should expand our global vision and develop keen insight into the trends of human development and progress, respond to the general concerns of people of all countries, and play our part in resolving the common issues facing humankind. With an open mind, we should draw inspiration from all of human civilization’s outstanding achievements and work to build an even better world.’

Report to China’s 2022 Party Congress Transcript: President Xi Jinping’s report to China’s 2022 party congress – Nikkei Asia

See also:

‘The head of the US Navy has warned that the American military must be prepared for the possibility of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan before 2024, as Washington grows increasingly alarmed about the threat to the island. Admiral Mike Gilday, chief of naval operations, said the US had to consider that China could take action against Taiwan much sooner than even the more pessimistic warnings. The debate in the US about when China might invade Taiwan has intensified since Admiral Philip Davidson, then-head of Indo-Pacific Command, told Congress last year that the Chinese military could take action against Taiwan before 2027. Davidson’s warning was partly downplayed at the time, but officials have intensified their warnings over the past year. “When we talk about the 2027 window, in my mind that has to be a 2022 window or potentially a 2023 window,” Gilday told the Atlantic Council on Wednesday. “I don’t mean at all to be alarmist . . . it’s just that we can’t wish that away.” Gilday’s comments came two days after US secretary of state Antony Blinken said China was “determined to pursue reunification on a much faster timeline” after deciding that the status quo was “no longer acceptable”. China claims sovereignty over Taiwan and has warned Washington not to encourage pro-independence forces in the country. At the opening of the Chinese Communist party’s 20th congress on Sunday, President Xi Jinping admonished the US for supporting Taiwan as he accused “external forces” of exacerbating tensions across the Taiwan Strait and suggested outside actors would shoulder the blame if China felt compelled to attack the country. Underscoring the mounting concern about Chinese military activity near Taiwan, which has increased in the wake of US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taipei in August, Joe Biden has on four occasions as president warned China that the US would intervene to defend Taiwan from an unprovoked attack.’ US Navy chief warns China could invade Taiwan before 2024 | Financial Times (ft.com)

Kevin Rudd – How likely is a US-China war? Kevin Rudd on a new era Xi Jinping | DW News – YouTube

Xi Jinping tightens grip on power as China’s Communist party elevates his status | China | The Guardian

https://www.politico.eu/article/ex-china-president-hu-jintao-escorted-out-communist-party/

Bibliography:

• Shirk, Susan L (2022) Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, OUP USA.
• Rudd, Kevin (2022) The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China, Public Affairs.
• Allison, Graham (2018) Destined for War: can America and China escape Thucydides’ Trap?, Scribe UK.

‘9th Principle of Negotiating Political Order– Calculate the political price of doing a deal.’

Mediation is ‘about doing a deal.’ Therefore, you have to decide the ‘price’ of doing a deal.

Because of the inescapable logic of mutually assured destruction, there is no BATNA (‘Best Alternative To A negotiated Agreement’) where nuclear powers stumble into a war in which their full nuclear arsenals are launched. However, in order to agree a modus vivendi there must be sufficient equilibrium in the balance of power to allow for flexibility without jeopardising survival. It is therefore necessary for each participant in a geo-political mediation [‘P’] to calculate the political price of doing a deal. Deciding to pay the price requires vision, courage, and leadership.

‘To attempt to manage [the] inescapable risk of nuclear confrontation, Kennedy repeatedly overrode the urgings of his advisers, choosing instead to give Khrushchev more time to consider, adapt and adjust. … In doing so, he crafted a unique political cocktail that consisted of a public deal, a private ultimatum, and a secret sweetener – all in defiance of the advice from most of his National Security Council. … JFK knew that proactive steps to avert such stand-offs could come at a high price, including compromising on politically sensitive issues and postponing initiatives that, while not essential, were nonetheless important. But he concluded that the price was worth paying. In his words, the enduring lesson of the Cuban missile crisis was; “above all, while defending our vital national interests, nuclear powers must avert confrontations that force an adversary to choose between a humiliating retreat and nuclear war.” [‘Commencement address at American University, June 10, 1963’].

To make similar wise choices, US leaders will need to muster a combination of hard thinking and harder work. They can begin with four core ideas:

• Clarify vital interests.
• Understand what [an adversary] is trying to do.
• Do strategy.
• Make domestic challenges central.’

(‘Destined For War – Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap‘ by Graham Allinson, 2017). President Joe Biden has described Graham Allinson as, ‘one of the keenest observers of international affairs around.’ See also my blog below, ‘Diplomacy and defence are not substitutes for one another – 1961 Address at  University of Washington by John Fitzgerald Kennedy, 25^th President of the United States of America’).

‘Time to mediate?’

At the King’s College London School of Security Studies Annual Conference, during a session held on the 9th June 2022, one of the delegates asked a speaker (who was a member of the US military), why  Russia had not thrown all of its might into the fight, i.e. deployed all of its military force. The answer which came back was that ‘it had’.

On the 10th August 2022 the BBC reported, ‘There are indications the Kremlin is running out of troops for its war with Ukraine. Regional authorities in Russia are pursuing a campaign to recruit volunteer fighters, but it is not getting much traction, one report says. According to independent Russian website Mediazona, at least 25 Russian regions are now trying to form volunteer battalions. It has been reported that in the last 5 days Russia has lost the equivalent of one battalion (i.e. c.1000 soldiers including tanks and equipment) per day.

Mathematically, there will comes a point hen Russia can no longer sustain military operations in Ukraine.

Today, in the News Statesman, Ido Vock in his ‘World Review’ wrote, ‘The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington-based think tank, calculates that Ukrainian forces have recaptured more territory in five days than Russia had since April. … ‘Boris Nadezhdin, a former member of the Duma, Russia’s national parliament, said on TV: “It is absolutely impossible to defeat Ukraine” with Russia’s current strategy of refusing to declare a full-scale war, leaving Moscow with the choice of suing for peace or escalating the conflict (a decision Vladimir Putin has been loath to take, preferring a piecemeal “shadow mobilisation”). The significance of Nadezhdin’s appearance lies less in his words and more in the fact that a long-standing (and largely politically insignificant) pro-Western liberal was invited on state TV at all. The Kharkiv counteroffensive may finally be the signal that gets through to the Russian leadership. Putin may have believed that in time, Russia’s supposedly superior numbers would grind the Ukrainians down and allow Moscow victory. In fact, something like the opposite has happened, with exhausted Russian forces rapidly retreating when probed, their supply lines weakened by months of Ukrainian strikes using US-supplied Himars rocket systems. The Russian army can now choose only how to lose. The first option is to continue putting off the hard choices and carry on suffering military defeats, including further south now that Ukraine has the initiative. The second is for Putin to declare war and enact a full mobilisation. It would take months, however, to train men called up, while Russia is having difficulty equipping the troops it has currently deployed and Ukraine is making gains right now. The third is for Moscow to seek genuine peace negotiations, although Kyiv’s recent successes on the battlefield may make it more reluctant to settle for limited concessions. The final option would be some kind of drastic escalation, such as the use of nuclear weapons or an engineered radiation leak at the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant, although such a reckless gamble would signal Russia’s extreme weakness and further threaten the survival of the regime. It is a delightful irony that the Ukrainian offensive made so much progress in the days leading up to 11 September. It is that date, of course, which had long been mooted for when sham “referendums” on the annexations by Russia of the Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions would be held. The Armed Forces of Ukraine cast their vote early.’

‘The Russian armed force’s most prestigious and leading tank formation, designed to defend Moscow, has been “severely degraded”, according to British intelligence. The 1st Guards Tank Army, of the Western Military District, will require “years” to rebuild its capability as the main unit designed to defend Moscow and lead counter-attacks in the case of war with Nato, Britain’s Ministry of Defence said on Tuesday. … In its daily intelligence briefing, the MoD said: “Elements of the Russian forces withdrawn from Kharkiv Oblast over the last week were from the 1st Guards Tank Army (1 GTA), which are subordinate to the Western Military District (WEMD). “1 GTA suffered heavy casualties in the initial phase of the invasion and had not been fully reconstituted prior to the Ukrainian counter-offensive in Kharkiv.” British military officials added: “1 GTA had been one of the most prestigious of Russia’s armies, allocated for the defence of Moscow, and intended to lead counter-attacks in the case of a war with Nato.”’ (Ukraine war latest: Prestigious Russian tank army tasked with defending Moscow ‘severely degraded’ by Josh White, Grace Millimaci, and Joe Barnes – the Daily Telegraph 13.09.2022).

‘A Russian marines brigade has been almost completely wiped out by Ukraine’s Armed Forces, Kyiv said Monday. … The update … said that the Ukrainian military destroyed almost 85 percent of Russia’s 810 marine infantry brigade, which is based in the city of Sevastopol in the Russian-occupied Crimean Peninsula. “After the successful actions carried out by the Defense Forces in the Kherson direction, the enemy suffered significant losses in manpower.”
Ukraine said the rest of the servicemen have an extremely low morale and psychological state, and “massively refuse to return to the combat zone.”’ (Newsweek 12.09.2022).

‘Half of Russia’s Black Sea fleet’s combat jets out of operation, Western official says – Blasts at the Saky air base in the annexed Crimean peninsula earlier this month have put more than half of the Russian Black Sea fleet’s naval aviation combat jets out of use, a Western official said on Friday. … The official, speaking on condition of anonymity, said Ukraine was now consistently achieving “kinetic effects” deep behind Russia’s lines which was having a material impact on Russia’s logistics support and “a significant psychological effect on the Russian leadership”.’ (Reuters 19th August).

‘Shelling around the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant has sparked grave concerns about the risk of radioactive catastrophe. The U.N. atomic watchdog has proposed the creation of a protection zone around the nuclear plant, Europe’s largest, and both sides are interested, IAEA chief said. “We are playing with fire,” Rafael Grossi told reporters.” We can not continue in a situation, where we are one step away from a nuclear accident. The safety of the Zaporizhzhia power plant is hanging by a thread.”‘ (Reuters 13.09.2022).
‘A senior Chinese official told the UN on Friday that just one incident might cause a serious nuclear accident “with irreversible consequences for the ecosystem and public health of Ukraine and its neighbouring countries”. Geng Shuang, China’s deputy permanent representative at the UN, pointedly called on all parties involved “to exercise maximum restraint strictly abide by international law and minimise the risk of accidents”, adding: ”We must not allow the tragedies of the Chernobyl and Fukushima nuclear accidents to be repeated.”’ (i News updated 28.08.2022).

8^th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – ‘Analyse the underlying dynamics.’

Each underlying dynamic [‘UD’] may be an opportunity/constraint. While in ‘realist’ IR theory*, a state will always place is own strategic imperatives above compliance with rules of international law, understanding the interplay of the UD’s may provide insights about common ground where the UD‘s intersect. A technique for mapping the UD’s is to categorize each one by reference to a series of overlapping circles, and to identify where they theoretically or actually interconnect. The categories may include, e.g.

• Domestic political drivers.
• National strategic imperatives.
• Geo-political ambitions.
• Needs.
• Priorities.
• Resources. [This includes the 3 P‘s that drive future economic growth: (i) population (size i.e whether it is increasing or shrinking); (ii) participation in the workforce (i.e. age skills & education); and (iii) productivity, because the balance of power between ‘State 1’, and ‘State 2’, will remain relatively stable unless and until the economic growth of State 1 exceeds that of State 2. Therefore, if State 1 has a population that is both shrinking and ageing, it cannot overtake State 2 as a economic and military power/super-power. In which case its PD/PND is wishful thinking, because it will lose if its goes to war with State 2].
• Existential threats.

Where these categories interconnect, it may be possible to avoid ‘Thucydides Trap’ if a coherent framework of practical principles for ensuring co-existence emerges during a process of jointly plotting a critical path toward peace. This requires first seeing/recognising, and second reframing, ‘critical constraints’ as ‘opportunities’, e.g. for mutually beneficial, i.e. economically prosperous collaboration, based upon: geography; resources; mutual respect for sovereignty and culture (see the ‘7th Principle’ below); security; and commercial access. The transformation of a constraint into an opportunity where the UD‘s intersect, e.g. international trade, can result in the joint construction of new ‘Pillars’, see my post below about the ‘6th Principle.’

*The example cited by Professor John Mearsheimer being the ‘Monroe Doctrine’, see:https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/monroe-doctrine#:~:text=The%20Monroe%20Doctrine%20is%20the,further%20colonization%20or%20puppet%20monarchs).

[This in incomplete].

7th Principle  of Negotiating Political Order– ‘Legitimacy.’

In my post below about the ‘6th Principle’, I wrote, ‘As preparation for mediation, the participants in an armed conflict may start to walk down a road that leads to ‘convergence’ by analysing resolution through the prism of:
(i)         existing ‘pillars’, which can be reinforced (i.e. economic, geostrategic, and multilateral); and
(ii)        new ‘pillars’ which can be jointly constructed, in order to agree in mediation upon a ‘political and strategic framework’ for managing their relationship.’
The 7th Principle is the 1st Pillar.
If each P can acknowledge the existence of the other (‘Legitimacy’), then axiomatically each P recognises that they can co-exist with each other. Legitimacy requires respect. Respect can engender trust. Once the foundation stones of ‘Respect’ and ‘Trust’ have been laid down, then a constructive problem solving dialogue can begin.

In order to co-exist in peace, a rules-based order needs to be developed and implemented.

Therefore, the starting point is a mediated dialogue about a ‘rules based order’ for peaceful co-existence, within which each P can compete with the other without sleep-walking into ‘Thucydides Trap’, see: https://lnkd.in/eEkWkbzp

In order to minimise the risk of accidental nuclear war occurring because of a decision made at the periphery e.g. by a submarine commander (which is what nearly happened during the Cuban missile crisis – see Max Hastings’ forthcoming book –  ‘Abyss: The Cuban Missile Crisis 1962’), a protocol needs to be agreed about how to reduce and manage that risk. This requires co-operation and is a first step in developing trust based upon mutual survival. ‘Legitimacy’ and ‘Thucydides Trap’ are ideas that I will return to in future blogs about Humanitarian Mediation.

6th Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Analyse the existence of pillars to support a political and strategic framework for managing the relationship between the states who are in direct conflict with each other

As the former Prime Minister of Australia , The Honourable Kevin Rudd observes in the context of managing the relationship between the US and China, in his book, ‘The Avoidable War – The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China’,
‘[O]ur best chance of avoiding war is to better understand the other side’s strategic thinking and to conceptualise a world where both the US and China are able to competitively coexist, even if in a state of continuing rivalry reinforced by mutual deterrence. A world where political leaders are empowered to preside over a competitive race rather than resorting to the lethality of actual armed conflict. Indeed, if we can preserve the peace of the decade ahead, political circumstances may eventually change: strategic thought may evolve in the face of new, much broader planetary changes; and it may then be possible for leaders to imagine a different way of thinking (the Chinese term is ‘siwei’) that prioritises collaboration over conflict in meeting the existential global challenges confronting us all.’ In my essay a ‘Fiduciary Theory of Art’ which appears on the ‘Mediation of Art and Cultural Heritage Disputes’ at www.carlislam.co.uk), under the sub-heading, ‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations’ (reproduced below), I argue that ‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations’ including the protection and preservation of Cultural Heritage are a ‘foundation stone in the negotiation of a sustainable and enduring peace process and agreement, based upon recognition of shared values, interests, realpolitik, and practical ethics.

Therefore, as preparation for mediation, the participants in an armed conflict may start to walk down a road that leads to ‘convergence’ by analysing resolution through the prism of:
(i)         existing ‘pillars’, which can be reinforced (i.e. economic, geostrategic, and multilateral); and
(ii)        new ‘pillars’ which can be jointly constructed,
in order to agree in mediation upon a ‘political and strategic framework’ for managing their relationship.

This requires recognition that ‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations’, are a universal tool in humanitarian mediation, because of the existence of ‘GIEC’s’ (including climate change – which is a global existential threat) and global financial stability – see the ‘2nd Principle of Humanitarian Mediation’ below.

5^th principle of Negotiating Political Order – Do not make things worse

See my blog below – ‘Engineering Convergence through Mediation  – Can we put the Genie back into the bottle?’ in which I state,

‘At the King’s College London School of Security Studies Annual Conference on the 8th and 9th June 2022, I asked [the] question ‘Is understanding what lies underneath competing narratives [‘N’] the key to mediation of a peace process in a conflict?’

i.e. can analysis of N reveal:

(i) the philosophy and political doctrine driving a conflict on each side; and

(ii) psychological biases which are road-blocks in geo-political mediation?

… before undertaking a step in Mediation W needs to first see the world through P‘s eyes. If W views the world through a rose-tinted geo-political lens, it will be looking inwards and not outward, in which case the outcome is likely to be strategic miscalculation, i.e. if the result is a mischaracterization of N by W, because W either: (i) does not understand N; or (ii) does not believe that N is real, actually exists in the psychology of P, and therefore is deeply embedded in PND. This incongruence dooms Mediation from the start, because W cannot even see where the ‘rails’ of the underlying and causal political dispute actually are, let alone the direction in which the train is going. Therefore, what W does can only halt the train by accident and not by design. Far worse, W can derail the train – which could be catastrophic for all on board. That is why it is a cardinal principle of any Mediation that the Mediator must not make the situation worse. This principle applies to the Mediation of a geo-political conflict no less than it applies to a civil dispute.’

Avoiding making things worse by understanding N, connects with the need for development of ‘a new level of mutual strategic literacy’, and a norm known as ‘managed strategic competition’ [‘MSC‘] proposed by The Honourable Kevin Rudd, former Prime Minister of Australia and author of the ‘Avoidable War – The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the U.S. and Xi Jinping’s China’ published earlier this year. The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China: Amazon.co.uk: Rudd, Kevin: 9781541701298: Books

‘There is both a moral and a practical obligation for friends of China and friends of the United States to think through what has become the single hardest question of international relations of our century: how to preserve the peace and prosperity we have secured over the last three-quarters of a century while recognizing the reality of changing power relativities between Washington and Beijing. We can allow the primordial dimensions of Thucydidean logic to simply take their natural course, ultimately culminating in crisis, conflict, or even war. Or we can identify potential strategic off-ramps, or at least guardrails, which may help preserve the peace among the great powers while also sustaining the integrity of the rules-based order that has underpinned the stability of the wider international relations system since 1945.

Therefore, to borrow a question from Lenin himself: “What is to be done?” As a first step, each side must be mindful of how their actions will be read by the other through the prism of their accumulated national perceptions — in other words, what buttons light up in the decision-making processes on one side when a particular action is taken by the other. At present, both sides are bad at this, often reflecting a combination of mutually assured non-comprehension and mirror imaging that has long characterized large parts of the U.S.-China relationship. If we are serious about the possibility of developing a joint strategic narrative that might be capable of governing the future of the relationship peacefully, we must, at a minimum, be mindful of how strategic language, actions, and diplomatic signaling will be interpreted within each side’s political culture, systems, and elites. It is this sort of awareness that can help us navigate the practical complexities of competing national interests, values, and perceptions within a stable, albeit still competitive, strategic framework.

Developing a new level of mutual strategic literacy, however, is only the beginning. What follows must be the hard work of constructing a joint strategic framework between Washington and Beijing that is capable of achieving the following three interrelated tasks:

1. Agreeing on principles and procedures for navigating each other’s strategic redlines (for example, over Taiwan) that, if inadvertently crossed, would likely result in military escalation.
2. Mutually identifying the areas of nonlethal national security policy—foreign policy, economic policy, technology development (for example, over semiconductors) —and ideology where full-blown strategic competition is accepted as the new normal.
3. Defining those areas where continued strategic cooperation (for example, on climate change) is both recognized and encouraged.’

See: China and the U.S.: The Case for Managed Strategic Competition | Asia Society

4th Principle  of  Negotiating Political Order– Realism

In my blog ‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations’ (below), I wrote,

‘When the political strategy of H is to create a failed state [‘FS‘], where it has failed in its primary objective to turn the invaded state into a client state, … [this is] a threat to the national security of any other state in the region [S], because there is a risk of a failed state emerging within S‘s geo-political sphere of influence. If the destruction of CG has the potential to politically destabilise H, then it follows that S also has a national security interest in the survival of H. Therein, and counter-intuitively, lies the seed of a principle that can result in the mediation of terms of peace which ensure the survival of both H and the sovereign state invaded by H. If this geo-political interest is recognised by all parties to the conflict and their supporters, then this can open up a dialogue …  to negotiate a ceasefire and peace agreement.’

If each P can view the conflict through the hard geopolitical lens of ‘realism’, then a settlement zone theoretically exists between:

1. The minimum H will accept in order to achieve its practical, i.e. realizable, political objectives; and
2. The maximum the invaded state will give in order to survive, i.e. to avoid becoming a FS.

Provided each P understands this, then a deal can be done, because continuation of armed conflict increases the existential threat to each state, and there is the constant peril of a nuclear war starting by accident. If the P’s agree that mutual survival is preferable to mutual destruction, which will have environmental consequences beyond the territory in which war is being waged, then pre-conditions to a ceasefire can be agreed to enable talks to take place in good faith. The table can then be set for a mediation. An agenda, and the scope, terms, and protocols for mediation can be discussed and agreed.

Therefore, whether and when a mediation will take place,  ultimately depends upon the existence of political will on both sides.

See also my blog below – ‘Engineering Convergence through Mediation – Can we put the Genie back into the bottle?’

3rd Principle of  Negotiating Political Order – Exploratory talks to identify  elements of a bespoke process 

‘Only when we can fully participate in a democratic process will armed struggle become obsolete, and only then will the conflict between us end.’

(Words attributed to Thabo Mbeki during secret talks held in England between the African National Congress (ANC), the political party spearheading the independence movement, and the South African Government. These took place  in a series of clandestine meetings over several years in the late 1980’s which were set up by Michael Young  an executive with Consolidated Goldfields, a British mining company which had a commercial stake in the future political stability of South Africa).

Potential elements of a bespoke process of mediation?:

1. Transformative Mediation – To enable each Participant [‘P‘] to re-evaluate their Political Doctrine [‘PD‘], objectives and priorities (see my blogs below: (i) ‘Engineering Convergence through Mediation  – Can we put the Genie back into the bottle?’ (where I use the acronym ‘PND’ to describe P’s nuclear doctine); and (ii) ‘Fiduciary Principles of International Relations’).
2. Restorative Justice – As a long-term peace and reconciliation process that as it becomes culturally embedded over generations reduces the risk of another conflict.

[Please note that each armed conflict is unique, and requires the design of a bespoke mediation process. This blog is an unfinished and evolving work in progress and I welcome all comments and contributions].

See also:

Transformative Mediation: A Self-Assessment (psu.edu)

The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Mediators – Mediate.com

2^nd Principle of Negotiating Political Order  –  Choice of Mediator [‘M’]

To discover the existence of common ground, which may contain hidden value that has the potential to expand the political and economic pie for settlement, the M and Participants [‘P’s’] need to look beyond the conflict at:

• the impact/potential impact of the conflict upon the political and economic stability of globally inter-connected economic systems and institutions [‘GIECS’], and because climate change is a universal existential threat, this includes the ‘environment’; and
• the political stability of states and interested non-state actors, e.g. multi-national companies, whose prosperity and existence depends upon the stability and preservation of GIECS (including the environment) [‘IP’s’].

In a multi-polar world, the M and P’s, therefore, need to understand the wider impact of the conflict upon the stability of e.g. economic systems (in which hegemons are heavily invested i.e. the US and China). A political leader/state elite, who is either a P, ally of a P, or M, by viewing the conflict through a global, rather than a regional lens, may be able to identify strands of common ground which can cohere, to form a foundation for the negotiation of a peace protocol and agreement, i.e. because in a globalized and inter-connected world, the conflict is not only existential to the P’s at war with each other, but also to those who depend upon the stability of the GIECS, i.e. the IP’s – who all have a vested interest in peace. That is why M must be both a trained mediator, and an independent, educated, and experienced, geo-political thinker.

A political leader who views the conflict through a narrow/populist/partisan/ideological prism, i.e. because they do not have these qualities, risks throwing petrol onto the fire instead of finding a way to extinguish the flames. Rhetoric is no substitute for brains, knowledge, experience, clear thinking, realism, diplomatic skill, and economic/political nouse.

See also:

Impact of Conflict and Political Instability on Banking Crises in Developing Economies – IMF Blog

1st Principle  of  Negotiating Political Order – Diplomats must have room to manoeuvre

The 1st Principle of Humanitarian Mediation is that ‘Diplomats must have room to manoeuvre’ in order to exert an influence upon the course of events before the ‘creature’ of war takes on its own life, resulting in events outside the imagination and control of the states involved.

Professor John J. Mearsheimer, in the introduction to the 60th anniversary edition of ‘American Diplomacy’ by George F. Kennan [University of Chicago Press (2012)], states [between pages xl – xlii]:
‘[W]hen mass armies clash with each other, the result, as Carl von Clausewitz put it is, “primordial violence, hatred and enmity.” [Carl von Clausewitz on War, trans. and ed. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.].
This kind of hostility almost guarantees that each side will be so enraged with the other that it will demand decisive victory and refuse a compromise settlement. This state of affairs is compounded by the fact that governments usually have to motivate their publics to make enormous sacrifices to win a great power war. Most importantly, some substantial number of citizens has to be convinced to serve in the military and possibly die for their country. One way that leaders inspire their people to fight modern wars is to portray the adversary as the epitome of evil and a mortal threat. This behaviour, it should be noted, is not limited to democracies as Kennan thought. Doing so, however, makes it almost impossible to negotiate an end to a war short of total victory. After all, how can one negotiate with an adversary that is thought to be the devil incarnate? It makes much more sense to pull out every punch to decisively defeat that opponent and get it to surrender unconditionally. Of course, both sides are invariably drawn to this conclusion, which rules out any hope of a negotiated compromise. … [Clausewitz’s] classic work, “On War”, is actually an attempt to grasp the concept of modern, absolute war in all its devastating power… The main purpose of Clausewitz’s famous dictum “war is an extension of politics by other means” is to convince civilian leaders that they should go to great lengths to limit wars when it makes good political sense, while recognising that war’s natural tendency in the age of nationalism is to escalate to its absolute or total form. These same forces were at play in World War I, which is why all of the great powers involved in that conflict – democracies as well as non-democracies – were committed to fighting until they collapsed or hopefully the other side collapsed first. In short, nationalism, not democracy, fuels the modern state’s desire for decisive victories and unconditional surrender, aspirations that make it difficult to limit wars between rival great powers.’

That is why Mediation is not possible where a participant [‘P’] requires the destruction of the other P, see my blog below –  ‘Engineering convergence through Mediation – Can we put the Genie back into the bottle?’

Engineering Convergence through Mediation  – Can we put the Genie back into the bottle?

At the King’s College London School of Security Studies Annual Conference on the 8th and 9th June 2022, I asked a question related to my evolving research interest in ‘Transforming Geo-Political Conflict Through Mediation’ – See the International Relations essay on the ‘Mediation of Art & Cultural Heritage Disputes’ page at www.carlislam.co.uk.

My Q.  ‘Is understanding what lies underneath competing narratives [‘N’] the key to mediation of a peace process in a conflict?’

i.e. can analysis of N reveal:

(i) the philosophy and political doctrine driving a conflict on each side; and

(ii) psychological biases which are road-blocks in geo-political mediation?

Answer: I drew the following conclusions from the comments made by the speakers in reply:

(i)  Mediation is not possible where a participant [‘P’] requires the destruction of the other P, i.e. when the values and interests underlying N collide [‘C’].

(ii) Mediation is possible where they potentially overlap and can cohere.

(iii)  Where a P is a nuclear power [‘PN’], the use of nuclear weapons is a very real potential outcome in C – one speaker thought this was almost an ‘inevitability’ (which is what Professor John Mearsheimer has been warning since 2014 and as recently as May 2022).

(iv) However, since the use of nuclear weapons by PN could result in its own destruction, if PN’s doctrine is to change the hegemonic world order, i.e. to displace the West [‘PND]’, then mediation is possible.

(v)    The military logic of PND is that when PN realises it is losing on the battlefield it will agree to a halt in lethal fighting. However, the conflict will not end until the aggressor has won in accordance with its PND. Therefore, unless a lasting peace is achieved in the interim, the fighting will at some future point in time resume, i.e. when PN, in its mind, is ready and prepared to win.

(vi)   When the P’s are in the mood to talk Mediation is possible.

(vii)  Because of the logic of PND, the war in Ukraine is likely to be the 1st of many conflicts to arise across the globe. In other words, things are going to get worse.

(viii) Because Russia [‘R‘] is a nuclear power, the West [‘W‘] cannot simply liberate it.

(ix)    Because: (a) the claims made by R reveal value driven ‘choices made by the Russian State elite’; and (b) the elite is more than one man, PND will not change unless and until the elite alter their ‘collective’ thinking i.e. Political Doctrine [‘PD‘].

If analysis of R‘s narrative has exposed a ‘divergence based upon values’ then what can W do to avoid further divergence, i.e. through smart Diplomacy?

A concluding remark made by one speaker was that there is a lack of understanding amongst policy makers that ‘how politicians behave domestically can impact upon foreign relations’ – i.e. because other states are watching. Therefore, in order to have any effect upon the future direction and shape of R‘s PD, our senior political leaders need to be seen to be ‘whiter than white’ – not least because any divergence by a W government from strict adherence to international law reinforces R‘s narrative that W is hypocritical and duplicitous.
This lack of ‘credibility’ impacts upon the stability of an ‘antithetical’ model of ‘offensive realism’ (i.e. a counter-thesis) that is based upon the idea of ‘solidarity’ between states which is rooted in fiduciary principles and norms of behaviour under International Humanitarian Law. This idea lies at the heart of my research, i.e. whether ‘universal ethical values’:

(i)  exist under International Humanitarian Law (‘IHL’) as ‘core fiduciary principles and norms’; and

(ii) are potential building blocks, in the Mediation of a peace process, protocol, and agreement,

where the primary causal factor in a geo-political conflict, is a clash between competing values and interests.

However logically, the concept is a grand ‘delusion’, unless every other state with whom W competes shares the same worldview as W. Therefore, before undertaking a step in Mediation W needs to first see the world through P‘s eyes. If W views the world through a rose-tinted geo-political lens, it will be looking inwards and not outward, in which case the outcome is likely to be strategic miscalculation, i.e. if the result is a mischaracterization of N by W, because W either: (i) does not understand N; or (ii) does not believe that N is real, actually exists in the psychology of P, and therefore is deeply embedded in PND. This incongruence dooms Mediation from the start, because W cannot even see where the ‘rails’ of the underlying and causal political dispute actually are, let alone the direction in which the train is going. Therefore, what W does can only halt the train by accident and not by design. Far worse, W can derail the train – which could be catastrophic for all on board. That is why it is a cardinal principle of any Mediation that the Mediator must not make the situation worse. This principle applies to the Mediation of a geo-political conflict no less than it applies to a civil dispute.

Can IHL bring warring P‘s together in an ‘offensive realism’ paradigm? Where institutionally, the destruction of Cultural Heritage by an invading P is an act of political self-destruction, i.e. because they share a common Cultural Heritage, then logically, that is a choice the aggressor is compelled to make, because political miscalculation risks making it weaker and not stronger as a result of the invasion.

Ukraine – Who can mediate?

As Jonathan Powell (who runs Inter Mediate in London) wrote in ‘Talking To Terrorists – How to end armed conflicts’ (2014), ‘Of course it is possible to mishandle a peace process just like any other political act, but that is no reason for not having a peace process. … President Kennedy captured the conundrum well: “A willingness to resist force, unaccompanied by a willingness to talk, could provoke belligerence – while a willingness to talk, unaccompanied by an willingness to resist force, could invite disaster.” … So the successful equation in dealing with serious terrorist groups is to combine military pressure down with the offer of a political way out through talks which can, over time, lead to an end to the armed conflict. …. That does not mean to say that it is sensible to plunge into a full-blown negotiation straightaway  … Rather it means that we should try to learn from past experience how best to make contact with such groups, how to build trust, how to combine force and talking, how to use third parties, how and when to turn the contacts into negotiations, how to bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion, and how to ensure the resulting agreement is implemented, so that we don’t keep on making the same mistakes.’ If these principles apply to the invasion of a sovereign state by another state actor, then, Mediation is a tool for resolving armed conflict through politics and economics. Therefore, the question is when and how to talk to Russia.
‘Whether mediation is undertaken by an international organization, State, or an NGO, any peace process needs an individual to lead the effort. … However, a Head of state, Foreign Minister, or Secretary General is likely to be too busy with other things to be able to concentrate sufficiently on a mediation process that lasts more than a few days. They may also lack the willingness to get their hands dirty with detailed strategizing and planning, doing hands-on negotiations with non-state actors, listening to civil society, conducting shuttle diplomacy, and managing a mediation team. Often, they lack the expertise required for a professional mediation effort. They may also be too closely associated with one or more parties, particularly if the dispute is in a neighbouring state. … It is therefore important to select a dedicated and professional mediator to do the work, whether implicitly in the name of a Government or Secretary General, or explicitly as a special envoy, personal representative, or the like. The separation between the two hierarchical levels can also be used to advance the negotiations, for instance by calling on involvement of the highest level at crucial moments, to increase pressure on the parties.’ (Negotiating Peace – A Guide To The practice, Politics, And Law of International Mediation’, by Sven M.G.Koopmans, 2018) Oxford University Press, paragraph 3.4.1. Could Turkey (which is a NATO member state) mediate between Russia and Ukraine?

See also:

The War in Ukraine: Lessons for Mediators – Mediate.com

Turkey’s Mediation of a Ukrainian Grain Export Plan May Bear Fruit | The National Interest

Putin thanks Erdoğan for mediating Ukraine grain exports | Daily Sabah

Kremlin thanks Turkey for mediation efforts over Ukraine war | Daily Sabah

Is Peace Mediation in Ukraine Possible, and How? | Conciliation Resources (c-r.org)

Research Bibliography

Abelow, Benjamin (2022) How the West Brought War to Ukraine: Understanding How U.S. and NATO Policies Led to Crisis, War, and the Risk of Nuclear Catastrophe, Siland Press.

Achen, Christopher H. and Larry M. Bartels (2017) Democracy For Realists – Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government, Princeton University Press.

Aksenova, Marina (2019) Complicity in International Criminal Law, Hart Publishing.

Allison, Graham (2004) Nuclear Terrorism – The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Henry Holt and Company LLC.

Allison, Graham (2018) Destined for War: can America and China escape Thucydides’ Trap?, Scribe UK.

Amerasinghe, Chittharanjan F. (2008) Diplomatic Protection, Oxford University Press.

Andrews, John (2016) The World In Conflict – Understanding The World’s Troublespots, The Economist Books.

Arendt, Hannah (1958) The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press.

Aust, Anthony (2005) Handbook Of International Law, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press.

Aust, Anthony (2013) Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Third Edition, Cambridge University Press.

Bailliet, Cecilia M. (editor) (2020) Research Handbook on International Law and Peace, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

Barston, R.P. (2013) Modern Diplomacy, Fourth Edition, Pearson.

Baud, Jacques (2024) The Russian Art Of War – How The West Led Ukraine To Defeat, Max Milo.

Baud, Jacques (2024) Operation Al-Aqsa Flood – The Defeat Of The Vanquisher, Max Milo.

Bayne, Nicholas and Stephen Woolcock (2011) The New Economic Diplomacy – Decision-Making and Negotiation in International Economic Relations, Third Edition, Ashgate.

Bell, Christine (2008) On The Law Of Peace, Oxford University Press.

Besong , Brian (2018) An Introduction to Ethics: A Natural Law Approach, Cascade Books.

Besson, Samantha & John Tasioulas (2013) The Philosophy of International Law, Oxford University Press.

Blake, Janet On Developing a New International Convention for Safeguarding Intangible Cultural Heritage, Art Antiquity & Law, Vol VIII, Issue 4, 381, December 2003.

Blumenthal, Max (2020) The Management of Savagery: How America’s National Security State Fuelled the Rise of Al Qaeda, Isis, and Donald Trump. Verso Books.

Boas, Gideon (2012) Public International Law – Contemporary Principles and Perspectives, Edwar Elgar.

Boogaard, Jeroen van den (2023) Proportionality in International Humanitarian Law, Cambridge University Press.

Borg, James (2007) Persuasion – The art of influencing people, 2nd eidtion, Pearson Prentice Hall.

Bowen, Jeremy (2022) The Making of the Modern Middle East: A Personal History, Picador.

Bowling, Daniel (Editor) & David Hoffman (Editor) (2003), Bringing Peace Into the Room: How the Personal Qualities of the Mediator Impact the Process of Conflict Resolution, Jossey-Bass.

Carstens, Anne-Marie & Elizabeth Varner (2020), Intersections In International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press.

Carter, Jennifer (2022). Human Rights Museums: Critical Tensions Between Memory and Justice, Routledge.

Carter, President Jimmy (2007) Palestine Peace Not Apartheid, Scribner.

Carty, Anthony (2017) Philosophy of International Law, Second Edition, Edinburgh University Press.

Catsambis, Alexis, Ben Ford & Donny L. Hamilton Editors (2011) The Oxford Handbook of Maritime Archaeology, Oxford University Press.

Chalcraft, Jasper Into the Contact Zones of Heritage Diplomacy: Local Realities, Transnational Themes and International Expectations, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society (published online 05.01.2021).

Chechi, Allesandro (2014) The Settlement Of International Cultural Heritage Disputes, Oxford University Press.

Chomsky, Noam (2011) How The World Works, Hamish Hamilton.

Chomsky, Noam (2016) Who Rules The World?, Penguin Books.

Chomsky, Noam and Gilbert Achcar (2024) Perilous Power – The Middle East and U.S. Foreign Policy, Routledge.

Clack, Timothy & Mark Dunkley (2022) Cultural Heritage in Modern Conflict, Past, Propaganda, Parade, Routledge.

Clark, Christopher (2013) The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914, Penguin.

Cloke, Kenneth (2019) The Crossroads of Conflict – A Journey Into the Heart of Dispute Resolution,  Goodmedig Press.

Cook, Stephen A. & Martin S. Indyk (2022) The Case for a New U.S.-Saudi Strategic Compact, Council on Foreign Relations.

Coleman, Stephen (2012) Military Ethics: An Introduction with Case Studies, OUP USA.

Cox, Michael (2022) Agonies of Empire – American Power from Clinton to Biden, Bristol University Press.

Crooke, Alastair (2009) Resistance – The Essence Of The Islamist Revolution, Pluto Press.

Crawford, James & Martti Koskenniemi Editors (2012) The Cambridge Companion To International Law, Cambridge University Press.

Crawford, Emily & Alison Pert (2024) International Humanitarian Law Third Edition, Cambridge University Press.

Criddle, Evan J. & Evan Fox-Decent (2016) Fiduciaries of Humanity – How International Law Constitutes Authority, Oxford University Press.

Criddle, J., Evan Fox-Decent, Andrew S. Gold, Sung Hui Kim & Paul B.Miller (2018), Fiduciary Government, Cambridge University Press.

Criddle, Evan J., Paul B. Miller and Robert H. Sitkoff (2019) The Oxford Handbook of Fiduciary Law, Oxford University Press.

Crisp, Roger (2015) The Oxford Handbook of The History Of Ethics, Oxford University Press.

Davies, Stephen (2016) The Philosophy Of Art Second Edition, Wiley Blackwell.

Davis, Daniel, Lt.Col (2020) Eleventh Hour in 2020 America: How America’s foreign policy got jacked up – and how the next Administration can fix it, Independently published.

Dawkins, Richard (1995) River Out Of Eden, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Dawkins, Richard (1996) Climbing Mount Improbable, Penguin Books.

de Chazournes, Laurence Boisson, Marcello G. Kohen & Jorge E. Vinuales (2013) Diplomatic and Judicial Means of Dispute Settlement, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno (1981), The War Trap, Yale University Press.

Denza, Eileen (2018) Diplomatic Law – Commentary on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Oxford University Press.

Diesen, Glenn (2024) The Ukraine War & The Eurasian World Order, Clarity Press Inc.

Djefal, Christian (2016) Static and Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Cambridge University Press.

Drazewska, Berenika (2021) Military Necessity in International Cultural Heritage Law, Brill Nijhoff.

Dromgoole, Sarach (2014) Underwater Cultural Heritage and International Law, Cambridge University Press.

Duke, Annie (2018) Thinking in Bets, Portfolio Penguin.

Duke, George & Robert P. George Editors (2017) The Cambridge Companion To Natural Law Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press.

Durbach, Andrea and Lucas Lixinski (2019) Heritage, Culture And Rights – Challenging Legal Discourses, Hart.

Eldridge, Richard (2014) An Introduction to the Philosophy of Art, Cambridge University Press.

Erakat, Noura (2019) Justice For Some – Law and the Question of Palestine, Stanford University Press.

Escobar, Pepe (2024) Eurasia v. NATOstan, Nimble Books LLC

Espósito, Carlos and Kate Parlett, Editors (2023) The Cambridge Companion to the International Court of Justice, Cambridge University Press.

Esterhuyse, Willie (2012) Endgame: Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid, Tafelberg.

Failat, Yanal Abul (2022) Outer Space Law: Legal Policy and Practice 2nd ed, Globe Law and Business.

Feinstein, Andrew (2012) The Shadow World: Inside the Global Arms Trade, Penguin. 

Feltham, Ralph G. (1998) Diplomatic Handbook, Eight Edition, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Ferguson, Niall (2012) Civilization – The Six Killer Apps of Western Power, Penguin Books.

Ferguson, Niall (2021) Doom – The Politics of Catastrophe, Allen Lane.

Finkelstein, Norman G. (2018), Gaza – An Inquest Into Its Martyrdom, University  of California Press.

Fisher, Roger & Scott Brown (1988) Getting Together – Building Relationships As We Negotiate, Penguin Books.

Fisher, Roger, Elizabeth Kopelman & Andrea Kuper Schneider (1994) Beyond Machiavelli – Tools For Coping With Conflict, Penguin Books.

Fisher, Roger & Daniel Shapiro (2007) Building Agreement – Using Emotions As You Negotiate, RH Business Books.

Fleck, Dieter, Editor (2021) The Handbook of International Humanitarian Law 4th ed, Oxford University Press.

Francioni, Francesco and Ana Filipa Vrdoljak, Editors (2020) The Oxford Handbook of International Cultural Heritage Law, Oxford University Press.

Freeman, Jr, Chas.W (2005) Arts Of Power Statecraft and Diplomcay, United States Institute of Peace Press Wsahington D.C.

Freedman, Sir Lawrence (2013) Strategy – A History, Oxford University Press.

Freedman, Sir Lawrence (2022) Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine,  Allen Lane.

Fox-Decent, Evan (2011) Sovereignty’s Promise – The State as Fiduciary, Oxford University Press.

French, Duncan, Matthew Saul and Nigel D. White, Editors 2012) International Law and Dispute Settlement – New Problems and Techniques, Hart.

Fukuyama, Francis (2011) The Origins Of Political Order – From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution, Profile Books.

Fukuyama, Francis (2015) Political Order And Political Decay – From the Industrial Revolution to the Globalization of Democracy, Profile Books.

Fukuyama, Francis (2022) Liberalism And Its Discontents, Profile Books.

Fuller, Timothy (2024) Michael Oakeshott on the Human Condition: Essays by Timothy Fuller, Liberty Fund Inc.

Gardiner, Richard (2015) Treaty Interpretation, Oxford University Press.

Goodman, Andrew (2024) Advanced Mediation Advocacy, Mediation Publishing.

Goold, Benjamin J. & Liora Lazarus (2019) Security And Human Rights, Hart Publishing.

Gozzi, Gustavo (2019) Rights and Civilizations – A History and Philosophy of International Law, Cambridge University Press.

Grando, Michelle T. (2009) Evidence, Proof, and Fact-Finding in WTO Dispute Settlement, Oxford University Press.

Grant, Adam (2021) Think Again – The Power Of Knowing What You Don’t Know, Penguin Books.

Grayling A.C. (2017) Democracy and Its Crisis, Oneworld.

Gurtov, Mel (2020) America in Retreat: Foreign Policy under Donald Trump (World Social Change), Rowman & Littlefield (23 Sept. 2020).

Halberstam, David (1993) The Best and the Brightest, Ballantine Books.

Hansen Peo and Stefan Jonsson (2015) Eurafrica – The Untold History Of European Integration And Colonialsim, Bloomsbury.

Hazan, Pirre (2024) Negotiating with the Devil: Inside the World of Armed Conflict Mediation, C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Heather, Peter and John Rapley (2024) Why Empires Fall – Rome, America and the Future of the West, Penguin Books.

Herman, Alexander (2021) Restitution – The Return of Cultural Artefacts, Sotheby’s Institute of Art.

Herman, Alexander (2023) The Pathenon Marbles Dispute, Institute of Art & Law.

Herman, Edward S. and Noam Chomsky (1994) Manufacturing Consent, Vintage Books.

Hitchens, Christopher (2016) And Yet … Essays, Atlantic Books London.

Hollis, Duncan B. (2012) The Oxford Guide to Treaties, Oxford University Press.

Hughes-Wilson, Colonel John (2023) Military Intelligence Blunders, JB.

Indyk, Martin (2021) Master of the Game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy, Knopf Books for Young Readers.

Iverson, Jens (2021) Jus Post Bellum: The Rediscovery, Foundations, and Future of the Law of Transforming War into Peace, Brill Nijhoff.

Jackson, Miles (2015) Complicity in International Law, Oxford University Press.

Jackson, Robert and George Sorensen (2013) Introduction To Interntional Relations, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press.

Jackson, Robert, George Sorensen and Jorgen Moller (2019) Introduction to Interntional Relations theories and approaches, Oxford University Press.

Jervis, Robert (2017) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton University Press.

Jervis, Robert (2017) How Statesmen Think – The Psychology of International Politics, Princeton University Press.

Jones, Emily (2013) Negotiating Against The Odds – A Guide For Trade Negotiators From Developing Countries, palgrave Macmillan.

Kahneman, Daniel (2011) Thinking Fast And Slow, Allen Lane.

Kapuściński, Ryszard (2019) Imperium, Third Edition, Granta.

Karmi, Ghada (2023) One State – The Only Democratic Future for Palestine-Israel, Pluto Press.

Kennan, George.F (2012) American Diplomacy, The University of Chicago Press.

Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days – A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis, W.W. Norton & Company.

Khalidi, Rashid (2020) The Hundred Years’ War On Palestine – A History of Settler Colonial Conquest and Resistance, Profile Books.

Kim, Jihon (2022) Non-State Actors in the Protection of Cultural Heritage: An Analysis on Their Rights, Obligations, and Roles, Springer-Verlag.

Kissinger, Henry (1957), (2013 update) A World Restored – Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22, Echo Point Books & Media LLC.

Kissinger, Henry (2022) Leadership: Six Studies in World Strategy, Allen Lane.

Koffler, Rebekah (2022) Putin’s Playbook: Russia’s Secret Plan to Defeat America, Regnery Gateway.

Kolb, Robert (2016) Theory of International Law, Bloomsbury.

Kolb, Robert (2017) Peremptory International Law Jus Cogens – A General Inventory, Bloomsbury.

Kolb, Robert (2017) The Law Of Treaties, Edward Elgar.

Koopmans, Sven M.G. (2008) Diplomatic Dispute Settlement – The Use of Inter-State Conciliation, T.M.C Asser Press.

Koopmans, Sven M.G. (2018) Negotiating Peace – A Guide To The Practice, Politics, And Law Of international Mediation, Oxford University Press.

Laderman, Charlie and Brendan Simms (2017) Donald Trump – The Making Of A World View, I.B. Tauris.

Lafollette, Hugh (2010) The Oxford Handbook of Practical Ethics, Oxford University Press.

Lammy, David (2020) Tribes: A Search for Belonging in a Divided Society, Constable.

Lanovov, Victor (2019) Complicity and its Limits in the Law of International Responsibility, Hart Publishing.

Lane, David (2024) Global Neoliberal Capitalism And The Alternatives – From Social Democracy To State Capitalisms, Bristol University Press.

Lefebvre, Alexandre and Melanie White (editors) (2012) Bergson, Politics, And Religion, Duke University Press.

Lewis, Michael (2018) The Fifth Risk, Allen Lane.

Leroux-Martin (2014) Diplomatic Counterinsurgency – Lessons from Bosnia and Herzegovina, Cambridge University Press.

Levinger, Matthew (2013) Conflict Analysis – Understanding Causes, Unlocking Solutions, United States Institute of Peace.

Luttwak, Edward N (2016) Coup d’État: A Practical Handbook, Revised Edition, Harvard University Press; 2nd edition (8 April 2016).

MacIntyre, Alasdair (2001) Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Duckworth.

MacIntyre, Alasdair (2022) After Virtue, Bloosmbury.

MacGregor, Douglas (2023) Margin of Victory: Five Battles that Changed the Face of Modern War, Naval Institute Press.

Mair, Peter (2013) Ruling The Void – The Hollowing Of Western Democracy, Verso.

Malhotra, Deepak & Max H. Bazerman (2008) Negotiation Genius, Harvard Business School, Bantam Books.

Malhotra, Deepak (2016) Negotiating The Impossible – How To Break Deadlocks And Resolve Ugly Conflcts (Without Money or Muscle), Harvard Business School, Berrett-Kohler Publishers, Inc.

Malik, Kenan (2014) The Quest for a Moral Compass: A Global History of Ethics, Atlantic Books.

Malik, Kenan (2023) Not So Black and White: A History of Race from White Supremacy to Identity Politics, Hurst Publishers.

Martin, Mike (2018) Why We Fight, C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Martinez, Raoul (2017) Creating Freedom – Power Control And The Fight For Our Future, Canongate.

Masalha, Nur (2022) Palestine: A Four Thousand Year History, I.B. Tauris.

May, Larry (208) The Cambridge Handbook of the Just War, Cambridge University Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2014) The Tragedy Of Great Power Politics (Updated Edition), Norton.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2019) The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and International Realities (Henry L. Stimson Letures), Yale University Press.

Mearsheimer, John J. (2023) & Sebastian Rosato How States Think: The Rationality of Foreign Policy, Yale University Press.

Merrill, John and Eric De Brabandere (2022) Merrill’s International Dispute Settlement, Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, Thomas, Jose de Sales Marques & Marion Telo (2021) Towards a New Multilateralism – Cultural Divergence and Political Convergence?, Routledge.

Milton, Patrick, Michael Axworthy and Brendan Simms (2018) Towards A Westphalia for the Middle East,C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Mitchell J. George & Alon Sachar (2016) A Path To Peace – A Brief History of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations and a Way Forward in the Middle East, Simon & Schuster.

Mirzoeff, Nicholas (2015) How to See the World, Penguin.

Monbiot, George and Peter Hutchinson (2024) The Invisible Doctrine – The Secret History of neoliberalism (& How It Came to Control Your Life), Allen Lane.

Nafziger, James A.R. & Robert Kirkwood Paterson Editors (2014) Handbook on the Law of Cultural Heritage and International Trade, Edward Elgar.

Napolitano, Andrew P. (2023) Freedom’s Anchor: An Introduction To Natural Law Jurisprudence In American Constitutional History, Academica Press Washington-London.

Oakeshott, Michael (1991) Rationalism in Politics and Other Essays, Liberty Fund Inc; 2nd edition.

Oakeshott, Michael (2007) Lectures in the History of Political Thought (Michael Oakeshott Selected Writings), Imprint Academic.

Obama, Barack (2020) A Promised Land, Viking.

Odon, Daniel Ovo (2023) Armed Conflict and Human Rights Law: Protecting Civilians and International Humanitarian Law, Routledge.

Osthagen, Andreas (2022) Ocean Geopolitics: Marine Resources, Maritime Boundary Disputes and the Law of the Sea, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.

O’Keefe, Patrick J. (2014) Shipwrecked heritage – A Commentary On The UNESCO Convention On Underwater Cultural Heritage, Second Edition, Institute of Art & Law.

O’Keefe, Patrick J. (2017) Protecting Cultural Objects: Before And After 1970, Institute of Art & Law.

Olsaretti, Serena, Editor (2018) The Oxford Handbook of Distributive Justice, Oxford University Press.

Omand, David (2020) How Spies Think – Ten Lessons in Intelligence, Penguin Viking.

Omand, David (2023) How To Survive A Crisis – Lessons in Resilience and Avoiding Disaster, Penguin Viking.

Palmer, Michael and Simon Roberts (2020) Dispute Processes: ADR and the Primary Forms of Decision Making 3rd ed, Cambridge University Press.

Pappe, Ilan (2007) The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications.

Pappe, Ilan (2017) Ten Myths About Israel, Verso.

Pappe, Ilan (2024) Lobbying for Zionism on Both Sides of the Atlantic, Oneworld Publications.

Parampil, Anya (2024) Corporate Coup – Venezuella And The End Of US Empire, OR Books.

Parsi, Triti (2017) Losing an Enemy: Obama, Iran, and the Triumph of Diplomacy, Yale University Press.

Paterson, Robert J ‘Protecting Taonga: The Cultural Heritage of the New Zealand Māori’, 8 Intnl J. Cultural Prop. 108 (1999).

Peak, Thomas (2021) Westphalia From Below: Humanitarian Intervention and the Myth of 1648, C Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Peled, Miko (2016) The General’s Son: Journey of an Israeli in Palestine, Just World Books; Second edition.

Petric, Ernest (2013) Foreign Policy – From Conception to Diplomatic Practice, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Phillips, Christopher (2024) Battleground: 10 Conflicts that Explain the New Middle East, Yale University Press.

Pirie, Fernanda (2021) The Rule of Laws: A 4000-year Quest to Order the World, Profile Books.

Poundstone, William (1992) Prisoner’s Dilemma, Anchor Books.

Powell, Jonathan (2014), Talking To Terrorists – How to end armed conflicts, Vintage.

Powell, Jonathan (2011) The New Machiavelli – How to Wield Power in the Modern World, Vintage.

Ramsbotham, Oliver, Tom Woodhouse & Hugh Miall (2021) Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Fourth Edition, Polity.

Randolph, Paul (2016) The Psychology of Conflict, Bloomsbury.

Retter, Mark and Andrea Varga (editors) (2021) International Law and Peace Settlements, Cambridge University Press.

Reus-Smit, Christian & Duncan Snidal (2008) The Oxford Handbook of International Relations, Oxford University Press.

Rice, Condoleezza and Amy Zeggart (2018) Political Risk – How Businesses and Organisations Can Anticipate Global Insecurity, Weidenfeld & Nicolson.

Richmond, Oliver P. (2022)  The Grand Design: The Evolution of the International Peace Architecture, Oxford University Press USA.

Roberts, Sir Ivor (2018) Satow’s Diplomatic Practice, Seventh Edition, Oxford University Press.

Roodt, Christa (2015) Private International Law, Art and Cultural Heritage, Edward Elgar.

Ross, Dennis (2004) The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace,St Martin’s Press.

Rudd, Kevin (2022) The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict between the US and Xi Jinping’s China, Public Affairs.

Ruys, Tom and Nicolas Angelet with Luco Ferro, Editors (2019) The Cambridge Handbook of Immunites And International Law, Cambridge University Press.

Ryzov, Igor (2019) The Kremlin School Of Negotiation, Canongate.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2013) To Move The World: JFK’s Quest for Peace, Bodley Head.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2020)  A New Foreign Policy – Beyond American Exceptionalism, Columbia Uinversity Press.

Sachs, Jeffrey D. (2020)  The Ages of Globalization – Geography, Technology and Institutions, Columbia Uinversity Press.

Sakwa, Richard (2023) The Lost Peace – How the West Failed to Prevent a Second Cold War, Yale University Press.

Sassòli, Marco (2024) International Humanitarian Law – Rules, Controversies, and Solutions to Problems Arising in Warfare Second Edition, Edward Elgar.

Saul, Ben & Dapo Akande (2020) The Oxford Guide To International Humanitarian Law, Oxford University Press.

Shafer-Landau, Russ (2013) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Wiley-Blackwell.

Sheehan, Neil (1998) A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam, Pimlico.

Sheppard, Anne (1987) Aesthetics – An introduction to the philosophy of art, Oxford University Press.

Shinn, John P.  ‘A new world order for cultural property: addressing the failure of international and domestic regulation of the international art market’, 34 Santa Clara L.Rev 977 (1994).

Simpson, Moira Museums and restorative justice: heritage, repatriation and cultural education,  Museum International, Vol 61, No.1-2, 2009 (UNESCO Publishing and Blackwell Publishing Ltd).

Schopenhauer, Arthur and A.C. Grayling (2017) The Art Of Always being Right -The Subtle 38 Ways Of Persuasion, Gibson Square.

Shafer-Landau, Russ (2013) Ethical Theory – An Anthology, Wiley-Blackwell.

Shapiro, Daniel (2017) Negotiating the Non-negotiable, Penguin Books.

Shirk, Susan L (2022) Overreach: How China Derailed Its Peaceful Rise, OUP USA.

Shlaim, Avi (2014) The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World, Penguin.

Simms, Brendan and D.J.B Trim 2011) Humanitarian Intervention, Cambridge University Press.

Singer, Peter (1993) A Companion To Ethics, Blackwell Publishing.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie ‘Every day global governance’, 132 Daedalus 83 (2003).

Slobodian, Quinn (2018) Globalists – The End Of Empire And The Birth Of Neoliberalism, Harvard University Press.

Smith, Retired General Sir Rupert (2005) The Utility of Force – The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin Books.

Stamatoudi, Irini ‘Mediation and cultural diplomacy’, 61 Museum Int’l 116 (2009).

Stewart, Rory & Gerald Knaus (2012) Can Intervention Work?, W.W. Norton & Company.

Strasser, Freddie & Paul Randolph (2004), Mediation – A Psychological Insight into Conflict Resolution, Contunuum.

Stone, Douglas, Bruce Patton & Sheila Heen (2000) Difficult Conversations, Penguin Books.

Strasser, Freddie & Paul Randolph (2004), Mediation – A Psychological Insight into Conflict Resolution, Contunuum.

Strother, Grant ‘Resolving Cultural Property Disputes in the Shadow of the Law’,  Harvard Negotiation Law Review, 2014, Vol19:335.

Sumption, Jonathan (2019) Trials Of The State – Law And The Decline Of Politics, Profile Books.

Talbot, David (2016) The Devil’s Chessboard – Allen Dulles, The CIA, And The Rise Of America’s Secret Government, William Collins.

Tams, Christian J. & Antonios Tzanakopoulos (2012), Basic Documents on The Settlement Of International Disputes, Hart Publishing.

Tan, Floris (2023) The Duty to Investigate in Situations of Armed Conflict: An Examination under International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and their Interplay, Brill Nijhoff.

Tasioulas, John Editor (2020) The Cambridge Companion To The Philosophy Of Law, Cambridge University Press.

Thouless R.H. & C.R. Thouless (1930) Straight & Crooked Thinking, Hodder Education.

Tsagourias, Nicholas & Alasdair Morrison (2023) International Humanitarian Law – Cases, Material And Commentary, Second Edition, Cambridge University Press.

Turner, Catherine (Editor) & Mark Wahlisch (Editor) (2021) Rethinking Peace Mediation: Challenges of Contemporary Peacemaking Practice, Bristol University Press.

Urban, Mark (2016) The Edge – Is The Military Dominance Of The West Coming To An End?, Abacus.

Ury, William (1985) Beyond The Hotline – How We Can Prevent the Crisis that Might Bring On a Nuclear War, Houghton Mifflin Company.

Ury, William (1993) Getting Past No – Negotiating In Difficult Situations, Bantam Books.

Ury, William (1999) The Third Side – Why We Fight And How We Can Stop, Penguin Books.

Ury, William (2008) The Power Of A Positive No – How To Say No & Still Get To Yes, Hodder Mobius.

Ury, William (2015) Getting To Yes With Yourself, HarperOne.

Ury, William (2024) Possible – How We Survive (and Thrive) in an Age of Conflict, Harper Business.

Vincent, John and Sifu Julian Hitch (2019) Winning Not Fighting – Why you need to rethink success and how you achieve it with the Ancient Art of Wing Tsun, Penguin Business.

Vivet, Emmanuel Editor (2019) Landmark Negotiations from Around the World – Lessons for Modern Diplomacy, intersentia.

Voss, Chris with Tahl Raz (2016) Never Split The Difference – Negotiating as if your life depended on it, RH Business Books.

Ward, Alexander (2024) The Internationalists: The Fight to Restore American Foreign Policy After Trump, Portfolio. 

Walker, Stephen (2021) Mediation Behaviour – Why We Act Like We do, Bloomsbury Professional.

Walker, Stephen (2024) Digital Mediation, Bloomsbury Professional.

Weatherall, Thomas (2015) Jus Cogens – Interntional Law and Social Contract, Cambridge University Press.

Welsh, Jennifer (2016) The Return Of History – Conflict, Migration, and Geopolitics in the Twenty-First Century, Anansi.

Wilde, Ralph (2014) International Territorial Administration – How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went Away, Oxford University Press.

Yarwood, Lisa (2012) State Accountability under International Law – Holding states accountable for a breach of jus cogens norms, Routledge.

Zhong, Hui (2018) China, Cultural Heritage And International Law, Routledge.

Zwier, Paul.J. (2013) Principled Negotiation And Mediation In The International Arena, Cambridge University Press.