Contents:
- The idea of Geopolitical Mediation.
- Publications & Talks.
- Blogs [Scroll down to find].
‘Cultural Heritage Diplomacy/Mediation as a geopolitical tool of environmental protection.’
‘Concerted diplomacy is necessary to bring peace to Sudan.’
‘If a proxy war requires a proxy solution, then a proxy solution may also avoid a proxy war.’
‘Is the potential for “convergence” in MENA a geopolitical “pivot” upon which war can be avoided in the South China seas?’
‘Structuring as a tool of mediating peace?’
The Idea of Geopolitical Mediation
In my draft essay – ‘Transforming Conflict Through Humanitarian Mediation & Cultural Heritage Diplomacy’ (see ‘Humanitarian Mediation’ page of this website) I wrote, ‘Where a conflict is primarily the result of a “clash” of divergent values, the solution, i.e. peace, hinges upon evolving a method of convergence.’ On Tuesday, Professor Jonathan Fulton, gave a talk to the Centre for Geopolitics at Cambridge University about the ‘Geopolitical Challenges of China’s Growing Influence in the Gulf.’ During the talk, I wondered whether an opportunity exists for ‘convergence’ between US and Chinese interests in MENA, as a diplomatic tool (along with the participation of regional partners), for engineering stability and peace in the region? In his article, ‘China is trying to create a wedge between the US and Gulf allies. Washington should take note.’ (See the link above), Professor Fulton observes that ‘recent events indicate that leaders in Beijing are no longer satisfied with the logic of strategic hedging and are pursuing a more muscular approach to the Gulf’. On 9 May, Tong Zhao wrote an article in ‘Foreign Affairs’ – ‘How China’s Echo Chamber Threatens Taiwan,’ warning that, ‘the main factor that will determine whether Washington and Beijing come to blows over Taiwan is not necessarily Xi’s strategy for unification but the idiosyncrasies of China’s political system. The dynamics among China’s political leadership, its policy elite, and the broader public have generated an internal feedback loop that is not entirely within Xi’s comprehension or control. This could result in China’s being fully mobilized for war even without Xi deciding to attack Taiwan.’ (See link above). For ‘homoeostasis’ to re-assert itself and supplant the internal ‘feedback loop’ about Taiwan in ‘domestic’ and international policy making, is it possible to diplomatically engineer ‘convergence’ in MENA to: (i) bring about a re-orientation of China’s strategy in the region (i.e. so that US preponderance in MENA is not threatened); and (ii) generate economic and cultural benefits for China (i.e. through increased trade and cultural exchange with Europe and MENA) that will outweigh/’trump’ domestic political imperatives about reunification with Taiwan in the psychology of China’s political elite, i.e. because China can either prosper through Belt & Road or risk war? That is a question I will put at the forthcoming talk about ‘The Geopolitics of China’s Belt & Road Initiative and Western Focus’ on 16 May by Anoush Ehteshami (Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University): https://lnkd.in/e4bTe_Vz
The question I put at the talk was – ‘Is the potential for a strategic “convergence” of US and China’s competing interests in MENA – linked to Belt & Road, a geopolitical “pivot” upon which war can be avoided in the South China seas, i.e. because China can either prosper through Belt & Road or risk war in the South China Seas?’ For the answer listen to the answer to the second question in the Q&Q session in the recording – which I will post here when I receive it. In short, the US and China do have common strategic interests in MENA, which could be explored in a constructive dialogue e.g. about how to resurrect the JPOA and open the door to infrastructure investment in Iran, which is sitting on approximately 29.6 trillion cubic meters of proven gas reserves which accounts for 16% of the world’s total reserves. This places Iran behind Russia with the second largest gas reserves worldwide. Iran also has more mineral deposits than Russia, which could be mined and exported. Iran is also uniquely situated at the confluence of Europe, MENA, Central Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Therefore, if my Theory about ‘Convergence’ is intellectually robust, a ‘convergence’ of US and Chineese interests in MENA could:
- avoid war in the South China Seas/Taiwan, by enabling China’s economic expansion through BRI in MENA, i.e. if economic expansion can thereby overtake China’s domestic politics of reunification in the psychology of China’s leadership and political elite – as it did under Deng (which is why the West did not fear China’s rise);
- restore US-Iran relations, by opening the door to business through e.g. US/European/Chineese/Iranian commercial joint-venture infrastructure projects;
- bring peace, affluence, and stability througout the MENA region (and eventually throughout the continent of Africa?); and
- thereby curb migration i.e. if economic migrants from MENA/Africa, seek jobs where the money is in MENA, instead of migrating to Europe.
Note added 31.05.2023:
To hear the full answer given by Anoush Ehteshami (Professor of International Relations in the School of Government and International Affairs, Durham University) to my question – ‘Is the potential for a strategic “convergence” of US and China’s competing interests in MENA – linked to Belt & Road, a geopolitical “pivot” upon which war can be avoided in the South China seas, i.e. because China can either prosper through Belt & Road or risk war in the South China Seas?’ , click on the link to his talk on the ‘Geopolitical Challenges’ page under ‘Articles & Talks’ at the top. Then fast forward to the Q&A at 57:56 using the bar underneath the video.
See also:
Middle East/North Africa (MENA) | United States Trade Representative (ustr.gov)
‘Structuring as a tool of mediating peace?’
‘A common thread links many of our contemporary anxieties about the future, from authoritarian backsliding in Russia to corruption in India, to failed states in the developing world, to entrenched interest groups in contemporary American politics. It concerns the difficulties of creating and maintaining effective political institutions, governments that are simultaneously, powerful, rule-bound, and accountable. This might seem like an obvious point that any fourth grader would acknowledge, and yet on further reflection it is a truth that many intelligent people fail to understand . … There is in fact a curious blindness to the importance of political institutions that has affected many people over the years, people who dream about a world in which we will somehow transcend politics.’ (‘The Origins Of Political Order’, by Francis Fukuyama volume 1 (2011), pages 10 and 11. If this analysis is correct, then it follows that an instrument/tool for creating political order out of anarchy is institution building. ‘Liberal democracy is more than majority voting in elections: it is a complex set of institutions that restrain and regularise the exercise of power through law and a system of checks and balances. In many countries, official acceptance of democratic legitimacy was accompanied by the systematic removal of checks on executive power and the erosion of the rule of law. … There had been a broad assumption in the years following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 that virtually all countries were transitioning to democracy and that failures of democratic practice will be overcome with the simple passage of time. Carothers pointed out that this “transition paradigm” was an unwarranted assumption and that many authoritarian elites had no interest in implementing democratic institutions that would dilute their power.’ (Fukuyama, page 4). If a proxy war requires a proxy solution, then a challenge for mediators in a contemporary ‘Westphalian’ process, is to facilitate the design/structuring/engineering of a new ‘political order’, that results in a sustainable peace, which is secured/guaranteed by the ‘key stakeholders’ with the participation and consent of their ‘proxies’. In other words, in their ‘toolkit’ mediators need the ability to facilitate ‘structural’ thinking about institution building – which like any form of structuring, requires ‘imagination’. Democratic institutions cannot be parachuted onto a tribal society. While countries are not trapped by their pasts, in many cases things happened hundreds or even thousands of years ago which continue to exert a major influence on the nature of local politics. Therefore, in seeking to understand the functioning of contemporary institutions, a mediator needs to look at their origins and to understand the often accidental/contingent forces that brought them into being. See also – https://digitalcommons.lasalle.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1146&context=the_histories
See also: https://lnkd.in/enUueT7f – ‘Despite the above reservations, China retains clear strategic advantages and wherewithal in Sudan. It possesses strong political capital to work cohesively with the African Union, which has been fundamentally more responsive to Beijing than Washington over the past decade. When fully employed, Beijing’s long-term engagement, and active on-the-ground presence in Sudan can make a significant difference to the country’s desperate search for stability and transitional justice. The ball is now in China’s court to deliver upon its oft-touted vision of peace-making diplomacy.’